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This dissertation studies spatial resource competition settings where nomadic
agents migrate across different locations, competing for time-varying and
location-specific resources. Such setting arises in crowd-sourced transportation
services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activities.
In these settings, many factors influence the agents’ behavior: the resource dy-
namics, the way resource is shared among agents at different locations, the infor-
mation available to the agents, etc. Understanding agents’ behavior in equilib-
rium and how their decisions depend on these factors can help system operators
design better mechanisms to improve social welfare of systems.
Analyzing these settings systematically is challenging, since agents’ decisions
influence each other spatially and temporally in a complicated nested way. This
dissertation aims at building models that capture the essentials of spatial resource
competitions, and are analytically tractable, to help understand the nature of
agents’ interactions in these settings, from a game theoretical point of view.
We first provide a general model for spatial resource competition settings. Us-
ing the methodology of mean field approximation, we analyze the dynamics and
the game between the agents at a single location, in the limit where there are in-
finitely many locations. We characterize an equilibrium for agents in the mean
field model where agents’ equilibrium strategies have a simple Markovian struc-
ture.
We then provide a method to approximately compute the equilibrium for a
common case of resource competition where the amount of resource each agent
gets decreases as the number of agents competing with her increases. We study
numerically how different factors affect agents’ equilibrium behavior. We also
extend our model and analysis to more general settings where locations are non-
homogeneous and there is a two-sided market at each location.
Finally, we study information design problem in spatial resource competition
scenarios. That is, how should a system operator communicate her extra informa-
tion about the system to the agents in order to better position them and increase
their welfare? We study both private and public signaling mechanisms. For pri-
vate signaling, we provide a method to obtain the optimal mechanism in poly-
nomial time. For public signaling, we show the sender preferred equilibrium has
a simple threshold structure and characterize the structure of the optimal pub-
lic mechanism under the sender preferred equilibrium. We show via numerical
computations that the optimal private and public signaling mechanisms achieve
substantially higher social welfare compared with no information sharing or full
information sharing in many settings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Consider a setting where a group of nomadic agents explore and compete for
resources that are time-varying, stochastic and location-specific. Many real-world
scenarios fall into this setting. For example, in the sharing economy, such as the
crowd-sourced transportation services like Uber and Lyft, or the crowdsourced
food delivery services like GrubHub and DoorDash, drivers choose neighbor-
hoods to locate themselves and provide service. The payoffs they earn depend on
the number of customers requesting service within the neighborhood they choose
(the location-specific resource), and the number of other drivers working there.
The overall resource level varies stochastically as demand rises and falls, and the
payoff of a driver decreases as more drivers provide service in her neighborhood.
Examples of such setting also arises in more traditional scenarios. For example,
mobile food vendors need to decide where to locate their trucks; pastoralists need
to decide where to graze their livestock; and fishermen need to decide where to
fish. In these examples, the utility each of agent at their location (whether profit
from hungry passers by, or food for livestock provided by the range-land, or profit
from the catch) depends both on the number of other agents at the location, and
on the location’s stochastically varying resource level (the amount of grazeable
land for pastoralists and amount of fish for fishermen).
Online communities like Reddit and Twitch also fall into this setting, in which
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participants choose sub-communities or channels and then derive enjoyment de-
pending both on some underlying but transitory societal interest in the sub-
community’s topic of focus (the overall resource) and the number of other par-
ticipants in the sub-community. When the number of other participants is too
small, lack of social interaction prevents enjoyment; when the number of other
participants is too large, crowding diminishes the sense of community.
Finally, another example of this setting is the research community, where aca-
demics choose a research area in which to work and derive value based on the
underlying level of societal interest and funding in their chosen area, and in the
number of other researchers working in it. As with online communities, the num-
ber of other researchers should be neither too large nor too small to maximize the
value derived.
In each of these scenarios, the overall welfare of the system is determined by
how agents explore their domain to find and exploit resource-rich locations. This
willingness to explore in turn depends on the level of competition or co-operation
among agents at the same location, and the distribution of agents and resources
across locations.
Many interesting questions regarding this setting arise. How do agents make
decisions to position themselves and when should they choose to leave their cur-
rent location? How do the resource dynamics or the nature of interaction among
the agents at one location influence agents’ decisions? How does the social welfare
of all agents depend on those factors? When resource dynamics and the nature of
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sharing are different across locations, how does an agent choose her destination?
How should a system operator communicate her information about the state of
different locations to the agents in order to better position them and increase their
total welfare?
Answers to these questions enable a deeper understanding of such compli-
cated multi-agent systems. Moreover, in many spatial resource competition sce-
narios, there is a system operator, or a policy maker that can affect the resource
dynamics, the way resource is shared or the information that is available to each
agent. Examples include Uber or Lyft in the ride-sharing market, city regulators
in the market of local food trucks and government officials in the labor markets.
From a practical point of view, answering these questions systematically can help
system operators come up with better policies and mechanisms to improve the
social welfare.
However, these questions are not easy to answer. For each agent, her utility
depends on the choices of other agents in the system. Meanwhile, her choices also
affect the payoffs and decisions of agents at the same location, as well as agents
in other locations. On the other hand, the decision an agent makes at any point in
time not only affects her current payoff but also her future payoffs. Furthermore,
due to the stochasticity of resources and the dynamics at other locations, it is hard
for an agent to have a complete information of the state of other locations when
she decides whether to explore a new location. These issues together make it
challenging to characterize agents’ behavior in equilibrium in such a complicated
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system, or design mechanisms to alter the agents’ behaviors in the way a policy
maker anticipated.
This dissertation aims at providing insights to understand such spatial re-
source competition settings and answer the forementioned questions, by build-
ing models that capture the essentials of the underlying settings, and are tractable
to analysis. Below, we describe the structure of the rest of this dissertation and
provide an outline of the contents of each chapter.
In Chapter 2, we provide a general model that describes spatial resource com-
petition settings. This model comprises a group of agents and a number of lo-
cations. Each location is endowed with an independent stochastic resource pro-
cess. Each agent periodically derives a reward determined by the location’s re-
source level and the number of other agents there, and has to decide whether to
stay at this location or move. Upon moving, an agent arrives at a different loca-
tion whose dynamics are independent and identical to the original location. We
study the game among the agents in this model using mean field approximation
[1, 52, 10, 46], which is a useful tool for analyzing games in complicated systems
by approximating the effect of all other agents on any given agent with a single
averaged effect, conditioning on the system is in the limit where there is a large
number of agents. With mean field approximation, we provide a simpler model
with a single location that can be viewed as one representative location among
infinitely many locations. We study the equilibrium behavior of the agents in the
mean field model, as a function of the dynamics of the stochastic resource pro-
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cess and the nature of the competition among co-located agents. We show that an
equilibrium exists, where each agent decides whether to switch locations based
only on their current location’s resource level and the number of other agents
there. Additionally, we show that in the common case of resource sharing sce-
narios where an agent’s payoff is decreasing in the number of other agents at her
location, equilibrium strategies obey a simple threshold structure. We exploit this
structure and provide a method to approximately compute the equilibria numer-
ically, and use these numerical techniques to study how system structure affects
agents’ collective ability to explore their domain to find and effectively utilize
resource-rich areas. We conclude this chapter by applying our model to a case
study on how ride-sharing platforms could improve their drivers’ total welfare
by adopting different commission rates. The major contents of this chapter ap-
pears in [78, 77].
Our model in Chapter 2 provides a way to analyze general resource compe-
tition games. However, several important issues are ignored for convenience of
analysis. In Chapter 3, we extend our models to incorporate these issues and pro-
vide corresponding equilibrium analysis. Specifically, we consider three major ex-
tensions. First, we consider non-homogeneous locations and allow agents choose
their destinations strategically when switching. Second, we consider scenarios
where the resource at each location is not exogenous, but comes endogenously
from another set of agents. In these scenarios, there is a two-sided market at each
location, with buyers and sellers. The buyers are strategic and their dynamics may
depend on the number of sellers at each location through price and quality of the
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service. This extended model aligns closer to many resource competition settings
that involve matching markets. Finally, we explicitly model the service time for
the two-sided market extension, as such a model would better describe many real
world scenarios such as the ride-sharing setting.
Chapter 4 studies information design in spatial resource competition games. In
many spatial settings, agents do not observe the state of other locations. A prin-
cipal with such information would usually like to design an information sharing
mechanism to communicate her extra information to the agents, in order to bet-
ter position them and increase the social welfare. In this chapter, we consider
a model with two locations. The agents, gathering at the first location, do not
observe the resource state of the second location, while a principal has this infor-
mation. Each agent needs to decide whether to move to the other location. We
adopt the Bayesian persuasion framework [48, 64] and study the optimal signal-
ing mechanism design problem for the principal. We study both private signaling
mechanisms, which gives the principal more flexibility and may achieve a higher
social welfare, as well as public signaling mechanisms, which is not susceptible to
“information leakage”: agents share their private information, leading to unantic-
ipated behaviors. For private signaling, we show the optimal mechanism can be
computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of agents. Obtaining the
optimal private mechanism involves two steps: first, solve a linear program to get
the marginal probability each agent should be recommended to move; second,
sample the moving agents satisfying the marginal probabilities with a sequen-
tial sampling procedure. We also provide conditions on model parameters under
6
which recommending the agents to take the social optimal strategy profile is per-
suasive. For public signaling, we show the sender preferred equilibrium has a
simple threshold structure and the optimal public mechanism with respect to the
sender preferred equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. We support
our analytical results with numerical computations that show the optimal private
and public signaling mechanisms achieve substantially higher social welfare com-
pared with no information or full information benchmarks in many settings.
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CHAPTER 2
MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIA FOR SPATIAL RESOURCE COMPETITION
GAMES
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we develop a formal model to analyze the spatial-temporal com-
petition among agents and their equilibrium behavior. The model we study com-
prises a single location and a group of agents. This location represents one in a
large collection of locations between which the agents move. It has a resource
level that varies stochastically with time. Each agent at the location periodically
obtains a payoff whose amount is determined by the number of other agents cur-
rently at the location, and the location’s current resource level. Based on these
quantities, the agent then decides whether to stay at the same location or leave.
Upon leaving the agent receives a reward that represents the expected future dis-
counted payoff that would be obtained by moving to another randomly chosen
location in the system. The agents are fully strategic and seek to maximize the
total expected payoff over their lifetime.
Using the methodology of mean field equilibrium, we study the equilibrium
behavior of the agents in this system as a function of the dynamics of the spatial-
temporal resource process and the level of competition in the agents’ sharing
of a location’s resources. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for general
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resource-sharing functions. For the specific case where the resource-sharing func-
tion is non-increasing in the number of agents at the location, we further show that
the equilibrium strategy has a simple threshold structure, in which it is optimal
for an agent to leave a location when the number of other agents there exceeds a
threshold that depends on the location’s resource level. This result enables a sim-
ple description of equilibrium strategies, and allows us to efficiently compute an
equilibrium.
Using numerical analysis of a setting with two resource levels and decreasing
resource-sharing function, we investigate how the equilibrium welfare depends
on resource levels’ rate of change and the density of agents. Here, the equilibrium
welfare is the sum of payoffs earned across all agents in equilibrium, normal-
ized to the length of time over which these payoffs have accrued and either the
number of agents or the number of locations. Using this methodology we show
qualitatively different system behavior when the single-location welfare function
(the contribution to welfare from all agents at one location) increases with the
number of agents at the location as compared with when it decreases. Our ability
to derive these and other insights discussed in detail in Section 2.5 provide evi-
dence that our model and equilibrium notion lend themselves to analysis through
simple numerical methods. Specifically, our methodology presents a promising
approach to evaluate engineering interventions, such as providing subsidies to or
imposing costs on agents to promote or discourage exploration to improve wel-
fare.
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2.1.1 Related Work
This work contributes to the literature on mean field equilibrium [1, 45, 47, 52, 71],
that studies complex systems under a large system limit and obtains insights
about agent behavior that are hard to obtain from analyzing finite models. The
main insight behind this literature, that in the large system limit agents’ behav-
ior is characterized by their private state and an aggregate distribution of the
rest of system, has been used to study settings including industry dynamics and
oligopoly models [43, 71, 72], repeated dynamics auctions [10, 46], online labor
markets [5], queueing [58, 76], content sharing [55], and pedestrian motion [51],
among others. In these papers, the unit of analysis is a single agent’s decision
problem, assuming the behavior of all other agents together constitutes a mean
field distribution. In contrast, in our work, the unit of analysis is the game among
the agents at a single location, assuming that the behavior of agents and the re-
source level at all other locations constitutes a mean field distribution.
This work also contributes to the literature on spatial models of ride-sharing
and crowd-sourced transportation [11, 12, 19]. In this literature, the paper most
closely related to ours is [18], who consider a ride-sharing platform with a contin-
uum of riders and drivers spread across a finite network of locations, and study
how the platform should set origin-based prices to maximize profits. In particular,
the drivers’ decision of where, when, and whether to provide service is explicitly
modeled. The paper studies the impact of the underlying network structure of the
locations on the platform’s profits and consumers’ surplus, under the assumption
10
that the demand at each location is stationary. In contrast, in our model, the re-
sources at each location (analogous to demand) are stochastic and time varying.
However, in our model, agents decide whether to stay or switch from their current
location, and not which location to switch to.
Our model is also related to congestion games [63, 65], in which agents choose
paths on which to travel, and then incur costs that depend on the number of other
agents that have chosen the same path. One may view paths as being synonymous
with locations in our model, and observe that in both cases the utility/cost derived
from a path/location depends on the number of other agents using that path, or
portion thereof. The main difference between our model and congestion games
is the stochastic time-varying nature of our overall level of resource (making our
model more complex), and the lack of interaction between locations contrasting
with the interaction between paths (making our model simpler).
Another related strand of literature studies ecological models of metapopula-
tions in static and dynamic habitats [33, 34, 54, 61]. [49] consider a set of habitats,
arranged on a lattice, each containing a subpopulation of a species, and where the
landscape structure of each habitat is stochastic and dynamic. Using a mean-field
analysis, and through numerical simulations, the authors study the dependence
of persistence and extinction rates of the species across habitats as a function of
the rate of change of the landscape. In such models, the species dynamics are
exogenously specified, whereas we are interested in the equilibrium behavior of
agents.
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This work can be seen as an extension of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem
[24], a generalization of the El Farol bar problem [6, 25]. In this game, each agent
chooses (simultaneously) a restaurant to visit, and earns a reward that depends
both on the restaurant’s fixed rank, which is common across agents, and the num-
ber of other agents at that restaurant. This reward is inversely proportional to the
number of agents visiting the restaurant. The Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem
is studied both in the one-shot and repeated settings, with results on the limiting
behavior of myopic [24] and other strategies [40], although we are not aware of
existing results on mean-field equilibria in this model. The model we consider
is both more general, in that we allow general reward functions and allow a lo-
cation’s resource to vary stochastically, and more specific, in that our locations
are homogeneous. Our model also differs in that our agents’ decisions are made
asynchronously.
2.2 Model
The model we would study in this chapter and Chapter 3 has only a single loca-
tion, representing one among infinitely many locations among which the agents
move. Before we formally present this model, we first describe a model that has
a finite number of locations which captures the characteristics of general resource
competition scenario. We then present the single location model and describe the
connection between these two models, and illustrate why we choose to study the
12
latter.
2.2.1 The Finite System
Consider a system with a finite set of locations and a set of N agents. We denote
the set of locations as K . Each location k ∈ K contains a stochastic time-varying
resource. We use Zkt to denote the resource level at location k at time t ≥ 0. We
assume the resource process {Zkt : t ≥ 0} is a finite state continuous time Markov
chain, and further assume the resource processes across different locations in the
system are distributed identically and independently. We let Z denote the set of
values the resource process can take, and let µzy > 0 denote the transition rate
of Zkt from a state z ∈ Z to a state y ∈ Z. Furthermore, we make the assumption
that each process Zkt is irreducible and positive recurrent, with a unique invariant
distribution given by {pires(z) : z ∈ Z}.
Spread across this set of locations are N agents. Each agent may switch be-
tween locations in search for resources and less competition, as we detail below.
Each agent i is associated with a Poisson clock with rate λ, such that each time the
clock rings, the agent decides whether to stay in the location or switch to another
one. We refer to each clock ring of agent i as the agent’s decision epoch, and let τ`i
and k`i denote the time and location of her `
th decision epoch respectively.
We let Nkt denote the number of agents at the location k at time t. At each
decision epoch t = τ`i , the agent i at location k = k
`
i receives a payoff F(Z
k
t ,N
k
t ) that
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depends on the resource level Zkt and the number of agents Nkt at that location.
We refer to the function F as the resource-sharing function. We assume that the
resource-sharing function is non-negative, i.e., F(z, n) ≥ 0 for each z ∈ Z and n ≥
1. To avoid trivialities, we require that there exists a (z0, n0) such that F(z0, n0) >
0. Finally, to model the competitive nature of interaction among the agents, we
assume that as the number of agents at a location increases, the payoff an agent
receives approaches zero: limn→∞ F(z, n) = 0 for each z ∈ Z.
Subsequent to receiving the payoff, the agent i makes the decision whether
to continue staying at her location or move to a different location. On choosing
to move to a different location, agent i instantaneously arrives at a new location
k`+1i . We make the assumption that the new location k
`+1
i is drawn independently
and uniformly from the set of all locations other than the agent’s current location.
Note that this assumption precludes us from modeling an agent’s strategic choice
of which location to move to. Nevertheless, we make this assumption as, even
under this restrictive assumption, the analysis of the agent’s decision problem
turns out to be challenging. In Chapter 3, we provide extension and modification
of this model that relaxes this assumption and align closer to practical settings.
We assume agents in the system are short-lived: after each decision epoch τ`i ,
subsequent to making her decision regarding whether to stay in her current loca-
tion or move to a different location, the agent i departs the system independently
with probability 1 − γ, never to return, and we denote as τi the time she leaves
the system. We also assume for each agent that departs, a new agent arrives to
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the system at a location chosen uniformly at random, to maintain constant system
size, same as in the mean field model.
Finally, we describe the utility and the information structure of each agent in
the model. We assume that each agent i, at each time t, at her current location k,
observes the resource level Zkt and the number of agents Nkt . On the other hand,
the agent cannot observe the resource level and the number of agents at any other
location. We assume the agents have perfect recall, and hence, at any decision
epoch τ`i , agent i bases her decision to stay or move on the entire history (namely
the resource levels and the number of agents at each location she has visited) she
has observed until that time.
Given this informational assumption, each agent i is risk-neutral and wants
to maximize the total expected payoff accrued over her lifetime. Formally, each
agent i seeks to maximize
E
 ∞∑
`=1
F(Z`i ,N
`
i )I{τ`i ≤ τi}
 ,
where the expectation is over the randomness in the resource levels, the arrival
and departure process of the agents, and their (and their competitors’) strate-
gies. Since the departure of an agent is independent of the rest of the system,
it is straightforward to show that the agent’s expected payoff can be equivalently
written as
E
 ∞∑
`=1
γ`−1F(Z`i ,N
`
i )
 .
Thus, each agent i’s decision problem is equivalent to the decision problem faced
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by a persistent agent (who never departs the system) seeking to maximize her
total expected discounted payoff.
Since the payoff obtained by an agent at any location is determined by the
number of agents at that location, each agent’s decision to stay in her current lo-
cation or to move to a new one depends on all the other agents’ behavior. Conse-
quently, the interaction among the agents in this finite model is a dynamic game,
and describing the agents’ behavior requires an equilibrium analysis. Since the
agents are not fully informed about the resource levels at other locations, the
standard equilibrium concept to analyze the induced dynamic game is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). A PBE consists of a strategy ξi and a belief system µi
for each player i. A belief system µi for agent i specifies a belief µi(hit) after any
history hit over all aspects of the system that she is uncertain of and that influence
her expected payoff. A PBE then requires two conditions to hold: (1) each agent
i’s strategy ξi is a best response after any history hit, given their belief system and
given all other agents’ strategies; and (2) each agent i’s beliefs µi(hit) are updated
via Bayes’ rule whenever possible (see [38, 37] for more details).
A PBE supposes a complex model of agent behavior. Each agent keeps track
of her entire history, and maintains complex beliefs about the rest of the system.
While this behavioral model may be plausible in small settings, in large systems
an agent’s history may not contain too much information about the state of all
other locations, since the agent would typically only visit a small fraction of the
locations. In such settings, it is more plausible that each agent would base her
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decision to stay or switch solely on the current state of the location she is in —
specifically on its level of resource and congestion — and on the aggregate features
of the entire system. Moreover, we expect that an agent would prefer to stay at a
location with a high resource level and few other agents.
Below, we seek to uncover this intuitive behavioral model as an equilibrium
in large systems by letting the number of agents and the number of location both
increase proportionally to infinity, and studying the limiting infinite system.
As the number of locations and agents grows to infinity proportionally (with
the proportionality constant β > 0 defined as the agent density), it is reasonable to
suppose that the dynamics at any fixed finite collection of location is independent
asymptotically, and that the rewards experienced by an agent can be described by
modeling the dynamics at a single location and then supposing that upon leaving
that location the agent moves to another location whose dynamics are indepen-
dent and identically distributed, ad infinitum until her lifetime expires. Thus, to
analyze a large finite system, we posit a formal model for the dynamic of a single
location, and treat each agent who leaves this location as returning to an indepen-
dent copy.
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2.2.2 Formal Model of a Single Location in the Limiting Infinite
System
Here we state our formal model of a single location k. Let Zkt denote the resource
level at the location at time t ≥ 0 and assume the resource process {Zkt : t ≥ 0} is
a finite state continuous time Markov chain, with the same assumptions as in the
finite system.
We let Nkt denote the number of agents at the location k at time t. The stochastic
process (Zkt ,Nkt ) will evolve according to arrivals to this location, and the decisions
made by agents at this location. Toward that end, we suppose that new agents ar-
rive to this location according to a Poisson process with rate κ, and we describe the
agents’ decision process below. The rate κ models both arrivals of agents switch-
ing from other locations in a finite system, and new arrivals of agents to the system
following the exit of other agents from the system, but here it is taken to be an in-
put to the formal model of a single location, and below it is required to satisfy
consistency conditions in equilibrium.
Same as in the finite system, associated with each agent i at location k is a se-
quence of decision epochs {τli}∞l=1 that are separated by independent and identically
distributed exponential time elapses. At each decision epoch τ`i , the agent i at lo-
cation k = k`i receives a payoff F(Z
k
t ,N
k
t ) that depends on the resource level Zkt and
the number of agents Nkt at that location. The same assumptions on F are made as
in the finite system.
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We make the same modeling assumption on agents’ finite lifetimes: subse-
quent to receiving a payoff at time τ`i , with probability 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1), the agent’s
lifetime expires and the agent exits the system permanently. We refer to γ ∈ (0, 1)
as the survival probability, and each agent i can exist in the system for at most a
random time interval distributed exponentially with rate λ(1 − γ).
If the agent’s lifetime does not expire, then the agent i decides whether to stay
at her location or move. Agents are free to make this choice based on their his-
tory of past observations. If the agent stays, then the dynamics and payoffs de-
scribed above continue forward for another decision epoch. If the agent leaves,
then the agent is awarded a one-time payoff of Vsw > 0 and no subsequent pay-
offs. Here, Vsw is taken simply to be a constant input to our model for a single
location, and below it is required to satisfy a condition at equilibrium. This con-
dition corresponds to Vsw being the conditional expected payoff experienced by
an agent when moving to a new location whose current number of agents and
resource level is distributed according to the stationary distribution induced by
equilibrium agent behavior.
2.2.3 The Single-Location Decision Problem When Other Agents
Follow Markovian Strategies
Having specified the arrival process and agents’ decision process in a single loca-
tion, we are interested in characterizing a symmetric equilibrium among agents.
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For a given arrival rate κ and the switching payoff Vsw, the particular notion of
equilibrium we consider is a Markov perfect equilibrium [37], where in equilib-
rium, each agent finds it optimal to base her decision only on the current state of
the location at her decision epoch, and not on her past (although she is not re-
stricted from doing so). Formally, let S = Z×N0 denote the set of possible states of
the process (Zkt ,Nkt ). A Markovian strategy for an agent is a function ξ : S→ [0, 1],
where ξ(z, n) denotes the probability with which the agent chooses to stay if the
state of the location at her decision epoch is (z, n) ∈ S. (Note that ξ(z, 0) is not
well-defined; by convention, we let ξ(z, 0) = 1 for all z ∈ Z).
As a step towards formulating the game among the agents, we first study the
dynamics at a location when all agents in location k adopt a Markovian strategy ξ.
Given the arrival rate κ and the Markovian strategy ξ, the process (Zkt ,Nkt ) for any
location k evolves as a continuous time Markov chain on the state space S with
the following transition rate matrix Qξ,κ:
Qξ,κ ((z, n)→ (x,m)) = I{x , z,m = n}µz,x + I{x = z,m = n + 1}κ
+ I{x = z,m = n − 1}λn (1 − γξ(z, n))
− I{x = z,m = n}
∑
y,z
µz,y + κ + λn (1 − γξ(z, n))
 ,
(2.1)
where z, x ∈ Z and n,m ∈ N0. Here, the first term on the right-hand side represents
the transition in the resource level Zkt at the location, which is an independent
Markov chain with rates µz,x. The second term on the right-hand side represents
the arrival of an agent to the location k at rate κ. The third term on the right-
hand side represents the departure of one of the n agents from the location k.
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Such a departure can only occur at a decision epoch of one of these agents. At
any such decision epoch, an agent stays with probability ξ(z, n) times the survival
probability γ. Thus, with probability 1 − γξ(z, n), the agent leaves the location k.
Since there are n agents at the location, each of whose decision epoch occur at rate
λ, the total rate for a departure at the location is given by λn(1 − γξ(z, n)). Finally,
the last term on the right-hand side represents the rate of no transition. We denote
this continuous time Markov chain describing the dynamics of a single location,
where all agents adopt the Markovian strategy ξ and the rate of arrival of agents
is κ, by MC(ξ, κ).
Now, consider the decision problem faced by a single agent i at location k,
assuming all other agents (current as well as in future) at the location follow strat-
egy ξ. For any fixed switching payoff Vsw > 0, and arrival rate κ, the decision
problem faced by an agent i can be described as follows. As long as the agent
stays at location k, at each decision epoch τ`i , she receives a payoff F(Z
`
i ,N
`
i ), and
must choose whether to “stay” in location k or to “switch”. Also, irrespective of
this decision, the agent’s lifetime expires with probability 1 − γ. On choosing to
stay, with survival probability γ, the agent continues until her next decision epoch
τ`+1i . On choosing to switch, with survival probability γ, the agent immediately re-
ceives the switching payoff Vsw. From this description, it follows that the decision
problem facing an agent i in location k is an optimal stopping problem. Denote
this optimal stopping problem by DEC(ξ, κ,Vsw). In the following, we develop the
dynamic programming formulation of this problem.
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We begin by defining the value functions for the agent. Let V(z, n) denote the
value function of agent i at her decision epoch, prior to her making a decision or
receiving payoffs, given resource level z ∈ Z and the number of agents n ∈ N at
location k. Similarly, we let Vst(z, n) denote the continuation payoff of the agent at
her decision epoch, subsequent to her making the decision to stay and conditional
on her not leaving the system, given resource level z and the number of agents n
at location k. We have the following Bellman’s equation for the optimal stopping
problem DEC(ξ, κ,Vsw) faced by the agent:
V(z, n) = F(z, n) + γmax{Vst(z, n),Vsw}
Vst(z, n) = Eξ[V(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],
(2.2)
whereEξ[·|z, n] denotes the expectation with respect to the process defined by (2.1),
subject to (Z0,N0) = (z, n), and τ denotes the time of the first decision epoch of the
agent i. Here, the first equation follows from the fact that at the decision epoch, the
agent receives an immediate payoff equal to F(z, n), and has to make the decision
whether to stay or switch. Subsequent to the decision, the agent survives in the
system with probability γ. Upon choosing to switch and surviving, the agent
receives a continuation payoff equal to Vsw. On the other hand, upon choosing to
stay and surviving, the agent receives a continuation payoff equal to Vst(z, n). The
second equation relates Vst(z, n) to the expectation of the agent’s value function at
the next decision epoch.
For value functions V and Vst satisfying the Bellman’s equation (2.2), any opti-
mal strategy ξi for agent i chooses to stay if the resource level z and the number of
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agents n in the location satisfies Vst(z, n) > Vsw, to switch if Vst(z, n) < Vsw, and any
mixed action if Vst(z, n) = Vsw. We let OPT(ξ, κ,Vsw) denote the set of all optimal
strategies for the agent’s decision specified by (2.2). Specifically, for any Marko-
vian strategy ξˆ, we have ξˆ ∈ OPT(ξ, κ,Vsw) if and only if the following conditions
hold: ξˆ(z, n) = 1 if Vst(z, n) > Vsw; ξˆ(z, n) = 0 if Vst(z, n) < Vsw; and ξˆ(z, n) ∈ (0, 1) only
if Vst(z, n) = Vsw.
2.2.4 Mean Field Equilibrium
With the description of the model in place, we are now ready to formally define
the notion of equilibrium we focus on.
First, for any arrival rate κ and the switching payoff Vsw, we require the agents
play a Markov perfect equilibrium at the location k. In other words, we require the
strategy ξ to satisfy the following requirement: assuming all agents other than an
agent i follow the strategy ξ, the agent i maximizes her payoff (across all possibly
history-dependent strategies) by following the strategy ξ. This leads us to the
following condition:
ξ ∈ OPT(ξ, κ,Vsw). (2.3)
Now, suppose for a given κ and Vsw, a Markov perfect equilibrium ξ is be-
ing played at location k. Then, the dynamics of the location’s state are given by
MC(ξ, κ). Let pi(ξ, κ) denote the steady state distribution of this process. In particu-
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lar, for z ∈ Z and n ≥ 0, we let piz,n(ξ, κ) denote the probability that the location has
a resource level z and the number of agents n in steady state. (We drop the explicit
dependence of the steady state distribution on ξ and κ, when the context is clear.)
Thus, pi(ξ, κ) is an invariant distribution under Qξ,κ, and satisfies
∑
z∈Z
∑
n∈N0
piz,n(ξ, κ)Qξ,κ((z, n)→ (x,m)) = 0, for all x ∈ Z,m ∈ N0. (2.4)
Now, consider an agent arriving to the location k in steady state pi(ξ, κ). We denote
the total expected payoff that this agent receives over her lifetime on following
the strategy ξ by Varr. Using the definition of the value function Vst, we obtain
Varr =
∑
(z,n)∈S
piz,n(ξ, κ)Vst(z, n + 1).
Here, the right hand side is obtained by observing that after the agent arrives to
the location in state (z, n), which happens with probability piz,n(ξ, κ), the number of
agents at that location becomes n + 1, and the agent’s continuation payoff is then
Vst(z, n + 1).
Our second condition on equilibrium requires that the total expected payoff
Varr to an agent arriving at location k equals the total expected payoff an agent
at the location receives upon switching Vsw. Intuitively, we expect this condition
to hold in any symmetric equilibrium of a system with a large but finite number
of homogeneous locations, where agents choose whether to stay in their current
location or switch to a different location (chosen uniformly at random). In such a
model, the switching decisions of the agents will force the switching payoffs of all
populated locations to have the same value. Since our model of a single location
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does not endogenously capture these considerations, we impose this explicitly. In
particular, we require that the switching payoff satisfies the following equation:
Vsw =
∑
(z,n)∈S
piz,n(ξ, κ)Vst(z, n + 1). (2.5)
The final condition we impose on the equilibrium is a requirement on the ar-
rival rate κ. Again, intuitively, in a symmetric equilibrium of a large finite model
with homogeneous locations, we expect the expected number of agents at each
location to be the same, given by the agent density β > 0. To capture this in our
model, we require that for a given agent density β, the arrival rate κ satisfies the
following condition: ∑
(z,n)∈S
n piz,n(ξ, κ) = β. (2.6)
Given these three conditions, we are now ready to define a mean-field equilib-
rium:
Definition 1 (Mean field equilibrium). A mean field equilibrium (MFE) consists of a
strategy ξ, an arrival rate κ and a switching payoff Vsw satisfying (2.3), (2.5), and (2.6).
Note that, in comparison to a PBE, a mean field equilibrium adopts a fairly nat-
ural and a vastly simpler model of agent behavior. In a PBE of a finite model, an
agent’s strategy depends on the state of her current location, her history, as well
as her belief about the state of all other locations. Moreover, the agent constantly
updates this belief based on her observations of the arrival process at her current
location. For example, if an agent sees a high volume of arrivals at her current lo-
cation, her updated belief would attribute lower resource levels at other locations,
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thereby lowering her expected payoff for switching. Such complex considerations
do not arise in an MFE, where the payoff from switching is assumed to be fixed
and independent of the state dynamics of the current location. In a large market,
this assumption is reasonable, as the fluctuations in the empirical distribution of
the states of other locations are expected to cancel each other, analogous to a law
of large numbers result1.
In the next section, we show existence of a mean field equilibrium.
2.3 Existence of a mean field equilibrium
Below, we state the main result of the paper, proving the existence of an MFE for
general resource-sharing functions. Subsequently, in Section 2.4, we analyze the
structure and properties of a mean field equilibrium under specific assumptions
on the resource-sharing function. We have the following main theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1. For any λ > 0, β > 0 and {µz,y > 0 : z, y ∈ Z}, there exists a mean field
equilibrium (ξ, κ,Vsw), where ξ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and all large enough n.
The underlying argument behind the proof is to carefully construct a corre-
spondence R and show that the existence of a mean field equilibrium is equivalent
to the existence of a fixed point of R. The latter is obtained by an application of
Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem [2]. Here, we first sketch the steps involved,
1Proving this statement rigorously is an interesting direction for future work.
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and highlight the technical challenges in each of those steps. Using these interme-
diate results, we then provide the proof of Theorem 2.3.1. (The complete proof is
provided in Appendices A.1.1-A.1.6.)
1. We first show that for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, the
Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) has a unique invariant distribution pi satisfying (2.4).
This involves showing that the chain MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible and positive re-
current, which we accomplish by using coupling arguments to bound the
chain between two M/M/∞ queues. The proof of this result is provided in
Appendix A.1.1.
Denote the (unique) invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ) by pi(ξ, κ). In Ap-
pendix A.1.2, by applying Berge’s maximum theorem [14], we show that
the invariant distribution pi(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ).
2. Second, we establish that for any strategy ξ, there exists a unique value of
κ > 0, such that the invariant distribution pi(ξ, κ) satisfies (2.6). This result
is achieved by showing that the quantity
∑
(z,n)∈S npi(z, n), where pi = pi(ξ, κ) is
strictly increasing and continuous for κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] for any fixed ξ, and
using the intermediate value theorem. The proof of this result is provided in
Appendix A.1.3.
Let κ(ξ) denote the unique value of the arrival rate κ for which pi(ξ, κ) sat-
isfies (2.6). The first two steps together then define an injective map from
the strategy ξ to an arrival rate κ(ξ) and a steady state distribution pi(ξ, κ(ξ)),
such that pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) is the (unique) invariant distribution of the Markov chain
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MC(ξ, κ(ξ)), and satisfies (2.6).
3. Third, we consider the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw) for a given strategy
ξ and switching payoff Vsw. We let V(ξ,Vsw) denote the value function sat-
isfying the corresponding Bellman equation (2.2), and let Vst(ξ,Vsw) denote
the corresponding continuation payoff function. Finally, we let Varr(ξ,Vsw)
denote the right-hand-side of (2.5):
Vsw(ξ,Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
piz,nVst(z, n + 1),
where pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)), and Vst = Vst(ξ,Vsw).
In Appendix A.1.4, we show that these functions are uniformly bounded. In
particular, we show that there exists 0 < V ≤ V, such that for all Markovian
strategy ξ and Vsw > 0, we have the switching payoff Varr(ξ,Vsw) ∈ [V,V].
The proof of the uniform bounds makes extensive use of the strong Markov
property for the chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)).
4. Fourth, we let X(ξ,Vsw) denote the set of all optimal strategies for the agent’s
decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw). Note that X(ξ,Vsw) = OPT(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw). In
Appendix A.1.5, we identify a convex, compact set Π̂ of Markovian strate-
gies, such that if ξ ∈ Π̂, and Vsw ∈ [V,V], then X(ξ,Vsw) ⊆ Π̂. Let Υ = Π̂× [V,V].
5. Finally, we construct the correspondence R : Υ⇒ Υ defined as
R(ξ,Vsw) = X(ξ,Vsw) × {Vsw(ξ,Vsw)}
= {(ζ,Vsw(ξ,Vsw)) : ζ ∈ X(ξ,Vsw)} .
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We depict the map pictorially in Fig. 2.1. In Appendix A.1.6, we show
that the correspondence R is upper-hemicontinuous. This requires show-
ing the continuity of the value functions in (ξ,Vsw), which is achieved using
the continuity in ξ of the process MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) under the topology of weak-
convergence [35].
We then obtain the following proof for the existence of a mean field equilibrium.
Proof. The steps outlined above show that R is an upper-hemicontinuous corre-
spondence on a convex, compact subset Υ of a metric space, with values that are
non-empty and convex. From an application of the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point
theorem [2], we obtain that R has a fixed point, i.e., there exists (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ such
that (ξ,Vsw) ∈ R(ξ,Vsw).
Thus, by definition of R, we have ξ ∈ X(ξ,Vsw). This implies that ξ satisfies
(2.3) for the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw). Second, by definition of κ(ξ), we
obtain that the steady state distribution pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) satisfies (2.6). Finally, from Vsw =
Vsw(ξ,Vsw), we obtain that (2.5) holds. From this, we conclude that (ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw)
constitutes a mean-field equilibrium.

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ξ κ(ξ) pi(ξ, κ(ξ))
Vsw Vst(ξ,Vsw) Vsw(ξ,Vsw)
X(ξ,Vsw)
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the correspondence R(ξ,Vsw) = X(ξ,Vsw) × {Vsw(ξ,Vsw)}.
(Here single arrows denote functions, and double arrows denote correspon-
dences.)
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis for Decreasing Resource-Sharing
Functions
Having shown the existence of an MFE for general resource-sharing functions,
we now characterize the equilibrium strategy for the specific case, where the
resource-sharing function is non-increasing in the number of agents at the loca-
tion. Under this assumption, we show existence of an MFE in which the equilib-
rium strategies have a threshold structure. We then use this structural characteri-
zation in Section 2.5 to compute this MFE and analyze its welfare.
We define decreasing resource-sharing functions as follows:
Definition 2. We say that a resource-sharing function F is decreasing if F(z, n + 1) ≤
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F(z, n) for each z ∈ Z and all n ∈ N.
Decreasing resource-sharing functions appear when agents’ interactions are
competitive rather than cooperative. In section 2.5 we consider these three exam-
ples of decreasing resource-sharing functions.
• As a first example of a decreasing resource-sharing function, consider
F(z, n) = f (z)/n for some function f . This models settings where all agents
at a location equally share the resource there. In particular, given resource
level z at a location, the n agents at the location would collectively obtain
total payoffs at rate λnF(z, n) = λ f (z), a quantity independent of n. We refer
to the quantity W(z, n) , λnF(z, n) as single-location welfare function.
• Next, consider F(z, n) = f (z)/√n. Here, the agents collectively receive pay-
offs at rate λ
√
n f (z), which is increasing in n. While agents compete with
each other, the single-location welfare function increases with the number of
agents there.
• Finally, consider F(z, n) = f (z)/n3/2. This models extremely competitive set-
tings, where the single-location welfare function decreases with the number
of agents.
Before providing our result, we define threshold strategies. Formally, for x =
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(xz : z ∈ Z), where xz ∈ R+ for each z ∈ Z, define the threshold strategy ξx as follows:
ξx(z, n) =

1 if n < bxzc;
xz − bxzc if n = bxzc;
0 otherwise.
for each z ∈ Z and n ≥ 0. In particular, under strategy ξx, an agent, at her decision
epoch, will stay at her current location with resource level z ∈ Z if the number
of agents n at the location is strictly below bxzc; will switch to a different location
if n > bxzc; and will stay with probability xz − bxzc and switch with remaining
probability if n = bxzc. We say that a strategy is a threshold strategy if it is of this
form.
We now state our main result of this section.
Theorem 2.4.1. If F is a decreasing resource-sharing function, there exists an MFE
(ξ, κ,Vsw) where ξ is a threshold strategy.
The proof of the theorem makes essential use of the following lemma, which
states that with decreasing resource-sharing functions, the continuation values are
non-increasing.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let ξ be a Markovian strategy, κ > 0 and Vsw > 0. If F is a decreasing
resource-sharing function, then for each z ∈ Z, the continuation payoff Vst(z, n) for the
decision problem DEC(ξ, κ,Vsw) is non-increasing in n.
The proof of the lemma, provided in Appendix A.1.7, shows that the decision
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problem DEC(ξ, κ,Vsw) has a dynamic program that satisfies closed convex cone
properties defined in [66]. With the lemma in place, the proof of Theorem 2.4.1
follows from minor modifications of the argument in the proof of Theorem 2.3.1,
and is omitted.
2.5 Computation of MFE and Numerical Equilibrium Analysis
The implications of Theorem 2.4.1 are of substantial practical importance: when
the resource-sharing function is decreasing, the equilibrium behavior of the agents
can be fully described by |Z| non-negative real numbers {xz : z ∈ Z}. This parsi-
mony allows simple computational methods to numerically identify an equilib-
rium, especially when |Z| is small. We use this fact to analyze the equilibrium
numerically for several representative decreasing resource-sharing functions. We
first describe our approach for computing an equilibrium in more detail below.
2.5.1 Computation of MFE
To simplify notation in this section, we use x to denote the threshold strategy ξx.
Recall that an MFE is a fixed point of the correspondence R(x,Vsw) = X(x,Vsw) ×
Varr(x,Vsw). For any (x,Vsw), we define the distance metric distR as follows:
distR(x,Vsw) = |Vsw −Varr(x,Vsw)| + inf
y∈X(x,Vsw)
‖x − y‖2,
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where ‖ · ‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm. The second term on the right-hand side
denotes the distance between x and the setX(x,Vsw), which is compact and convex.
To find a fixed point of R, we identify a value of (x,Vsw) such that distR(x,Vsw) = 0.
We implement two relaxations to this exact problem. First, we consider an approx-
imation distR to the metric distR, obtained primarily by truncating the state space
to a finite set. Second, we perform an adaptive search method to find a (approx-
imate) minimizer of the function distR. We choose this approximate minimizer
as the value of the (approximate) MFE strategy and the corresponding switching
payoff. We describe the steps in detail below.
1. We truncate the state space S of the agent’s decision problem to SL = Z ×
{0, 1, · · · , L − 1} for some L ∈ N. For each x ∈ [0, L − 1]|Z|, we let MCL(x, κ)
denote the Markov chain obtained by restricting the transitions of the chain
MC(x, κ) to lie in the set SL, and let piL(x, κ) denote its steady state distribution.
For any x ∈ [0, L]|Z|, the distribution piL(x, κ) can be obtained by solving a set
of L · |Z| linear equations analogous to (2.4).
2. For any given x ∈ [0, L − 1]|Z|, we perform a binary search over the interval
[βλ(1 − γ), βλ] to find a value κ = κL(x) for which∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑z∈Z
L∑
n=0
npiz,n − β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1,
where pi = piL(x, κL(x)) and 1 > 0 denotes the tolerance level within which we
seek to satisfy (2.6).
3. For any given x ∈ [0, L − 1]|Z| and Vsw ∈ [V,V], we then consider the deci-
sion problem DEC(x, κL(x),Vsw) (with state space restricted to SL). We per-
34
form value iteration to compute approximate value functionsVst(x,Vsw) and
Varr(x,Vsw), where we iterate until Vst(x,Vsw) is within 0 > 0 (in sup-norm)
of the limit. Using these approximate value functions, we identify the set of
approximately optimal thresholds X(x,Vsw). Define distR by replacing Varr
and X in the definition of distR withVarr and X .
4. We seek to minimize distR(x,Vsw) over all values of x ∈ [0, L − 1]|Z| and
Vsw ∈ [V,V]. We use the Nelder-Mead neighborhood search method [62] to
find the minimizer of the distance function. To locate the global minimum,
we run the method in parallel with multiple initial values of x and Vsw, cho-
sen among a discretized set of threshold strategies ΠkL = {0, (L − 1)/k, 2(L −
1)/k, · · · , (k − 1)(L − 1)/k, L − 1}|Z| for some k ∈ N and a discretized subset of
[V,V] constructed in a similar way.
5. After obtaining (x∗,V∗sw) that attains the minimum of dist

R over all runs, we
do a validation check by comparing distR(x∗,V∗sw) with a threshold 2 to see if
this distance is close enough to 0 for (x∗,V∗sw) to be an equilibrium. We accept
(x∗,V∗sw) as an approximate MFE strategy and the corresponding switching
payoff if distR(x∗,V∗sw) ≤ 2. If the validation check fails, a larger k is chosen to
provide more fine-grained initial starting points until a maximum number
of iterations is reached. Although our method does not guarantee to find
an approximate equilibrium on terminating, in all our computations in sec-
tion 2.5.2, we obtain an approximate equilibrium with corresponding distR
smaller than 10−10.
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We also note that there may be multiple equilibria in our model for general
model parameters and resource-sharing functions; we have not shown unique-
ness. Such instances of non-uniqueness may arise, for example, when the
resource-sharing function is multimodal, as in those settings, coordination con-
cerns dominate, and an agent may prefer to stay at a location if other agents do so,
and prefer to switch if others switch. In such instances, the preceding numerical
procedure selects for a particular (approximate) equilibrium, and our compara-
tive statics results in the following section correspond to the equilibrium2 selected
by this algorithm.
2.5.2 Comparative Statics
In this section, we present the results of our numerical investigations of the agents’
behavior in a mean field equilibrium using the computational approach described
in the preceding section. We study the setting where Z = {0, 1}, with transitions
rates µ0,1 = µ1,0 = µ. As our model is invariant to proportional scaling of the
transition rate µ and the agents’ inter-epoch rate λ, we fix λ = 1. We set the survival
probability to γ = 0.95. We consider decreasing resource-sharing functions of the
form F(z, n) = zn−α, where α ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}. In this setting, some locations have
resource (those with z = 1) while others do not (z = 0), and the single-location
welfare function is increasing for α = 0.5, constant for α = 1, and decreasing for
2We conjecture that the equilibrium is unique when the resource-sharing function is decreasing
and the resource level is binary, the setting we study for comparative statics in Section 2.5.2. An
extensive numerical investigation supports this conjecture, but we do not have a formal proof.
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α = 1.5 in the number of agents there. Finally, our approximation scheme uses
parameters L = 200, k = 20, 0 = 10−4, 1 = 10−6 and 2 = 10−8.
In our computational study, we study how the model’s parameters influence
both agent behavior as quantified by the equilibrium thresholds and system effi-
ciency as quantified by the welfare per location. The welfare per location is defined
as the rate of total expected payoff obtained in equilibrium by all the agents at a
location in steady state. At a location with resource level z ∈ Z and n agents, the
total payoff rate to those n agents is given by W(z, n) = λnF(z, n). Since in steady
state, the state (z, n) is distributed according to the mean field distribution pi, the
agents’ welfare per location equals
WL = Epi[W(Z,N)] =
∑
z,n
λnF(z, n)piz,n.
We also analyze the welfare per agent, defined as the rate at which a randomly
chosen agent receives payoff in equilibrium. Since the agent density is equal to
β, the welfare per agent WA is given by WA = WL/β. When β is held fixed the two
welfare measures are proportional, and thus we study WA in addition to WL only
when we vary β.
Figure 2.2 shows how the equilibrium thresholds and the welfare per location
vary as the resource process changes more frequently, i.e, as µ increases, for a
fixed value of β = 20. For each resource-sharing function, for small values of µ,
the difference between the thresholds x1 and x0 is substantial. Since the resource
level changes slowly, an agent in a location with resource is willing to suffer sig-
nificant competition (in the form of other agents) before choosing to switch her
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location. Note that, as α increases, the level of competition at which agents switch
decreases, consistent with our observation that as α increases, competition be-
comes more severe. On the other hand, as µ increases, the difference in the two
thresholds diminishes. This is because increasing µ diminishes the benefit of stay-
ing in a location. As the resource levels change more frequently, the resource pro-
cess mixes more readily and thus future resource levels are less correlated with
current levels.
Figure 2.2 also shows that the welfare per location depends crucially on the
resource-sharing function. When the single-location welfare function increases
with the number of agents at that location (α = 1/2), the welfare per location de-
creases as resource levels change more frequently, i.e., as µ increases. In contrast,
when the single-location welfare function decreases with the number of agents
there (α = 3/2), the welfare per location increases as µ increases. To understand
this, observe that when µ is small, the thresholds x1 and x0 are well-separated,
implying that the agents will be concentrated in locations with positive resource
level. On the other hand, when µ is large, the two thresholds are similar, and
agents are more equitably distributed between locations with and without re-
source. When α < 1, the former distribution of the agents obtains more welfare
per location, since single-location welfare function is increasing with the number
of agents at a location with resource, and having more agents at these locations
increases welfare. On the other hand, when α > 1, the former distribution incurs
lower welfare per location due to severe competition among the agents at the loca-
tion with resource. (When α = 1, the distribution of the agents between locations
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium thresholds and welfare under different resource transition
rates µ, with agent density fixed at β = 20.
with or without resource does not substantially affect the welfare per location. In
particular, as long as a location with resource has at least one agent present, the
total payoff at that location is the same.)
Figure 2.3 shows equilibrium properties as a function of the agent density β
when resource levels change slowly (µ = 0.25). The difference between the thresh-
olds x1 and x0 widens as β increases for each resource-sharing function. This is
because increasing β for any fixed state (z, n) at the current location diminishes an
agent’s expected payoff from switching, since there are more agents to compete
against. Thus, when the current location has resource, the agents become more
likely to stay as β gets larger.
We further observe that, as β increases, the welfare per location increases when
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α = 0.5, decreases when α = 1.5, and is essentially constant when α = 1. As in Fig-
ure 2.2, this relation is explained by the equilibrium distribution of agents between
locations with and without resource, arising from the dependence of the equilib-
rium thresholds on β: as the difference between the two thresholds increases, the
welfare per location increases when α = 0.5, and decreases when α = 1.5. How-
ever, since the degree of competition increases as β increases, we observe that
irrespective of the resource-sharing function the welfare per agent decreases.
The preceding comparative statics reveals an important feature of our dynamic
model and its equilibrium that is lacking in a static analysis: our analysis cap-
tures the joint distribution of the agents and the resource levels across locations.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates this by showing that agents’ strategies change as the re-
source transition rate µ changes. In contrast, since all values of µ result in the same
steady-state proportion (50%) of locations in each resource state, a static analysis
that only tracks the stationary resource state distribution would generate the same
market outcomes for all values of µ. Furthermore, the welfare also changes with
µ for resource-sharing functions other than z/n, where the total payoff rate in a
location λnF(z, n) depends non-trivially on n. Such an effect would not materialize
in a static model which ignores the dynamics of the resource process and tracks
only the steady state.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium thresholds and welfare under different agent densities β.
WA is multiplied by 15 for all values. Note the resource transition rate is given by
µ = 0.25.
2.5.3 Case Study: Setting Platform Commission
In this section, we provide a case study to illustrate how our model can be used
to evaluate engineering interventions. Specifically, we apply our model to the
ride-hailing market in Manhattan. Ride-hailing platforms charge a commission
when they transfer rider payments to their driver partners, and consequently, the
drivers’ behavior in the market is influenced by this commission rate. In this
case study, we investigate how different commission rates affect the aggregate
revenue of the drivers and the platform (and how it is split between the two); the
outcome of this analysis provides a reference for platforms when an adjustment
of commission rate is under consideration.
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We view taxi drivers as agents, different neighborhoods of Manhattan as loca-
tions, and taxi trip demand as the resource in our model. We assume the drivers,
at the end of each day, decide for the next day whether to stay in the same neigh-
borhood or switch to another one. We also assume a driver makes this decision
based on the trip demand in his current neighborhood as well as his estimate of
the number of competing drivers in the same neighborhood.
Below we describe how the model parameters are estimated, and further de-
scribe the assumptions. We use the yellow cab trip records from the New York
City Taxi and Limousine Commission dataset [29] to estimate these parameters.
The data limitations prevent us from performing a full-blown analysis; in such
instances, we use our judgment to assign parameter values. We set the parameter
values as follows:
• Agent density β: We divide Manhattan into 12 regions, with the diameter of
each region approximately equal to the average taxi trip length in Manhat-
tan. The agent density is then estimated as β = 400 drivers per location, fol-
lowing an estimate of 4800 active taxi drivers, obtained by averaging across
different times of day.
• Resource process {µz,y}: We assume a resource model with binary states, with
0 denoting the typical resource state, and 1 denoting a high resource state.
Such a high resource may describe local conditions (such as local events,
weather patterns, etc) that temporarily lead to high demand for rides. To
estimate the transition rates between the two states, we use weather as a
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proxy, and estimate the transition between rainy and non-rainy days using
historical weather data from Manhattan [42]. This yields a transition rate
of µ0,1 = 1/3.86 and µ1,0 = 1/1.93, with units day
−1. These values are a rea-
sonable proxy for state transitions, indicating a high resource state approxi-
mately every 4 days, for a duration of about 2 consecutive days.
• Payment function F: Most ride-hailing platforms use dynamic pricing mech-
anisms to improve market efficiency, and such mechanisms can be designed
to increase the aggregate revenue with the number of drivers [23, 27], as
increased driver availability allows more trips to happen. However, at the
same time, higher competition among the drivers decreases the revenue re-
ceived by an individual driver. To model these aspects, we let the aggregate
revenue rate from riders at a location with resource state z and n drivers
equal n1−α f (z) for some parameter α ∈ (0, 1), where f (z) captures the depen-
dence on the resource state. This entails the revenue rate per driver to equal
f (z)/nα and hence the rate of payment to an individual driver in the location
takes the following form:
F(z, n) =
(1 − c(z)) f (z)
nα
, z ∈ {0, 1}, n ∈ N,
where c(z) denotes the (resource-dependent) commission rate charged by the
platform. For our analysis, we choose α = 0.5.
To estimate f (0), we use the average daily rider payment on non-rainy days
in Manhattan from [29], which yields an estimate of 1.2 × 104 dollars per
hour per location. We do not, however, estimate f (1) using rider payments
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on rainy days, since our data comes from yellow cab data with fixed prices,
whereas modern ride-hailing platforms typically increase price as demand
increases. We therefore assume the average total rider payment when the
resource is high (z = 1) to be 20% higher, and set f (1) = 1.2 f (0).
• Decision rate: We choose λ = 1 day−1.
• Survival probability: We choose γ = 0.995, indicating a planning horizon of
1/λ(1 − γ) = 200 days.
Assuming a baseline commission rate of 15% in both resource states, we inves-
tigate how the revenue of drivers and the platform would vary under a number
of commission rate scenarios. For each such combination of c(0) and c(1) (and
under parameter values described above), we numerically compute the resulting
mean field equilibrium in our model, and the driver and platform revenues in the
computed equilibrium. We share these results in Table 2.1. These results can be
used to access the magnitude of the impact, and to decide whether commission
should be raised in aggregate, or if it would be better to selectively raise it based
on demand (resource states). A table such as this could be shared with decision
makers as part of a larger decision process.
As discussed earlier, our dynamic model allows us to capture the joint distri-
bution of the drivers and the aggregate revenue across locations. The distribution
of the drivers across locations is important because it influences a driver’s payoff
upon switching, which influences her switching decisions. Our model enables us
to include this endogenous effect of the driver distribution on the drivers’ switch-
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c(0) c(1) DriRev ∆DriRev PlatRev ∆PlatRev AggRev ∆AggRev
0.15 0.15 26.121 - 4.610 - 30.731 -
0.175 0.175 25.353 -2.94% 5.378 16.66% 30.731 0.00%
0.15 0.20 25.504 -2.36% 5.219 13.20% 30.723 -0.02%
0.20 0.15 25.210 -3.49% 5.507 19.46% 30.718 -0.04%
0.2 0.2 24.584 -5.88% 6.146 33.32% 30.730 0.00%
Table 2.1: Here, c(z) is the commission rate at resource state z ∈ {0, 1}. DriRev,
PlatRev and AggRev denote the revenue (in units 105 dollars per hour) for drivers,
for the platform, and in aggregate, respectively. ∆DriRev denotes the change in
drivers’ revenue compared with the base case (c(0) = c(1) = 0.15), with ∆PlatRev
and ∆AggRev defined similarly.
ing decisions in evaluating different commission rates. Without the dynamics
(and the tractable equilibrium concept of a mean field equilibrium), such effects
would be hard to incorporate in a static analysis, rendering it incomplete.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, our analysis establishes that in equilibrium, the agents in our
model base their decision to explore solely on the state of the location they cur-
rently reside in, and on its steady state distribution. In particular, our results jus-
tify analyzing spatial-temporal models under simple yet optimal models of agent
behavior.
The spatial resource competition model in this chapter and analysis raise many
topics for future research, which we will discuss in details in Chapter 5. On the
modeling front, we have assumed that each location is homogeneous. In particu-
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lar, we assume the resource process is distributed independently and identically
across different locations. One consequence of this homogeneity is agents do not
choose their destination when they switch. One natural extension of our model is
to incorporate location heterogeneity and to let agents choose where to go strate-
gically when switching. Such a model would better align the settings we study.
In the next chapter, we will provide an extended model and corresponding equi-
librium analysis for system with non-homogeneous locations. On the other hand,
we assumed the resource process at a location is exogenous specified, and in next
chapter we will consider a variation our model that allows the “resource” being a
group of strategic customers whose dynamics may endogenously depend on the
number of agents at the location.
On the other hand, our work also sets the stage for analyzing engineering inter-
ventions and their economic impact in settings we study. In Section 2.5.3, we pro-
vide an example of one such intervention that involves altering the resource shar-
ing function at each location through subsidies or penalties to induce the agents to
stay in or switch from a location, thereby affecting their welfare. More extensive
studies could be undertaken that utilizes this model to help policy makers design
mechanisms.
A further question is whether sharing information about locations’ states
would benefit or harm the agents, and how such an information sharing mecha-
nism should be designed. Answers to these questions would help platforms such
as Uber or Airbnb to increase their efficiency. In Chapter 4, we would study the
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information mechanism design problem for spatial resource competition settings.
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CHAPTER 3
HETEROGENEOUS LOCATIONS AND TWO-SIDED MARKETS
In Chapter 2, we studied a model aimed to describe spatial resource compe-
tition settings. We assumed the resource process at each location is independent
and locations are homogeneous hence agents’ decision about which location to
move to was ignored. In many real-world spatial resource competition scenarios,
the resource dynamics across different locations can be significantly different, and
the agents usually take such difference into consideration when choosing where
to locate themselves. For example, in the ride-sharing setting, residential neigh-
borhoods and business districts have different demand patterns: the business dis-
tricts are usually much more busier in peak hours and have a larger demand vari-
ations across different times of day. Drivers usually take the different demand
pattern of each location into consideration when they choose where to provide
service. Furthermore, the way resource is shared among agents in one location
may also be different across different locations.
On the other hand, the resource is an exogenous Markov process in our model.
In many real-world scenarios, however, the resource may be provided endoge-
nously by a different set of agents. For example, in ride-sharing platforms such as
Uber and Lyft, the resource is the demand of rides provided by riders; in crowd-
sourced labor markets such as TaskRabbit, the resource is the demand for task
fulfillments provided by consumers. In these scenarios, each location has a two-
sided market with buyers and sellers. Applying our model to these settings, the
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exogenous resources assumption essentially implies that each buyer’s dynamic
is as simple as arriving at the market, making a purchase and then leaving the
market.
This independent and identical Markovian resource process assumption ig-
nores two important factors. First, in a two sided market, the buyers are usually
strategic and a buyer’s purchase decision depends on the price and the quality of
the service. The price and the amount of purchase in turn jointly affect the payoff
of sellers. An effective model for those scenarios should allow different pricing
mechanisms to affect the resource level and the resource sharing dynamics. Sec-
ondly, when we consider the social welfare of a two-sided market, we should take
both sellers’ and buyers’ welfare into consideration. Our current model only in-
cluded sellers’ welfare and it is not clear how to characterize buyers’ welfare in
this model. To better align to two-sided market settings, a model should allow us
to conveniently characterize buyers’ welfare as well as sellers’.
Finally, in our model we assumed the resource is derived instantly. However,
in scenarios such as ride-sharing, each service would take a period of time to
complete. In this chapter, we extend our model to take those important factors
into consideration.
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3.1 A Model with Heterogeneous Locations and Equilibrium
Analysis
In this section, we present a mean field model where each location is endowed
with a type drawn from a finite set of types, and the type determines the resource
process and the sharing function at this location, thus incorporating location het-
erogeneity into the model.
3.1.1 Model
We begin with a description of the finite system, which has a set of K locations
and N agents. Each location k now has a type θk coming from a finite set of types
Θ. We assume the type is drawn according to a distribution over types, and let
pθ denote the probability of type θ. The resource process {Zkt : t ≥ 0} at location k
evolves as a continuous time Markov chain whose state space Zθk and transition
{µθkzy : z, y ∈ Zθk} depends on the type of the location (without losing of generality,
we let Z = ∪θ∈ΘZθ). The resource-sharing function Fθk also depends on the type
of the location, and for each θ ∈ Θ, Fθ follows the same assumptions of resource-
sharing functions we made in Chapter 2.
The assumptions on agents’ decision epochs and exponential lifetimes remain
the same as in Chapter 2. However, unlike the homogeneous locations model,
at the end of a decision epoch of an agent i, if the agent chooses to switch to a
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new location, she first chooses a type θ ∈ Θ, and then uniformly selects a location
among all type-θ locations.
Similar to Chapter 2, we let the number of locations and number of agents
both increase to infinity, while the agent density β = N/K remain fixed, obtaining
a limiting infinite system. We also assume the type of each location is still drawn
from the distribution {pθ}θ∈Θ as the system grows to infinity. We assume the dy-
namics at each location decouple in the limiting system, and study a mean field
model where there is a single location for each type θ ∈ Θ, representing all type-θ
locations in the limiting system.
In the mean field model, for each type θ, agents arrive at the type-θ location
following a Poisson process with rate κθ, and this arrival flow models arrivals from
other locations as well as outside in the limiting infinite system. For each agent,
at each of her decision epoch, she observes a payoff Vθarr for arriving at the type-θ
location for each type θ. She then decides whether to switch to another location.
On choosing to switch, she obtains a one time payoff Vsw = maxθ∈Θ Vθarr and exits
the system. Vsw models the agent’s expected total future payoff on choosing a
location with type θ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ Vθarr and continues to stay in the system.
3.1.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We aim to characterize a symmetric equilibrium where all agents follow the same
strategy. We first characterize, for each type θ ∈ Θ, the Markov perfect equilibrium
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of a type-θ location with given arrival rate κθ and switching payoff Vsw, and then
provide consistency conditions for κθ and Vsw and define the mean field equilib-
rium.
Let Zt be the resource level and Nt be the number of agents at the location.
Consider the dynamics of Zt and Nt at the type-θ location where all agents adopt
the same Markovian strategy ξθ : Z×N0 → ∆([0, 1]), where ξθ(z, n) is the probability
an agent chooses to stay at the location when the resource level is z and number
of agents is n. Along with the arrival rate κθ, the process {(Zt,Nt) : t ≥ 0} evolves
as a continuous time Markov chain, denoted as MC(ξθ, κθ), with transition kernel
Qξθ,κθθ given as:
Qξθ,κθθ ((z, n)→ (x,m)) =I{x , z,m = n}µθz,x + I{x = z,m = n + 1}κθ
+ I{x = z,m = n − 1}λn (1 − γξθ(z, n))
− I{x = z,m = n}
∑
y,z
µθz,y + κθ + λn (1 − γξθ(z, n))
 .
(3.1)
The decision problem faced by a particular agent i when all other agents follow
strategy ξθ is an optimal stopping problem and we denote it as ˜DEC(ξθ, κθ,Vsw).
Let Vθ(z, n) denote the value function of agent i at her decision epoch prior to
making a decision and receiving payoffs, and let Vθst(z, n) denote the continuation
payoff on choosing to stay, given resource level z and number of other agents n.
The problem ˜DEC(ξθ, κθ,Vsw) is characterized by the following Bellman Equation:
Vθ(z, n) = Fθ(z, n) + γmax{Vθst(z, n),Vsw}
Vθst(z, n) = E[V
θ(Zτ,Nτ)|(Z0,N0) = (z, n); ξθ, κθ],
(3.2)
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where γ and τ has the same definition as in Chapter 2. We let ˜OPT(ξθ, κθ,Vsw) be the
set of best responses of the decision problem ˜DEC(ξθ, κθ,Vsw). The Markov perfect
equilibrium at the location given κθ and Vsw is then a symmetric Markov strategy
played by all agents that satisfies
ξθ ∈ ˜OPT(ξθ, κθ,Vsw). (3.3)
For a given κθ and {Vθarr}θ∈Θ, assume a Markov perfect equilibrium strategy ξθ is
being played. We denote the invariant distribution of the corresponding Markov
process MC(ξθ, κθ) as piθ(ξθ, κθ), satisfying∑
z∈Z
∑
n∈N0
piθz,n(ξθ, κθ)Q
ξθ,κθ
θ ((z, n)→ (x,m)) = 0, for all x ∈ Z,m ∈ N0. (3.4)
Let βθ be the number of agents in steady state of a type-k location (agent den-
sity), which is given as ∑
z∈Z,n∈N0
npiθz,n(ξθ, κθ) = βθ. (3.5)
We assumed the agent density remained fixed as β, and locations’ types still
follow the distribution {pθ}θ∈Θ as we obtaining the limiting system. Therefore, we
require the overall agent density equals the expected agent density with respect
to the location distribution: ∑
θ∈Θ
βθpθ = β. (3.6)
For each type θ ∈ Θ, the expected payoff of arriving at the type-θ location Vθarr
should be equal to the expected continuation payoff of staying at that location
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under the steady state:
Vθarr =
∑
z∈Z,n∈N0
piθz,n(κθ, ξθ)V
θ
st(z, n + 1). (3.7)
Since locations are not homogeneous, the arriving payoff for each type of lo-
cation may be different. Let Θ¯ , argmaxθ∈Θ Vθarr be the set of types whose arriving
payoff is maximal among all types. For any type θ ∈ Θ\Θ¯, agents in a system
with a large but finite number of locations would not choose type-θ locations as
destination on choosing to switch, and we call such locations as “abandoned lo-
cations”. Arrivals to an abandoned location comprises of only the new agents
from outside the system that lands at this location. In the finite system, the rate of
agents arriving from outside the system is equal to the rate of agents leaving the
system, and incoming agents choose their destination uniformly, hence the arrival
rate of new agents to a particular location is given as βλ(1 − γ). We then require
for all θ ∈ Θ\Θ¯, the arrival rate must satisfy κθ = βλ(1 − γ). On the other hand, for
locations that are not abandoned, the arriving payoff should equal the one-time
switching payoff Vsw, since Vsw models the total continuation payoff of switching
to a non-abandoned location. Summarizing the above argument, we require
(Vθarr − Vsw)(κθ − βλ(1 − γ)) =0, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
κθ ≥ βλ(1 − γ), ∀θ ∈ Θ,
(3.8)
and
Vsw = max
θ∈Θ
Vθarr. (3.9)
We then define the mean field equilibrium of a heterogeneous locations model
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as follows:
Definition 3. A mean field equilibrium is characterized by ({ξθ : θ ∈ Θ}, {κθ : θ ∈ Θ}, {βθ :
θ ∈ Θ}, {Vθarr : θ ∈ Θ},Vsw) that satisfies (3.9), (3.3), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8).
Our major results of the homogeneous location model carries through to this
extended model.
Proposition 1. If for all type θ ∈ Θ, the resource sharing function Fθ(z, n) is non-
increasing in n for all z ∈ Z, then for any type θ ∈ Θ, let ξθ be a Markovian strategy, κθ > 0
and Vsw > 0, the continuation payoff Vθst(z, n) for the decision problem ˜DEC(ξθ, κθ,Vsw) is
non-increasing in n for all z ∈ Z.
The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to that of Lemma 2.4.1 and we omit it.
Following this proposition, the threshold structure of the equilibrium strategy is
retained.
Theorem 3.1.1. If for all type θ ∈ Θ, Fθ(z, n) is non-increasing in n for all z ∈ Z, given any
λ > 0, β > 0, {µθz,y > 0 : z, y ∈ Z} for all θ ∈ Θ and type distribution {pθ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ ∆(Θ),
there exists a mean field equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem adopts the same general approach as that of the
homogeneous locations model, which constructs a correspondence whose fixed
point characterizes an equilibrium, and show the existence of a fixed point using
Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. The construction of the correspondence is
different from that of the previous chapter, so we provide a proof sketch in Ap-
pendix B, emphasizing these differences.
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3.1.3 Discussion
This model and the corresponding equilibrium analysis can be further extended
easily to allow agents from outside the system choose the type of their destination
to join not uniformly but according to a distribution over location types. We omit
the details of this extension.
Similar to the previous chapter, approximate equilibria of this model can be
computed via finding a fixed point of the correpondence using neighborhood
search methods. One could study numerically how different resource dynamics
and resource sharing functions at each location type affect the agent density and
the social welfare at each type of location. Such study would help, for example,
ridesharing platforms such as Uber and Lyft better design their spatial pricing
schemes.
3.2 A Model for Two-Sided Markets and Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we consider spatial resource sharing settings where there is a two-
sided market between buyers and sellers at each location. In this scenario, the
term “resource” is from the viewpoint of the sellers. The same service or goods
is provided at all locations. At each location, buyers come to the market, observe
the price of the service and make a one-time purchase decision based on the price
and the quality of the service, and then leave the market. The price is determined
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endogenously by supply and demand, or set by a system operator. If a buyer
decides to purchase, one of the sellers is chosen uniformly to provide the service
and is paid the price. Motivated by the ride-sharing setting, we assume the service
is not completed instantly, and the seller may be relocated to another location
after the service (and these assumptions can be simplified to allow instantaneous
service without relocation, and we omit the details). The sellers can move across
different locations to provide their service and they would always prefer locations
with higher volume of buyers and lower competition from other sellers.
We provide a formal model for the above setting in Section 3.2.1 and the cor-
responding equilibrium analysis in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Model
Consider a model with K locations and N sellers. At each location there is a two-
sided market with buyers and sellers. Buyers arrive at the location following a
Poisson process with rate φ. Each buyer i’s valuation of the service Ui is drawn
independently from a known distribution F. Upon arriving at the location, the
buyer is quoted a price p(n,m) ≥ 0 for the service, where n is the number of sellers
at the location ready to provide service, and m is the number of sellers at the
location who are currently serving other buyers, at the time the buyer enters the
market. The price can be interpreted as the market clearing price at this location.
We assume for any m ∈ N0, limn→∞ p(n,m) = 0 and for any n ∈ N0, limm→∞ p(n,m) =
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0.
The total utility of a particular buyer i depends on her valuation Ui ∼ F and a
disutility f (n) ≥ 0, which models the case where the service quality depends on
the number of available sellers n. The buyer would purchase the service if her total
utility is higher than the price. Let q(n,m) denote the probability of purchasing.
q(n,m) is given as
q(n,m) = P(U − f (n) ≥ p(n,m)) = 1 − F(p(n,m) + f (n)). (3.10)
We require f (0) = +∞ so when no seller is available at the location, the buyer
would not purchase. We also assume the price p and disutility f satisfies that
there exists n0,m0 ∈ N0 such that q(n0,m0) > 0 to avoid triviality.
If the buyer decides to purchase, among the n available sellers at the location,
each one is selected uniformly at random to serve the buyer. The selected seller
would get paid the price p(n,m). The service time is exponentially distributed
with rate τ > 0. Upon completing the service, the selected seller would stay in the
current location with probability η ∈ [0, 1] and be relocated uniformly at random
to another location with probability 1 − η. Each seller also decides periodically
whether she should switch to another location to provide service. Specifically,
each seller has an associated sequence of decision epochs, with exp(λ) intervals.
At each decision epoch, she exits the system permanently with probability γ, and
if not exiting, she decides whether to stay in the current location, or switch to
another location chosen uniformly at random.
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The mean field model has a single representative location. Sellers are idle and
available to provide service when not assigned to serve a buyer, and if gets se-
lected to serve, the seller becomes busy for an exp(τ) period. Upon service com-
pletion, with probability η the agent becomes idle and stays in the location; and
with probability 1− η, she switches to other locations, receiving a one-time payoff
Vsw, accounting for her total future payoff of being relocated to another location.
On the other hand, if an agent decides to switch in a certain decision epoch, she
also receives Vsw and switches.
New sellers arrive at the location following a Poisson process, accounting for
sellers completing service and joining this location, switching sellers from other
locations, as well as sellers from outside landing at this location. We assume the
average number of sellers in steady state is still exogenously given as β.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We first identify the Markov perfect equilibrium for the game between sellers at
the location, given an arrival rate of sellers κ and switching payoff Vsw. In a Marko-
vian equilibrium, each seller’s decision on whether to switch only depends on the
number of busy and idle sellers at the location at the decision time, and a Marko-
vian strategy is a function ξ : N20 → [0, 1] where ξ(n,m) denotes the probability to
switch when there are n idle and m busy agents. Let Nt and Mt be the number of
idle and busy sellers respectively at time t. If all sellers follow a Markovian strat-
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egy, (Nt,Mt) is Markov process, and we denote it as MC(ξ, κ), with the transition
kernel Qκ,ξ given as
Qξ,κ((n,m)→ (k, l)) =

nλ(1 − γξ(n,m)), k = n − 1, l = m;
κ, k = n + 1, l = m;
τ(1 − η), k = n, l = m − 1;
τη, k = n + 1, l = m − 1;
φq(n,m), k = n − 1, l = m + 1;
−nλ(1 − γξ(n,m)) − κ − τ − φq(n), k = n, l = m.
(3.11)
Here the first case corresponds to the event a seller’s lifetime expires and exits the
system or she decides to switch in a decision epoch; the second case corresponds
to arrival of an agent to this location, and upon arrival this agent becomes idle
and waits for service assignment; the third case corresponds to a seller completes
service and switches away from the location; the fourth case corresponds to a
service completion and the underlying seller stays in the location and becomes
idle again; the fifth case corresponds to an arrival of a buyer and she decides to
request a service. We let pi(ξ, κ) be the steady state distribution of MC(ξ, κ).
On the other hand, for each seller, at each of her decision epoch, assuming all
other sellers adopting a Markovian strategy ξ, the agent faces a decision problem
ˆDEC(ξ, κ,Vsw). Let V(n,m) denote her value function of this decision problem, and
Vst(n,m) denote her expected continuation payoff of staying at the location, when
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there are n idle sellers and m busy sellers at the location at this decision epoch.
V(n,m) is characterized by the Bellman equation:
V(n,m) =γmax{Vst(n,m),Vsw},
Vst(n,m) =E[V(Nδ,Mδ)|(N0,M0) = (n,m); δ ∼ exp(λ); κ, ξ],
(3.12)
where given (N0,M0) = (n,m), the distribution of (Nδ,Mδ) is determined by Qξ,κ.
Let ˆOPT(ξ, κ,Vsw) be the set of best responses of ˆDEC(ξ, κ,Vsw). The Markov
perfect equilibrium strategy is a Markovian strategy ξ such that
ξ ∈ ˆOPT(ξ, κ,Vsw). (3.13)
For consistency in the equilibrium, we require in steady state the expected
number of agents at the location equals β:
∑
n,m∈N0
(n + m)pi(n,m; ξ, κ) = β. (3.14)
We also require the expected continuation payoff for staying at the location, which
should equal the payoff of arriving at this location in a finite system with large
number of locations, to be consistent with the switching payoff:
Vsw =
∑
n,m∈N0
Vst(n + 1,m)pi(n,m; ξ, κ). (3.15)
A mean field equilibrium for this model is a Markovian strategy ξ, an arrival
rate κ and a switching payoff Vsw that satisfies (3.12), (3.13) and (3.15), and our
existence result carries through:
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Theorem 3.2.1. For any valuation distribution F, λ > 0, φ > 0, τ ≥ 0, β > 0, there exists
a mean field equilibrium.
The proof of this result is similar to the proof of the existence of mean field
equilibria for the original model, by constructing a correspondence whose fixed
point corresponds to an equilibrium, and show the existence of a fixed point with
Fan-Glicksberg theorem. We omit the details.
On the other hand, in many two-sided markets, the market clearing price de-
creases as supply increases. If we assume for any m ∈ N0, p(n,m) is non-increasing
in n and for any n ∈ N0, p(n,m) is non-increasing in m, with a similar argument as
that in the proof of Lemma 2.4.1, it can be shown the agents’ equilibrium strategy
has a threshold structure for both n and m. Specifically, the following proposition
holds
Proposition 2. If for for any m ∈ N0, p(n,m) is non-increasing in n and for any n ∈ N0,
p(n,m) is non-increasing in m, then the continuation payoff Vθst(n,m) for the decision
problem ˆDEC(ξ, κ,Vsw) is non-increasing in n for all m ∈ N0 and non-increasing in m for
all n ∈ N0.
3.2.3 Discussion
With Proposition 2, the dimension of the equilibrium strategy is reduced and we
can use similar methodology as in Section 2.5 to approximately compute a mean
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field equilibrium for given model parameters. We can further investigate numer-
ically, for example, how different pricing schemes affect the equilibrium of the
market, and how the equilibrium strategies change under different market dy-
namics: e.g., the buyer arrival rate, the service time and the relocation probability.
Such analysis enables this model to be applied in practical scenarios.
An important practical application of this model is to study how platforms or
system operators could set the prices p(n,m) in order to improve the social welfare
or other metrics of the system. In contrast to our previous model, this two-sided
model allows us to characterize both the sellers’ and the buyers’ welfare naturally.
When there are n idle sellers and m busy sellers at the location, upon a service
request, the buyer’s welfare is given as U − p(n,m)− f (n), and the seller’s utility is
the price p(n,m). Therefore, let W(n,m) be the social welfare including the welfare
of both the sellers and the buyers, when there are n idle sellers and m busy sellers,
we have
W(n,m) = φq(n,m)
(
EF[U |U − f (n) ≥ p(n,m)] − f (n)
)
,
and the social welfare per location in steady state is given as:
WL = Epi[W(N,M)] =
∑
n,m
φq(n,m)
(
EF[U |U − f (n) ≥ p(n,m)] − f (n)
)
pi(n,m).
This model can be extended to align with more general settings. For example,
in many real-world scenarios, the utility of the buyer and buyers’ arrival rate φ
may be different when exogenous environment changes, e.g., in the ride-sharing
setting, the ride demands and riders’ valuation of a ride may be different under
63
different weather conditions. This model can be extended to incorporate this sce-
nario. We may assume at each location, at time t, a state of nature Zt determines
the buyers’ arrival rate φ or buyers’ valuation distribution F, and Zt is a Marko-
vian process. In this case, the price of the service may also depend on the state of
nature z.
We can also include location heterogeneity in this model by letting the arrival
rate φ, the price function p and the buyers’ valuation distribution F be different
for different type of locations, and obtain a mean field model similar to what we
did in Section 3.1.1.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION DESIGN IN SPATIAL RESOURCE COMPETITION GAMES
4.1 Introduction
We study information design in the spatial resource competition settings, where
a group of agents migrate across a network of locations, competing for stochas-
tic time-varying resources at each location. This setting characterizes many real
world scenarios: on crowd-sourced transportation platforms, drivers migrate
across different neighborhoods of a city, competing for ride demands; in unskilled
labor markets, workers migrate across different cities for more job opportunities;
in nomadic animal husbandry, pastoralists migrate across different range lands,
competing for water and pastures, etc.
In these scenarios, information about other locations largely affects an agent’s
decision about whether to leave her current location, and where to explore. How-
ever, such information is usually limited or even unavailable to the agents. Mean-
while, in many cases, there is a principal who has access to more information than
any individual agent, e.g., platforms such as Uber and Lyft in the ride sharing
market, or the government agencies in labor markets, or non-profits in the case of
pastoralists. Using this information, the principal can influence the decisions of
the migrating agents, better locate them and improve the total social welfare. For
example, Uber and Lyft show the demand trend at different neighborhoods as a
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heatmap to the drivers [69] in order to locate them to areas with higher demands,
and government agencies provide information about employment and job open-
ings in various sectors.
However, sharing information may not always bring higher welfare, if the in-
formation is not released in a careful way: if a sports match or a concert at a sta-
dium is about to finish and Uber informs every available driver in the nearby area,
too many drivers may flood to this area, with many of them failing to find a cus-
tomer due to over-supply. In such cases, it might be wiser for the platform to only
inform a particular group of drivers to better match supply and demand. How
to choose such a group? More generally, spatial resource competition scenarios
typically exhibit negative externalities. In presence of such negative externalities,
how should a principal effectively communicate her information to the agents in
order to better position them?
Answering this question for a large network of locations is challenging: the
effect of a signal that attracts a group of agents to a particular location may perco-
late across the entire network through agents’ subsequent migration. On the other
hand, signals can take very complicated forms in large networks, depending on
many factors, including the number of locations and agents, the dynamics at each
location, and the agents’ belief about the state of the system and other agents’
strategies. With the goal of obtaining insights to this spatial information design
problem while retaining a tractable analysis, we consider a two-location model,
which serves as a foundation for more complicated analysis.
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4.1.1 Overview of Model and Main Results
We consider a model with 2 locations, `0, `1, and N agents. Initially, all the agent
are at `0, and must decide whether move to `1, which has a stochastic resource. The
utility each agent receives upon moving to `1 depends on the stochastic resource
level at `1, as well as how many other agents move there. The agents do not know
the resource level at `1 while a principal can observe it. The principal would like
to design a mechanism to share this information to the agents in order to attract a
proper number of agents to move to `1.
We adopt the framework of Bayesian persuasion [48, 64] to study this informa-
tion design problem. The principal’s goal is to choose a signaling mechanism that
maximizes the expected social welfare, i.e., the total expected utility of the agents.
In this work, we consider both private signaling mechanisms, where the princi-
pal sends personalized signals to each agent privately, as well as public signaling
mechanisms, where the principal sends the same information to all the agents.
The standard approach using a revelation-principle style argument [16] to find
the optimal private signaling mechanism leads to a linear program in 2N vari-
ables, rendering the computation challenging. Instead, our first main result in
Section 4.3 characterizes a computationally efficient two-step approach to find the
optimal private signaling mechanism. First, we perform a change-of-variables
and instead of the signaling mechanism, we focus on the marginal probabilities
pik that an agent i is recommended to move to `1 along with k − 1 other agents,
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for each i and k. We show that the marginal probabilities {pik}i,k corresponding to
the optimal private signaling mechanism can be found by solving a linear pro-
gram in O(N2) variables. Then, we describe an efficient sampling procedure that
samples sets of agents according to the the optimal marginal probabilities {pik}i,k.
The optimal private signaling mechanism then asks the sampled set of agents to
move to `1 and the rest to stay at `0. Finally, we provide a condition on the model
parameters under which the optimal signaling mechanism has a simple threshold
structure and can be computed in O(logN) time.
Although private signaling mechanisms provide the principal more flexibil-
ity, a number of practical concerns often render private mechanisms infeasible
[32, 57, 22]. First, private mechanisms make the strong assumption of no ”infor-
mation leakage” among the agents, i.e., the agents do not share their personalized
information with each other. This assumption may easily fail in practice. Fur-
thermore, fairness considerations may prevent a principal from sharing different
information with different agents; a fair-minded principal may even seek to avoid
the semblance of providing conflicting information to different agents.
Owing to these reasons, in Section 4.4, we analyze the problem of finding the
optimal public signaling mechanism, where the principal shares the same infor-
mation with all the agents. To do this, we first characterize the equilibria of the in-
complete information game among the agents subsequent to receiving any public
signal. While the equilibrium set is quite complex, we show that for any common
posterior belief of the agents, the equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare
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has a simple threshold structure. Using this result, we show that the optimal pub-
lic signaling mechanism can be found as a solution to a linear program with O(N)
variables and constraints. Furthermore, we show that the optimal mechanism
only randomizes over two signals.
Finally, we numerically investigate the performance of the optimal private and
public signaling mechanisms, and show that these achieve substantially higher
social welfare than the no-information or full-information mechanisms.
The main point of departure of our work from past literature on information
design is the modeling of negative externality among the agents. Past work on
information design has focused mainly on settings with no externalities [32] or
settings where there is positive externalities among the agents [22, 21]. In such
settings, correlation among the agents’ choice of action is beneficial, whereas the
main challenge in our work is in de-correlating the agents’ actions. This is espe-
cially challenging under public signaling, where public signals naturally tend to
correlate the agents’ actions.
To conclude this section, we note that the our approach for finding the opti-
mal private signaling mechanism is not restricted to our model, but applies more
broadly to settings where an agents’ utility upon taking the action depends on the
number of agents who take that action. Thus, our results on the computation of
the optimal private signaling mechanism might be of independent interest to the
research community.
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4.1.2 Related Work
Our work focuses on information design in a resource competition scenario,
adopting the Bayesian persuasion framework. We briefly survey here the related
works on information design and Bayesian persuasion.
Information design problems on how a sender should persuade one or more
receivers date back to [41] and [59]. The two mainstream frameworks studying
this problem is the Bayesian persuasion framework, originating from [48, 64] and
the “cheap talk” model [28, 36], where the main difference is the former assumes
the signal sender has the power to commit to a particular information sharing
mechanism.
[48] studies the basic setting with one sender and one receiver. [39] consid-
ers a setting where multiple senders wish to influence one receiver. For the more
general “one sender, many receivers” setting, [8, 4, 32] considered the simplest
scenario: each receiver’s action imposes no externalities on other agents. [7, 8, 4]
characterize polynomial time computable optimal mechanisms when the sender’s
utility is supermodular or anonymous submodular. [32] provide an (1− 1/e) opti-
mal mechanism for general submodular sender utilities.
When agents’ payoffs depend on other agents’ actions, not too much about the
structure and computation of the optimal signaling mechanism has been explored
for general settings. However, a lot of work have studied various special cases.
[67] characterizes the optimal mechanism in two-agent and binary action settings.
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[4] provides polynomial time computable optimal mechanism for binary action
settings when the sender’s utility is supermodular, and similar result is given in
[22, 21]. Both works point out the optimal policy correlates recommendations to
take the positive action as much as possible. Our work considers resource compe-
tition settings where agents’ actions have negative externalities, and to the best of
our knowledge, is the first to study such settings.
Information design and Bayesian persuasion are studied in many other set-
tings, including voting [70, 3, 13], ad auction [9], online retailing [57, 30], bilateral
trade [15], advertising [26], security games [75], customer queues with delays [56],
Stackelberg competition between firms [74] and team formation [44], etc. A more
thorough review of this topic can be found in [31]. Beyond the one-time persua-
sion setting considered in most of the work we listed, several other works [20, 50]
considered the problem of sequentially persuading a group of agents.
4.2 Model and Preliminaries
4.2.1 Model
We consider a model with N agents, a principal, and 2 locations, denoted by `0
and `1. Initially, all the agents are at location `0. There is a stochastic resource at
`1, with the resource level denoted by θ. We primarily focus on the binary setting,
with θ ∈ Θ , {0, 1} capturing the presence or absence of a resource; our model can
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be extended to the case where Θ is a finite set. Without observing θ, each agent at
`0 independently decides whether or not to move to `1, where she obtains a utility
that depends on θ, as well as the number of other agents who also choose to move
to `1. In addition, we assume that each agent incurs a moving cost if she moves to
`1.
Formally, each agent i ∈ [N] simultaneously chooses an action ai ∈ {0, 1}, where
ai = 0 implies the agent chooses to stay at `0 and ai = 1 implies she chooses to
move to `1. Let a = (ai, a−i) denote the profile of actions chosen by all the agents,
and A , {0, 1}N denote the set of action profiles. Note that for any a ∈ A, the
number of agents that choose to move to `1 is given by n(a) =
∑N
i=1 ai. Then, for
any action profile a and any resource level θ, an agent i’s utility, Ui : Θ × A→ R, is
given by
Ui(θ, a) =

θ · F
(∑N
j=1 a j
)
− r(i), if ai = 1;
0, if ai = 0.
Here, F : [N] → R+ is the resource sharing function that determines how the
resource at `1 is shared among the agents at `1, and r(i) denotes agent i’s moving
cost. In particular, an agent i who chooses to move to `1 receives an utility of
θF(n(a)) from the resource, and incurs a cost r(i) for moving. Furthermore, we
have normalized the utility of staying at `0 to be zero. Without loss of generality,
we assume that r(i) is increasing in i, i.e., r(1) ≤ r(2) ≤ · · · r(N). For notational
convenience, in the following, we let r(0) = 0 and F(0) = F(1).
We make the following assumptions on the resource sharing function F:
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Assumption 1. The resource sharing function F(n) is decreasing and convex in n ≥ 1.
Furthermore, the total utility from the resource nF(n) is increasing and concave in n ≥ 0.
The first condition is meant to capture the fact that in most resource sharing
settings, the amount of resource each agent receives decreases as competition in-
creases, with the decrement diminishing with the level of competition due to mar-
ket saturation. On the other hand, the second condition captures the fact that as
the competition increases, the total level of resource available to the agents also
increases, albeit also at a diminishing rate. This is especially common in platform
markets, where the presence of more agents on side leads to better service quality
for the other side of the market, leading to more conversion.
4.2.2 Information structure
We assume that the principal and the agents hold a common prior belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ)
about the resource level θ, where µ(1) denotes the prior probability that θ = 1,
and µ(0) = 1 − µ(1). While the resource level θ is unobserved by the agents, we
assume that the principal observes θ prior to the agents’ choice of actions. The
principal’s goal is to communicate this information about θ to the agents prior to
their moving decision, in order to better position them at the two locations. (We
describe the principal’s objectives in more detail below.)
Following the methodology of Bayesian persuasion, the principal commits to
73
a signaling mechanism as a means to share information with the agents. Formally,
a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ) consists of a signal set Σ and a signaling scheme
φ : Θ → ∆(ΣN). Given a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ) and upon observing the re-
source level θ, the principal first chooses a signal profile s = (s1, · · · , sN) ∈ ΣN with
probability φ(s|θ) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the principal (privately) reveals the signal si to
agent i. In particular, si is not revealed to an agent j , i.
Note that φ(s|θ) denotes the conditional probability that the signal profile is
s, given the resource level is θ. In particular, we have
∑
s∈ΣN φ(s|θ) = 1 for each
θ ∈ Θ. Analogously, we define φ(θ, s) = µ(θ)φ(θ|s) to be the unconditional joint
probability that the signal profile is s and the resource level is θ. Finally, we let φ(s)
denote the probability of the principal selecting the signal profile s ∈ ΣN , given by
φ(s) = φ(0, s) + φ(1, s).
A special case of a signaling mechanism is a public signaling mechanism, where
the principal publicly announces the information about θ to all the agents. In other
words, the principal always shares the same information with all the agents. Such
public signaling can be captured by a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ) where φ(s|θ) = 0
for any s ∈ ΣN with si , s j for some i, j ∈ [N]. Finally, we refer to any signaling
mechanism that is not public as a private signaling mechanism.
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4.2.3 Strategies and equilibrium
Since an agent i does not have access to the signals of the other agents, she main-
tains a belief over both the resource level θ and the signals s−i of the other agents.
Upon receiving her signal si from the principal, the agent updates her belief using
Bayes’ rule, before deciding whether to move. Let qi(·|si) denote posterior belief of
agent i about the resource level and the signals sent to other agents, given by
qi(θ, s−i|si) = µ(θ)φ(si, s−i|θ)∑
θ′,s′−i µ(θ
′)φ(si, s′−i|θ′)
. (4.1)
A strategy pi : Σ → [0, 1] for agent i specifies, for each possible signal si, the
probability pi(si) with which she decides to move to location `1. Each agent, given
her posterior belief and the strategies p−i of the other agents, seeks to choose a
strategy pi that maximizes her expected utility. More precisely, given a signaling
mechanism (Σ, φ) and the strategies p−i of the other agents, the expected utility of
an agent i for moving to location `1 upon receiving a signal si is given by
ui(si,move, p−i) = Eqi[Ui(θ, ai = 1, a−i)|a−i ∼ p−i(s−i)],
Then, in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each agent i, upon receiving a signal si, decides
to move to `1 if her expected utility ui(si,move, p−i) is positive. We have the follow-
ing formal definition:
Definition 4. Given a signaling mechanism (Σ, φ), a strategy profile (p1, . . . , pN) forms
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE), if for each i ∈ [N] and si ∈ Σ,
pi(si) =

1 if ui(si,move, p−i) > 0;
0 if ui(si,move, p−i) < 0.
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(If ui(si,move, p−i) = 0, then pi(si) in[0, 1].)
As mentioned earlier, the principal’s goal is to choose a signaling mechanism
to maximize the expected social welfare. Formally, the social welfare W : Θ × A → R
is defined as
W(θ, a) , θ · n(a) · F(n(a)) −
N∑
j=1
a jr( j).
Here the first term denotes the total utility obtained by the n(a) =
∑N
j=1 a j agents
from the resource at `1, and the second term denotes the total moving costs in-
curred by the agents. We assume that the principal knows the agents’ moving
costs. Then, the principal’s decision problem is to choose a signaling mecha-
nism (Σ, φ) such that in a resulting Bayes-Nash equilibrium (p1, · · · , pN) among
the agents, the expected social welfare, given by E[W(θ, a)|ai ∼ pi(si), (θ, s) ∼ φ],
is maximized. In the next section, we study the problem of computation of the
optimal signaling mechanism and characterize its structure. Subsequently, in Sec-
tion 4.4, we analyze the related problem of optimal public signaling, where the
principal is restricted to sharing information via public signaling mechanisms.
4.3 Private Signaling Mechanism
From a standard revelation-principle style argument [48, 16], there exists a
straightforward and persuasive signaling mechanism that optimizes the expected
social welfare. In a straightforward mechanism, the principal makes an action
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recommendation to each agent, and if it is optimal for each agent to follow the
recommendation (assuming all others do so), then the mechanism is said to be
persuasive. Thus, to obtain an optimal private mechanism, it is sufficient to re-
strict our attention to persuasive straightforward mechanisms. This implies that
it suffices for the principal to determine the subset of agents to recommend to
move for each resource level.
For θ = 0, 1 and S ⊆ [N], let φ(S |θ) be the probability of recommending the set
S of agents to move to `1, given resource level θ. We abuse the notation to let
W(θ, S ) , θ|S |F(|S |) −
∑
i∈S
r(i)
be the social welfare when resource level is θ and agents in S move to `1. The
optimal signaling scheme φ is then obtained as solution to the following linear
program:
max
φ
∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(S |θ)W(θ, S ) (4.2)
s.t.
∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S :i∈S
φ(S |θ)(θF(|S |) − r(i)) ≥ 0, i ∈ [N], (4.3)
(LP.1)
∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S :i<S
φ(S |θ)(θF(|S | + 1) − r(i)) ≤ 0, i ∈ [N], (4.4)
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(S |θ) = 1, θ = 0, 1,
φ(S |θ) ≥ 0, θ = 0, 1; S ⊆ [N].
The first two sets of constraints ensure φ is persuasive: the first constraint states
that any agent i who is recommended to move to `1 must have non-negative utility
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for moving, whereas the second constraint states that any agent i who is recom-
mended to stay must have non-positive utility for moving. The other constraints
ensure that φ(·|θ) is a valid probability distribution for both θ = 0, 1. Note that this
linear program has O(2N) variables, and is computationally challenging. As a first
step towards simplifying the problem, we note the following lemma, which al-
lows us to only consider mechanisms that recommend all agent to stay at `0 when
θ = 0.
Lemma 4.3.1. For any persuasive mechanism, there exists another persuasive mechanism
that recommends every agent to stay at `0 when θ = 0, and achieves a higher social welfare
than the original mechanism.
We provide proofs of all results in Appendix C.1. Although Lemma 4.3.1 re-
duces the size of (LP.1) by half, this linear program is still computationally chal-
lenging. However, taking a closer look at each agent’s utility function, we notice
that each agent i’s payoff for moving when θ = 1 depends only on how many
other agents are moving. With this observation, we now consider an alternative
formulation of (LP.1).
Given a persuasive signaling scheme φ satisfying Lemma 4.3.1, i.e., φ(∅|0) = 1,
we define pik to be the joint probability, given θ = 1, that this signaling scheme
recommends k agents to move and agent i is among them, i.e.,
pik =
∑
S
φ(S |1) · I{i ∈ S , |S | = k}. (4.5)
The following lemma allows us to write the objective and persuasive constraints
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of (LP.1) in terms of p = {pik : i ∈ [N], k ∈ [N]}.
Lemma 4.3.2. The objective (4.2) of (LP.1) can be written as
µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik(F(k) − r(i)),
and the persuasive constraints (4.3), (4.4) can be written as
N∑
k=1
pik(F(k) − r(i)) ≥ 0, i ∈ [N], (4.6)
N−1∑
k=1
1k
N∑
j=1
p jk − pik
 (F(k + 1) − r(i))
+
1 − N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
p jk
 (F(1) − r(i)) ≤ µ(0)µ(1)r(i), i ∈ [N]. (4.7)
Our main result in this section shows the converse is also true: given p = {pik >
0 : i ∈ [N], k ∈ [N]} satisfying persuasive constraints (4.6) and (4.7), with a few
more linear constraints ensuring the pik’s are valid joint probabilities, there ex-
ists a persuasive signaling scheme φ satisfying Lemma 4.3.1 such that (4.5) holds.
Furthermore, there exists a polynomial time sequential sampling procedure that
samples the set of agents to recommend to move as per the signaling scheme φ.
Lemma 4.3.3. Assume p = {pik > 0 : i, k ∈ [N]} satisfies the persuasive constraints (4.6)
and (4.7). If p further satisfies
N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
i=1
pik ≤ 1, (4.8)
kpik ≤
N∑
j=1
p jk, k ∈ [N], i ∈ [N], (4.9)
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then there exists a persuasive signaling scheme φ such that φ(∅|0) = 1 and φ(·|1) satisfies
(4.5).
Note that if pik is the joint probability that k agents are recommended to move
to `1 and agent i is among them, then qk , 1k
∑N
i=1 pik is the probability that k agents
are recommended to move. Upon letting q0 = 1 − ∑Nk=1 qk, we note that (4.8) en-
sures {qk}Nk=0 is a valid probability distribution over {0, . . . ,N}. On the other hand,
qik ,
pik
qk
=
kpik∑N
i=1 pik
is the conditional probability that agent i is recommended to
move given there are k agents asked to move, and (4.9) ensures qik’s are valid
probabilities.
We briefly describe the sketch of the proof of Lemma 4.3.3, and omit the details
due to space limit. The main idea is that there exists a sampling procedure that
samples a set of agents such that for each i, k ∈ [N], pik is the probability that k
agents are sampled and agent i is among them. Specifically, this sampling proce-
dure first samples the size k′ of the output set according {qk}Nk=0. Following that,
given any k′ > 0, we adopt a sequential sampling subroutine presented by [68]
to sample k′ agents. This subroutine eliminates one agent from agents 1, . . . ,N at
each step, and ensures the probability a particular agent i still remains in the pool
after each step is either 1, or strictly less than 1 while proportional to pik′ . If (4.9) is
satisfied, when N − k′ agents are eliminated, the probability each agent i remains
in the output set is ensured by this subroutine to be qik, and the joint probability
that k′ agents are sampled and agent i is included is then pik′ . We briefly describe
the main flow of this subroutine in Appendix C.1.3 and omit its details and proof
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of correctness, and refer interested readers to [68]. We then let φ(·|1) be the prob-
ability distribution of the set sampled according to this procedure, and note that
φ(·|1) thereby satisfies (4.5) and the persuasive constraints.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, from Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.3,
to obtain the optimal private signaling mechanism, we first solve the following
linear program (LP.2) to obtain the optimal solution p∗.
max
pik:i,k∈[N]
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik(F(k) − r(i))
s.t.
N∑
k=1
pik(F(k) − r(i)) ≥ 0, i ∈ [N],
N−1∑
k=1
1k
N∑
j=1
p jk − pik
 (F(k + 1) − r(i))
(LP.2) +
1 − N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
p jk
 (F(1) − r(i)) ≤ µ(0)µ(1)r(i), i ∈ [N],
N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
i=1
pik ≤ 1,
kpik ≤
N∑
j=1
p jk, k ∈ [N], i ∈ [N],
pik ≥ 0, k ∈ [N], i ∈ [N],
After obtaining p∗, we sample the set of agents to recommend to move according
to the following procedure given in Algorithm 1. Let φ∗ be the persuasive signal-
ing mechanism corresponding to p∗ and Algorithm 1, as given by Lemma 4.3.3.
φ∗ must be feasible for (LP.1). Furthermore, the objective corresponding to φ∗ in
(LP.1) is equal to that of p∗ in (LP.2). Therefore φ∗ must be the optimal solution to
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(LP.1), and is the optimal private signaling mechanism.
Note that (LP.2) has N2 variables and N2 + 2N + 1 constraints, therefore can
be solved efficiently in polynomial time. The sequential sampling subroutine in
[68] takes at most N steps to sample the set of agents to move, and in each step
it takes polynomial time to determine which agent to eliminate. Therefore, the
entire process to obtain the set of agents to recommend to move under the optimal
private signaling mechanism can be completed in polynomial time.
Algorithm 1: Sampling the set of Agents to Move.
Input: p = {pik : i ∈ [N], k ∈ [N]}.
Output: S.
for k ← 1 to N do
qk ←
∑N
i=1 pik
k ,
q0 ← 1 −∑Nk=1 qk
Sample k′ according to {qk}Nk=0.
if k′ > 0 then
Sample k′ agents from all agents.
Let S be the set of sampled agents.
else
S ← ∅.
We summarize our main result in this section as the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. The optimal private signaling mechanism can be computed by first solv-
ing (LP.2), then sampling the set of agents to recommend to move according to Algo-
rithm 1.
To conclude this section, we provide an observation that under certain con-
ditions of modeling parameters, recommending the agents to follow the social
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optimal strategy profile is persuasive.
Let W˜(n) , nF(n) − ∑ni=1 r(i) be the social welfare when θ = 1 and the first n
agents move to `1. Since nF(n) is concave and r(i) is increasing in i, W˜(n) is also
concave in n. Let i∗ , max{i : i ∈ argmax0≤i′≤N W˜(i′)} be the largest maximizer
of W˜. In the following proposition, we show the strategy profile that all agents
staying when θ = 0, and the first i∗ agents moving when θ = 1, achieves the highest
social welfare among all strategy profiles, and we give a sufficient condition under
which recommending the agents to follow this strategy profile is persuasive.
Proposition 3. If µ(1) ≤ r(i∗ + 1)/F(i∗ + 1), then recommending all agents to stay when
θ = 0 and recommending the first i∗ agents to move when θ = 1 is an optimal persuasive
mechanism.
Remark. Note that r(i∗ + 1)/F(i∗ + 1) does not depend on µ. Thus, this propo-
sition gives an upper bound on µ(1) for achieving the maximum possible social
welfare using signaling mechanisms. In Appendix C.2 we compute this upper
bound for µ(1) under several typical families of resource sharing functions and
cost structures. Also, since W˜ is concave, computing for i∗ takes only O(logN)
time, reducing the computational time for the optimal mechanism substantially
compared with the general method.
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4.4 Public Signaling Mechanism
Having characterized the optimal private signals, we next consider the principal’s
problem under the restriction that the signaling mechanism be public. One reason
for studying this restriction is that private signaling makes strong assumptions of
no information leakage among the agents, an assumption that can easily fail in
practice. Public signaling by construction avoids this information leakage con-
cern. From a practical standpoint, restriction to public signaling can arise due to
fairness requirements, where the principal seeks to avoid the semblance of pro-
viding conflicting information to different agents.
A main technical difficulty in analyzing public signaling is the failure of the
revelation principle argument[48, 16]: it no longer suffices to optimize only over
on straightforward and persuasive public mechanisms. To overcome this diffi-
culty, we first note that in a public signaling mechanism, after any information
transmission from the principal, all the agents have a common belief about the
resource level θ, and participate in a Bayesian game under this common belief,
where each agent simultaneously chooses whether to move to `1. Thus, we begin
our analysis of public signaling mechanisms by first analyzing the structure of the
equilibria of this Bayesian game under any common belief of the agents.
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4.4.1 Equilibrium structure
Subsequent to receiving a public signal, let q ∈ [0, 1] denote the common belief of
the agents that θ = 1. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the subsequent game can be
represented by a strategy profile p = (p1, · · · , pN), where pi denotes the probability
that agent i chooses to move to `1. Our goal is to identify, for any common belief
q ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium profile that achieves the highest expected social welfare,
given by W(q, p) = qE[W(1, a)|a ∼ p] = qE[n(a)F(n(a))|a ∼ p] −∑i piri.
We first note that the set of equilibria of this game can be quite complex. First,
there can be a multiplicity of equilbria for any q ∈ [0, 1], as the following example
illustrates for an instance with 2 agents:
Example: Let N = 2, F(1) = 1, F(2) = 0.6, r(1) = 0.5 and r(2) = 0.6. For q ∈
[0, 0.5), the only equilibrium is p(q) = (0, 0). For q ∈ [0.5, 0.6), the only equilibrium
is p(q) = (1, 0). For q ∈ [0.6, 5/6], there are three equilibria: p1(q) = (1, 0), p2(q) =
(0, 1) and p3(q) = ((5q − 3)/2q, (10q − 5)/4q). For q ∈ (5/6, 1), there is a unique
equilibrium (1, 0) and for q = 1, there are two equilibria, (1, 0) and (1, 1).
Secondly, as the following proposition shows, the equilibria themselves have
very counterintuitive features, where if multiple agents randomize, then the one
with larger moving costs must move with a higher probability:
Proposition 4. For an equilibrium profile (p1, . . . , pN) under a common belief q, let
Imix ⊆ [N] be the set of agents who randomize: Imix , {i ∈ [N] : 0 < pi < 1}. For
any agent i, j ∈ Imix where i < j, it must be that that pi ≤ p j.
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While the preceding result goes counter to the intuition that agents with higher
moving cost should be less likely to move, it is explained by the fact that in order
for an agent with higher moving cost to be indifferent between moving and stay-
ing, it must be that she must find location `1 to be less competitive than the one
with the lower moving cost, which implies that the one with the lower moving
cost must move to `1 with lower probability.
Despite the complexity of the equilibrium set, one can nevertheless consider a
simple class of equilibria, namely the threshold equilibria, defined as follows:
Definition 5. For common belief q ∈ [0, 1], an equilibrium p = (p1, · · · , pN) is said to be
a threshold equilibrium, if there exists a t ∈ [0,N] such that
pi =

1, if i < dte;
t + 1 − dte, if i = dte;
0, if i > dte,
where dte is the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to t. We denote such an
equilibrium by (q, t).
In a threshold equilibrium (q, t), at most one agent randomizes between mov-
ing and staying. Furthermore, all agents i < dte move to `1, whereas all agents
i > dte stay at `0. Thus, threshold equilibria capture the intuition that agents with
higher moving costs should move with lower probability. Our first result shows
that, indeed, for any q ∈ [0, 1], there exists a threshold equilibrium. Before we
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state our result, we define the following quantities for any common belief q:
i(q) ,max{i ∈ {0, . . . ,N} : qF(i) − r(i) ≥ 0},
i(q) ,max{i ∈ {0, . . . ,N} : qF(i) − r(i) > 0}.
(4.10)
Note that qF(i) − r(i) denotes the expected utility of agent i for moving to loca-
tion `1, if all agents j < i move to `1 and all agents j > i stay in `0. Thus, i(q)
denotes the agent with the largest moving cost who strictly prefers to move to `1,
if all agents with smaller moving costs move, and those with larger moving costs
stay. Similarly, i(q) denotes the agent with the largest moving cost who does not
strictly prefer to stay, under similar choices of other agents. Moreover, since F(i)
is decreasing in i and r(i) is increasing in i, we have i(q) ≥ i(q) for any belief q. Fur-
thermore, since qF(0) − r(0) ≥ 0, we have i(q) ≥ 0 and hence [i(q), i(q)] ∩ [0,N] , ∅.
We have the following result:
Lemma 4.4.1. For any q ∈ [0, 1], and any t ∈ [0,N], (q, t) is a threshold equilibrium if
and only if t ∈ [i(q), i(q)].
The preceding lemma guarantees the existence of threshold equilibria. The
question then is how do threshold equilibria fare against other equilibria in terms
of their expected social welfare. The following result, our main theorem of this
section, establishes that for any common belief, the expected social welfare over
all equilibria is attained at a threshold equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4.1. For any common belief q ∈ [0, 1], the expected social welfare W(q, p)
under any equilibrium (q, p) is no more than that under the threshold equilibrium (q, i(q)):
W(q, i(q)) ≥ W(q, p), for any equilibrium p.
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The preceding theorem has the following implications: First, the expected so-
cial welfare is always maximized at a pure equilibrium (q, i(q)): no agent strictly
randomizes between moving and staying. Second, under the optimal public sig-
naling mechanism (Σ, φ), for any signal s and the induced common belief q ∈ [0, 1],
it must be that the resulting equilibrium among the agents is (q, i(q)). For other-
wise, one can always (publicly) recommend the agents to move to this equilib-
rium and improve the expected social welfare. In the next section, we use these
two facts to completely characterize the optimal public signaling mechanism as a
solution to linear program.
4.4.2 Optimal Public Signaling Mechanism
The results in the preceding section imply the following structure for the optimal
public signaling mechanism: For each θ, the principal (publicly) recommends the
threshold i number of agents to move to location `1, with the constraint that, under
the induced common belief q upon receiving the recommendation i, it must be the
case that i(q) = i. This follows from an argument similar to the revelation-principle
style argument for the private signaling mechanism, with the modification where
the condition i(q) = i plays the same role of the persuasive constraints. We omit
the details due to its similarity to that of the private signaling case.
Thus, the public signaling mechanism can be described by choosing the signal
set to be Σ = {0, · · · ,N} and φ : Θ → ∆(Σ), where φ(i|θ) denotes the probability
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that the principal recommends the first i agents to move to `1 when the resource
level is θ. The common belief upon sending a public signal s = i is then given by
qi = µ(1)φ(i|1)/(µ(1)φ(i|1) + µ(0)φ(i|0)). The equilibrium constraint is thus i(qi) = i
for each i ∈ Σ. Note that the definition of i(q) then implies that
qiF(i) − r(i) > 0 (4.11)
qiF(i + 1) − r(i + 1) ≤ 0. (4.12)
Finally, the expected social welfare is given by
∑
θ=0,1 µ(θ)
∑N
i=0 φ(i|θ)W(θ, i),
where W(θ, i) = θiF(i) − ∑ j≤i r j. Taken together, using the fact that qi =
µ(1)φ(i|1)/(µ(1)φ(i|1) + µ(0)φ(i|0)) and letting φ(θ, i) = µ(θ)φ(i|θ), we obtain the fol-
lowing LP in φ:
max
φ
∑
θ=0,1
N∑
i=0
W(θ, i) · φ(θ, i)
s.t. (F(i) − r(i)) · φ(1, i) − r(i) · φ(0, i) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,N};
(F(i + 1) − r(i + 1)) · φ(1, i) − r(i + 1) · φ(0, i) ≤ 0, for all i ∈ {0, · · · ,N − 1};∑
i=0,...,N
φ(θ, i) = µ(θ), φ(θ, i) ≥ 0, for θ = 0, 1, for all i ∈ {0, · · · ,N}.
(4.13)
In (4.13), the objective is the expected social welfare under φ. The first two sets
of constraints encode (4.11), ensuring that each signal i indeed induces the cor-
responding threshold equilibrium. (Note that since W(θ, i) is decreasing in i, the
strict inequality in (4.11) can be replaced by the weaker inequality without loss of
optimality.) The last constraints ensure φ(·|θ) is a valid probability distribution for
each θ. Note that the preceding LP has 2(N + 1) variables and 2(N + 1) constraints,
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and thus can be efficiently solved in polynomial time.
Remark. With a similar argument as that in [48], one can show the optimal
public signaling mechanism sends at most two signals with positive probabilities.
That is, the optimal public signaling mechanism randomizes over two thresholds,
with different weights for θ = 0 and θ = 1. Our results in this section can be
easily extended to allow for larger state space Θ, with cardinality any finite K. In
this case, the optimal public signal is the solution to a linear program with O(NK)
number of variables and constraints, and the optimal public scheme sends at most
K signals with positive probability.
4.5 Computational Results
In this section, we compare numerically the social welfare under the optimal pri-
vate and public signaling mechanisms with three benchmarks: the no-information
benchmark, the full-information benchmark, and the social optimal benchmark,
where all agents choose the social optimal action, that is, all agents stay when
θ = 0, and the first i∗ agents move when θ = 1 and i∗ is defined earlier as the
largest maximizer of W˜(n) = nF(n) − ∑ni=1 r(i). Note the third benchmark may
not be achievable through a signaling mechanism, but rather provides an upper
bound for the social welfare any signaling mechanism can generate.
We consider three different resource sharing function F(i) = 1/iα for α =
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(a) Constant costs: r(i) = 0.5r.
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(b) Linear costs: r(i) = 0.1ri.
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Figure 4.1: Social welfare of the optimal signaling mechanisms and the bench-
marks. x-axis is the cost coefficient r, and y-axis is the social welfare of different
mechanisms/benchmarks over social welfare under no information sharing. For
all cases, the total number of agents N = 20 and the prior is µ(0) = 0.2, µ(1) = 0.8.
0.2, 0.5, 0.9. The parameter α controls the curvature of the resource sharing func-
tion, representing different resource sharing scenarios. We consider three different
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cost structures, constant costs where r(i) = 0.5r, linear costs where r(i) = 0.1ri and
quadratic costs where r(i) = 0.02ri2, where r is the cost coefficient and we vary r to
represent different cost functions. We compute the social welfare of the optimal
mechanisms and the benchmarks for different resource sharing and cost functions
and plot the results in Figure 4.1.
Numerical results in Figure 4.1 show that the optimal private signaling mech-
anism generates a social welfare close to the social optimal benchmarks in most
cases, and the optimal public signaling mechanism also generates social welfare
higher than the full information or no information benchmark in most scenarios.
The benefit of private signaling is high when agents have similar costs, as illus-
trated by the subplots in the first column. [4] and [22] show that when agents’
actions have positive externalities, the optimal private mechanism should corre-
late the recommendations to take the positive action for every agent as much as
possible. Here in our setting where agents’ actions have negative externalities, a
different phenomenon is observed: private signaling de-correlates the agents’ rec-
ommendations and generates more expected social welfare compared to public
signaling where agents’ actions are more correlated.
In Proposition 3, we give an upper bound for µ(1) under which the social op-
timal benchmark is achievable via private signaling. We also study numerically
how much social welfare can be generated when this condition does not hold, by
considering different priors. We presents these results in Appendix C.3.
92
4.6 Discussion
We consider information design in a two location resource competition model.
For private signaling, we provide a method to compute the optimal mechanism
in polynomial time, and also characterize a condition of model parameters under
which the optimal mechanism has a simple threshold structure. For public signal-
ing mechanisms, we characterize the structure of the socially optimal equilibrium
and establish the form of the optimal public signaling mechanism. Numerical re-
sults show the optimal private and public signaling mechanisms increase the so-
cial welfare substantially compared with the no-information and full-information
setting.
Readers may have noticed that our method for obtaining the optimal private
signaling mechanism does not restrict to the resource sharing setting we are con-
sidering. In fact, it is applicable to all settings where the externality of each agent’s
action is anonymous (the utility of an agent depends only on how many other
agents are taking the same action, but not on which agents are taking this action).
Formally, for information design settings with binary action spaces where receiver
i’s utility has form fi
(
ai,
∑
j,i a j
)
and the sender’s utility has form f (
∑
i ai)+
∑
i gi(ai),
our method can be used to obtain the optimal private signaling mechanism in
polynomial time. Such utility functions can be found in many settings, for exam-
ple, in most voting settings where the sender does not differentiate across voter.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This dissertation studies spatial resource competition settings, with focus on
building models to capture various characteristics of these settings and studying
agents’ equilibrium behaviors in these models; as well as studying the role of
information sharing in these settings.
In Chapter 2, we present a model to describe general resource competition
settings. We use mean field appproximation to consider a single location model
whose dynamic represents that of any particular location in systems with large
of number of locations and agents. Our analysis and results for the mean field
model show that in equilibrium, the agents base their decision to explore solely
on the state of the location they currently reside in, and on its steady state dis-
tribution, justifying analyzing spatio-temporal models under simple yet optimal
models of agent behavior. In Chapter 3, we discussed several important exten-
sions of the original model and provided corresponding equilibrium analysis for
these extensions. Finally, to study information sharing in these settings, in Chap-
ter 4, we present a two-location model and study the optimal mechanism design
problem with this model. We provide polynomial time schemes to obtain the op-
timal private and public signaling mechanisms, and our method for computing
the optimal private signaling mechanism can be applied to more general settings.
Our models and analysis raise many questions for future research, beyond the
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ones we discussed in each chapter.
First, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we have used the methodology of mean
field approximation to analyze a single location in isolation (or a single location
for each type of location in Chapter 3), assuming the joint effects of the agents
in other locations are approximated by the mean field distribution. A natural
question is whether the resulting mean field equilibrium strategies constitute an
approximate equilibrium in a system with a large but finite number of agents and
locations. Such approximation results for mean field equilibrium have been ob-
tained in other contexts (see, for example, [1, 10, 46]). In the finite system, a single
agent visits multiple locations over her lifetime, inducing correlations among the
states of those locations. The analytical challenge in obtaining an approximation
result involves showing such correlations vanish as the system size increases, and
the dynamics of a location in the finite system approaches the dynamics of the
single-location in the mean field model in the limit. To overcome these challenges
and rigorously show whether and how the mean field equilibrium approximates
an equilibrium in a finite system provides theoretical guarantee of the effective-
ness of our model and is itself an interesting research problem.
We provided two extensions of our original model in Chapter 3. Many impor-
tant factors in various resource competition scenarios are still ignored and yet to
be considered. For example, agents may be heterogeneous and have different val-
uation of resources. Agents may compete for more than one resources that have
different dynamics. These settings are more complicated, and studying them may
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bring better insights to understant corresponding real world scenarios.
Going beyond our model in Chapter 4, in many spatial settings, there are more
than two locations. The form of signals and the action and belief structure of the
agents can be much more complicated. Fully solving the optimal signaling mech-
anism in such a system may be computationally intractable, while it is hopeful
heuristic mechanisms with theoretical guarantee or good empirical performance
on the social welfare generated may exist and is an interesting future research
path. Meanwhile, in most settings, agents migrate among locations so signaling
is not “one-shot” but rather a sequential and dynamic process, where signals sent
at a time impact the actions and beliefs of agents ever since hence affect signals
that should be sent later. The Bayesian persuasion framework does not extend
naturally to these settings. Building models and analyze such dynamic signaling
process is an important future path for better understanding real world spatial
signaling problems.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of invariant distribution of
MC(ξ, κ)
In this section, we show that for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0,
the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) has a unique steady state distribution.
Lemma A.1.1. For any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ ≥ 0, there exists a unique
steady state distribution for MC(ξ, κ) satisfying (2.4).
Proof. Fix a Markovian strategy ξ, and an arrival rate κ > 0. We prove the lemma
statement by showing that the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible and positive
recurrent. The fact that MC(ξ, κ) is irreducible follows straightforwardly from (2.1)
and the fact that the resource process is independent and ergodic. Thus, it only
remains to show that the chain is positive recurrent.
Let S0 , {(z, 0) : z ∈ Z} and define Tz(S0) is the first return time of the chain to
S0, given it starts at (z, 0):
Tz(S0) , inf{t > 0 : (Zt,Nt) ∈ S0, (Zs,Ns) < S0 for some 0 < s < t,
97
given (Z0,N0) = (z, 0)}.
In the following, we show that Tz(S0) has finite expectation for each z ∈ Z. From
this, using the ergodicity of the resource process, it follows that the return time
to a particular state (z0, 0) ∈ S0 also has finite expectation, and hence the chain is
ergodic.
To show that Tz(S0) has finite expectation, we use a coupling argument. Given
a Markov chain (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with (Z0,N0) = (z, 0), we construct a coupled
process N(1)t ∼ M/M/∞((1 − γ)λ, κ) with N(1)t = 0, as in the proof of Lemma A.1.19.
Define T˜z(0) to be the first return time to 0 of the chain N
(1)
t . From the construction
of the coupling, it follows that Nt ≤ N(1)t for all t ≥ 0, and hence Tz(S0) ≤ T˜z(0).
Thus, we have E[Tz(S0)] ≤ E[T˜z(0)]. The result then follows immediately from the
fact that an M/M/∞((1 − γ)λ, κ) queue is ergodic, and hence E[T˜z(0)] < ∞ for all
z ∈ Z. 
A.1.2 Joint continuity of the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ)
In the following, we show that the steady state distribution pi(ξ, κ) of the Markov
chain MC(ξ, κ) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous in its parameters. This conti-
nuity result will play an important role in subsequent results that constitute our
proof of existence of an MFE.
To prove the continuity of pi(ξ, κ), we adopt an approach similar to [53], where
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we characterize the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ) as a maximizer of a continu-
ous function, and apply Berge’s maximum theorem. Before we present the formal
argument, we specify the topologies (and the metric) we impose on the set of
Markovian strategies and the set of invariant probability distributions, and spec-
ify the continuous function Λ that we consider. First, we endow the state space
S = Z×N0 with the discrete topology. Let Cb(S) denote the set of bounded function
h : S → R. (Note that since we impose the discrete topology on S, any such h is
also continuous.) We endow Cb(S) with the sup-norm:
‖h1 − h2‖∞ , sup
(z,n)∈S
|h1(z, n) − h2(z, n)| , for h1, h2 ∈ Cb(S) (A.1)
Let Π ⊆ Cb(S) denote the set of Markovian strategies, with the topology induced
from Cb(S).
We letM(S) denote the set of finite signed measures on S, and we endowM(S)
with the weak topology, which is equivalent to the topology induced by `1-norm
since S is countable:
‖µ − ν‖1 =
∑
(z,n)∈S
|µ(z, n) − ν(z, n)|, for µ, ν ∈ M(S). (A.2)
Let Γ = {pi(ξ, κ) : ξ ∈ Π, κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ]} ⊆ M(S) denote the set of invariant
distributions (with the induced topology) for all Markovian strategies and arrival
rates. Let Γ denote the closure of Γ.
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For ξ ∈ Π, κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] and ν ∈ Γ, define Λ(ξ, κ, ν) as follows:
Λ(ξ, κ, ν) , −
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|(νQ)(z, n)| , (A.3)
where Q = Qξ,κ denotes the transition kernel of MC(ξ, κ), and νQ is defined as
(νQ)(z, n) =
∑
(y,m)∈S
ν(y,m)Q((y,m)→ (z, n)).
With the preliminaries in place, we are now ready to state the main lemma of
this section.
Lemma A.1.2. The map (ξ, κ) 7→ pi(ξ, κ) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous in (ξ, κ)
for ξ ∈ Π and κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
Proof. In Lemma A.1.3, we show that the set of distributions Γ is uniformly tight.
Then, from Prohorov’s theorem [17], we obtain that Γ is compact. Observe that
argmax
ν∈Γ
Λ(ξ, κ, ν) = {pi(ξ, κ)}. (A.4)
This follows from the fact that pi(ξ, κ) is the unique probability distribution over S
for which (2.4) holds.
In Lemma A.1.4, we show that Λ(ξ, κ, ν) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous
its parameters for ξ ∈ Π, ν ∈ Γ and κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ]. The result then follows from
a direct application of Berge’s maximum theorem [14] to (A.4).

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The following two auxiliary lemmas are used in the proof of Lemma A.1.2.
Lemma A.1.3. The set Γ of invariant distributions is tight.
Proof. We prove the lemma using a coupling argument. For any ξ ∈ Π and κ ∈
[βλ(1 − γ), βλ], let (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ), with (Z0,N0) = (z, n) for some (z, n) ∈ S. Let pi
denote the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ). Independently, let N̂t ∼ M/M/∞(λ(1−
γ), βλ) with N̂0 = n. Let p̂i denote the invariant distribution of M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ);
it is straightforward to show that p̂i is Poisson with mean β/(1 − γ).
Using Lemma A.1.18 and Lemma A.1.19, we obtain that Nt is (first-order)
stochastically dominated by N̂t for all t ≥ 0. From this, we obtain (by taking limits
and using ergodicity) that for all k > 0, we have
∑
z∈Z
∑
n>k
pi(z, n) ≤
∑
n>k
p̂i(n).
For any  > 0, choose a k > 0 such that
∑
n>k p̂i(n) < . (Such a k exists, given that
p̂i is Poisson with finite mean.) This implies that
∑
z∈Z
∑
n>k
pi(z, n) < , for all  > 0.
Since k is independent of the choice of (ξ, κ), we obtain that Γ is tight. 
The following lemma proves the joint continuity of Λ.
Lemma A.1.4. The function Λ as defined in (A.3) is jointly (and uniformly) continuous.
101
Proof. Consider ξi ∈ Π, κi ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] and νi ∈ Γ for i = 1, 2. We let Qi denote
the transition kernel of MC(ξi, κi). We have
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|
≤ |Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)| + |Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|. (A.5)
Now, note that
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|(ν1Q1)(z, n) − (ν1Q2)(z, n)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
∑
(y,m)∈S
1
n + 1
ν1(y,m) |Q1((y,m)→ (z, n)) − Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤
∑
(y,m)∈S
ν1(y,m)
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|Q1((y,m)→ (z, n)) − Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤ sup
(y,m)∈S
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|Q1((y,m)→ (z, n)) − Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))| . (A.6)
Now, using (2.1), we obtain that
Q1((y,m)→ (z, n)) − Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))
=I{z = y, n = m + 1}(κ1 − κ2) + I{z = y, n = m − 1}λγm(ξ1(y,m) − ξ2(y,m))
− I{z = y, n = m} (κ1 − κ2 + λmγ(ξ1(y,m) − ξ2(y,m))) ,
and hence ∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|Q1((y,m)→ (z, n)) − Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤
(
1
m + 2
+
1
m + 1
)
|κ1 − κ2| + λγ
(
1 +
m
m + 1
)
|ξ1(y,m) − ξ2(y,m)|
≤2 (|κ1 − κ2| + λγ|ξ1(y,m) − ξ2(y,m)|) .
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Thus, from (A.6), we obtain
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1)| ≤ 2|κ1 − κ2| + 2λγ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞. (A.7)
Next, observe that
|Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|(ν1Q2)(z, n) − (ν2Q2)(z, n)|
≤
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
∑
(y,m)∈S
|Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))| |ν1(y,m) − ν2(y,m)|
≤
∑
(y,m)∈S
|ν1(y,m) − ν2(y,m)|
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))| . (A.8)
Now, again from (2.1) and after some straightforward algebra, we obtain that
∑
(z,n)∈S
1
n + 1
|Q2((y,m)→ (z, n))|
≤ 2
m + 1
∑
z,y
µy,z + κ2
(
1
m + 2
+
1
m + 1
)
+ λ(1 − γξ2(y,m))
(
1 +
m
m + 1
)
≤
∑
z,y
µy,z + 2κ2 + 2λ
≤max
y∈Z
∑
z,y
µy,z + 2(β + 1)λ,
where we have used the fact that κ2 ≤ βλ in the last inequality. Thus, we from
(A.8), we obtain
|Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)| ≤
maxy∈Z ∑
z,y
µy,z + 2(β + 1)λ
 ‖ν1 − ν2‖1. (A.9)
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Therefore, combining (A.5), (A.7) and (A.9), we obtain
|Λ(ξ1, κ1, ν1) − Λ(ξ2, κ2, ν2)|
≤2|κ1 − κ2| + 2λγ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞ +
maxy∈Z ∑
z,y
µy,z + 2(β + 1)λ
 ‖ν1 − ν2‖1.
Thus, Λ is Lipschitz, and hence jointly and (uniformly) continuous in its parame-
ters. 
A.1.3 Existence of κ satisfying equilibrium condition
In this section we show for any Markovian strategy ξ, there exists a unique arrival
rate κ ∈ [βλ(1−γ), βλ] for which the steady state distribution pi of the Markov chain
MC(ξ, κ) satisfies the equation (2.6).
Towards that goal, for any Markovian strategy ξ and arrival rate κ > 0, define
φ(ξ, κ) ,
∑
(z,n)∈S
npiξ,κ(z, n)
where piξ,κ is the unique steady state distribution of MC(ξ, κ). We seek to show that
there exists a κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] such that φ(ξ, κ) = β. We prove this result using
intermediate value theorem. First, we show that φ(ξ, κ) is a strictly increasing func-
tion of κ for any given ξ ∈ Π. Second, we show φ(ξ, βλ(1 − β)) ≤ β and φ(ξ, βλ) ≥ β,
which implies any κ such that φ(ξ, κ) = β must lie in [βλ(1 − γ), βλ]. The result then
follows once we show φ(ξ, κ) is a continuous function of κ.
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In the rest of this section, we assume that the strategy ξ is fixed, and drop the
explicit dependence on ξ from notation wherever convenient. We now proceed
with the first-step.
Strict monotonicity of φ(·)
Lemma A.1.5. Given any Markovian strategy ξ, φ(κ) is a strictly increasing function of
κ on [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
Proof. For any κ1, κ2 ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] with κ1 < κ2, consider two coupled chains(
Z(i)t ,N
(i)
t
) ∼ MC(ξ, κi) for i = 1, 2, as in the proof of Lemma A.1.19, where Z(1)t = Z(2)t
and N(1)t ≤ N(2)t for all t ≥ 0.
For i = 1, 2, we have
1
t
∫ t
0
N(i)s ds→
∑
z,n
npii(z, n) = φ(κi)
almost surely as t → ∞, where we write pii for piκi . Since N(1)t ≤ N(2)t for all t, we
have φ(κ1) ≤ φ(κ2).
Next, suppose for the sake of contradiction that φ(κ1) = φ(κ2). Since Z
(1)
t = Z
(2)
t
and N(1)t ≤ N(2)t for all t ≥ 0, we have
I{Z(1)t = z,N(1)t ≥ n} ≤ I{Z(2)t = z,N(2)t ≥ n}, (A.10)
for all (z, n) ∈ S, t ≥ 0.
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For any (z, n) ∈ S, we have
1
t
∫ t
0
I{Z(i)s = z,N(i)s ≥ n}ds→
∑
n′≥n
pii(z, n′) (A.11)
almost surely as t → ∞, for i = 1, 2. By (A.10) and (A.11) we have∑
n′≥n
pi1(z, n′) ≤
∑
n′≥n
pi2(z, n′),
for any (z, n), and
φ(κ1) =
∑
n≥0
n
∑
z∈Z
pi1(z, n)
 = ∑
n≥0
∑
z∈Z,n′>n
pi1(z, n′) ≤
∑
n≥0
∑
z∈Z,n′>n
pi2(z, n′) = φ(κ2).
Since by our assumption φ(κ1) = φ(κ2), the inequality in the preceding equation is
actually an equality. This implies∑
n′≥n
pi1(z, n′) =
∑
n′≥n
pi2(z, n′),
for all (z, n), which further implies that pi1 and pi2 are the same distribution.
For i = 1, 2, the equation (2.4) implies
pii(z, n)
κi + ∑
y,z
µz,y + λn(1 − γξ(z, n))

=pii(z, n − 1)κi +
∑
y,z
µy,zpii(y, n) + pii(z, n + 1)λ(n + 1)(1 − γξ(z, n + 1)),
which leads to
κi(pii(z, n) − pii(z, n − 1))
=
∑
y,z
µy,zpii(y, n) + pii(z, n + 1)λ(n + 1)(1 − γξ(z, n + 1))
− pii(z, n)
∑
y,z
µz,y + λn(1 − γξ(z, n))
 . (A.12)
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Since pi1 = pi2, the right hand side of (A.12) is the same for i = 1, 2, hence we have
κ1(pi1(z, n) − pi1(z, n − 1)) = κ2(pi2(z, n) − pi2(z, n − 1)).
But κ1 < κ2 and pi1 = pi2 implies that for i = 1, 2, pii(z, n) = pii(z, n−1) for all (z, n), hence
pii cannot be a probability distribution over S, and this contradiction completes the
proof. 
Bounds for φ(·)
In this section, we provide bounds on the function φ(κ) for any κ > 0. These
bounds immediately imply that for κ = βλ, φ(κ) ≥ β, and for κ = βλ(1 − γ), φ(κ) ≤ β.
Together with Lemma A.1.5, this implies that any κ for which φ(κ) = β must lie in
the interval [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
Lemma A.1.6. For any Markovian strategy ξ and arriving rate κ ≥ 0, φ(κ) satisfies
κ
λ
≤ φ(κ) ≤ κ
λ(1 − γ) .
Proof. Let (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ), and (Z0,N0) = (z, n). Denote as M/M/∞(λ, κ) an (in-
dependent) M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate κ and service rate λ, and let N(i)t ∼
M/M/∞(λi, κ) for i = 1, 2 be two independent processes with N(1)0 = N(2)0 = n, where
λ1 = λ and λ2 = (1 − γ)λ.
Let piκ be the steady state distribution of MC(ξ, κ), and pii be the steady state
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distribution of M/M/∞(λi, κ) for i = 1, 2. We have
1
t
∫ t
0
Nsds→
∑
z,n
npiκ(z, n),
and
1
t
∫ t
0
N(i)s ds→
∑
n
npii(n), i = 1, 2
almost surely as t → ∞. From Lemma A.1.19, we have N(1)t 4sd Nt 4sd N(2)t for all
t ≥ 0, therefore we have∑
n
npi1(n) ≤
∑
z,n
npiκ(z, n) ≤
∑
n
npi2(n).
The result then follows from the fact that for i = 1, 2, pii is Poisson distribution with
mean κ/λi. 
Continuity of φ(·)
Observe that the existence of a κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ] such that φ(κ) = β would follow
immediately once we prove the continuity of φ(·) in κ for any fixed Markovian
strategy ξ. In this section, we prove a stronger statement, namely that φ(ξ, κ) is
jointly continuous in (ξ, κ).
Lemma A.1.7. The map φ(ξ, κ) is jointly and uniformly continuous in (ξ, κ) for Marko-
vian ξ and for κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ].
Proof. Given Markovian strategies ξ1 and ξ2, and arriving rates κ1, κ2 ∈ [βλ(1 −
γ), βλ] , let pii be the steady state distribution of MC(ξi, κi), for i = 1, 2. We have, for
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any arbitrary k ≥ 0,
|φ(ξ1, κ1) − φ(ξ2, κ2)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑z,n n(pi1(z, n) − pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑z∈Z
∑
n≤k
n(pi1(z, n) − pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑z∈Z
∑
n>k
n(pi1(z, n) − pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑z∈Z
∑
n≤k
n(pi1(z, n) − pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ + ∑z∈Z
∑
n>k
npi1(z, n) +
∑
z∈Z,n>k
npi2(z, n).
(A.13)
Now, bounding the first term, we obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑z∈Z
∑
n≤k
n(pi1(z, n) − pi2(z, n))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤k
∑
z∈Z
∑
n≤k
|pi1(z, n) − pi2(z, n)| ≤ k‖pi1 − pi2‖1. (A.14)
To bound the other terms, we use a coupling argument. Let (Z(i)t ,N
(i)
t ) ∼ MC(ξi, κi)
with (Z(i)0 ,N
(i)
0 ) = (z, n) for i = 1, 2. Let N̂t ∼ M/M/∞(λ(1− γ), βλ), with N̂0 = n, denote
the number of agents in an (independent) M/M/∞ queue at time with arrival rate
βλ and service rate λ(1 − γ). Let p̂i denote the steady state distribution of N̂t. By
Lemma A.1.18 and Lemma A.1.19, we have N(i)t 4sd N̂t for all t ≥ 0 and for each
i = 1, 2. From this stochastic dominance, it is straightforward to obtain that
∑
z∈Z,n>k
npii(z, n) ≤
∑
n>k
n̂pi(n), i = 1, 2. (A.15)
Thus, from(A.13), (A.15) and (A.14), we have
|φ(ξ1, κ1) − φ(ξ2, κ2)| ≤ k‖pi1 − pi2‖1 + 2
∑
n>k
n̂pi(n).
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Now, for any  > 0, choose k such that
∑
n>k n̂pi(n) < /4. (Note that this choice of
k is independent of (ξi, κi) and depends only on the steady state p̂i of M/M/∞(λ(1 −
γ), βλ), which is Poisson with mean β/(1 − γ).) Second, from Lemma A.1.2, we
obtain that for any  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all (ξ1, κ1) and (ξ2, κ2)
such that ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖∞ < δ and |κ1 − κ2| < δ, we have ‖pi1 − pi2‖1 < /2k. Taken together,
we obtain that for any  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that for all (ξ1, κ1) and (ξ2, κ2)
such that ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖ < δ and |κ1 − κ2| < δ, we have |φ(ξ1, κ1) − φ(ξ2, κ2)| < . Thus, we
obtain that φ(·) is jointly and uniformly continuous.

Continuity
For any ξ ∈ Π, let κ(ξ) denote the unique value of κ for which pi(ξ, κ) satisfies (2.6).
Below, we show that κ(ξ) is a continuous function of ξ.
Lemma A.1.8. The map ξ 7→ κ(ξ) is continuous.
Proof. Define W(ξ, κ) = −|β − φ(ξ, κ)|. Note that, from Lemma A.1.5, we obtain
argmax
κ∈[βλ(1−γ),βλ]
W(ξ, κ) = {κ(ξ)}.
From Lemma A.1.7, we obtain that φ(ξ, κ) is jointly continuous in (ξ, κ), and hence
so is W(ξ, κ). The result then follows from Berge’s maximum theorem [14]. 
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A.1.4 Uniform bounds on value functions
For a given ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, we seek to study the decision problem
DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw). Before we proceed, we need some definitions. Let (Zt,Nt) ∼
MC(ξ, κ(ξ)), and let Eξ(·|z, n) denote the expectation-operator with respect to
{(Zt,Nt) : t ≥ 0} conditioned on (Z0,N0) = (z, n). Fix an agent, say agent 1, among all
the agents at time 0, and let τ be the agent’s first decision epoch.
Let T : Π × R+ × Cb(S) → Cb(S) denote the Bellman-operator for the agent’s
decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw), where for any ξ ∈ Π, Vsw > 0 and U ∈ Cb(S), the
function W = T(ξ,Vsw,U) is defined as follows:
W(z, n) = F(z, n) + γmax
{
Eξ [U(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n] ,Vsw
}
, for all (z, n) ∈ S. (A.16)
The following lemma states that the map T(ξ,Vsw, ·) is a contraction. The proof
follows from standard arguments and is omitted.
Lemma A.1.9. For any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, we have T(ξ,Vsw,U) ∈ Cb(S) for all
U ∈ Cb(S). Furthermore, the map T(ξ,Vsw, ·) : Cb(S) → Cb(S) is a contraction (with
contraction parameter γ) for any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0.
LetV(ξ,Vsw) ∈ Cb(S) be the unique fixed point of T(ξ,Vsw, ·). DefineVst(ξ,Vsw) ∈
Cb(S) andVarr(ξ,Vsw) ∈ R+ as follows:
Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) = Eξ [V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]
Varr(ξ,Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)Vst(z, n + 1; ξ,Vsw),
(A.17)
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where pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)). HereV(z, n; ξ,Vsw) (andVst(z, n; ξ,Vsw)) denote the value taken
byV(ξ,Vsw) (resp.,Vst(ξ,Vsw)) at (z, n) ∈ S.
We begin this section by providing bounds onVarr,Vst andV. Define
V =
1
1 − γ‖F‖∞,
V = exp
(
− β
1 − γ
) ∑
(z,n)∈S
βn(1 − γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)n+1(n + 1)!
pires(z)F(z, n + 1) > 0,
where Ψ = 1
λ
maxz∈Z
∑
y,z µzy ∈ (0,∞), and pires is the steady state distribution of the
resource process.
The following lemma, providing a uniform upper bound on the value func-
tions, follows immediately from definition.
Lemma A.1.10. For any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, the value functions satisfy |Varr(ξ,Vsw)| ≤
‖Vst(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ ≤ ‖V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ ≤ V = ‖F‖∞1−γ .
Proof. Observe that from (A.17), we have |Varr(ξ,Vsw)| ≤ ‖Vst(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ ≤
‖V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞. Also, from the fact that V(ξ,Vsw) is the fixed-point of T(ξ,Vsw, ·), we
obtain
‖V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ ≤ ‖F‖∞ + γmax{‖V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞, |Varr(ξ,Vsw)|} = ‖F‖∞ + γ‖V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞.
Rearranging, we obtain that ‖V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ ≤ 11−γ‖F‖∞ = V. 
The next lemma provides a uniform lower bound on the value functions.
The proof makes extensive use of the strong Markovian property for the chain
MC(ξ, κ(ξ)).
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Lemma A.1.11. For any ξ ∈ Π and Vsw > 0, we haveVarr(ξ,Vsw) ≥ V.
Proof. Observe that
V(z, n; ξ,Vsw) = F(z, n) + γmax{Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw),Vsw} ≥ F(z, n).
Recalling the definition ofVst(ξ,Vsw) and using the (strong) Markov property, we
obtain
Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) = λnλ + κ(ξ) + ∑y,z µzyV(z, n; ξ,Vsw)
+
κ(ξ)
nλ + κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z µzy
Vst(z, n + 1; ξ,Vsw)
+
∑
w,z
µwz
nλ + κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z µzy
Vst(w, n; ξ,Vsw)
+
(n − 1)λ(1 − γξ(z, n))
nλ + κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z µzy
Vst(z, n − 1; ξ,Vsw)
+
(n − 1)λγξ(z, n)
nλ + κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z µzy
Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw)
≥ λ
nλ + κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z µzy
V(z, n; ξ,Vsw)
≥ λ
λ(n + β) +
∑
y,z µzy
F(z, n),
where the last line follows from the fact that κ(ξ) ≤ βλ. Using the definition of Ψ,
we obtain
Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) ≥ 1n + β + ΨF(z, n) ≥
1
n(1 + β + Ψ)
F(z, n). (A.18)
Next, observe that pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) satisfies the steady-state equation (2.4):∑
(y,m)∈S
pi(y,m)Qξ((y,m)→ (z, n)) = 0,
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where Qξ denote the transition kernel of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). Using the
expression (2.1) for Qξ, we obtain
pi(z, n)(κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z
µzy + λn(1 − γξ(z, n)))
= pi(z, n − 1)κ(ξ) +
∑
w,z
pi(w, n)µwz + pi(z, n + 1)λ(n + 1)(1 − γξ(z, n + 1)).
This implies that
pi(z, n) ≥ pi(z, n − 1) κ(ξ)
κ(ξ) +
∑
y,z µzy + λn(1 − γξ(z, n))
≥ pi(z, n − 1) βλ(1 − γ)
βλ(1 − γ) + ∑y,z µzy + λn
≥ pi(z, n − 1) β(1 − γ)
β(1 − γ) + Ψ + n
≥ pi(z, n − 1) β(1 − γ)
(1 + β + Ψ)n
.
Thus, we obtain
pi(z, n) ≥ pi(z, 0) β
n(1 − γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)nn!
.
Now, from Lemma A.1.19, we obtain that the process (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) with
(Z0,N0) = (z, n) is stochastically dominated by (Zt,N
(1)
t ) where N
(1)
t is an (inde-
pendent) M/M/∞(λ(1 − γ), βλ) process with N(1)0 = n. Hence, we have pi(z, 0) ≥
pires(z)P(N(1)∞ = 0), where the steady state N(1)∞ is given by a Poisson distribution
with parameter β/(1 − γ), implying P(N(1)∞ = 0) = exp(−β/(1 − γ)). Thus, we obtain
pi(z, n) ≥ pires(z) exp
(
− β
1 − γ
)
βn(1 − γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)nn!
. (A.19)
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Finally, from (A.17), we have
Varr(ξ,Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)Vst(z, n + 1; ξ,Vsw)
≥
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)
F(z, n + 1)
(1 + β + Ψ)(n + 1)
≥ exp
(
− β
1 − γ
) ∑
(z,n)∈S
βn(1 − γ)n
(1 + β + Ψ)n+1(n + 1)!
pires(z)F(z, n + 1)
= V.
where we use (A.18) in the first inequality and (A.19) in the second. 
A.1.5 A compact set of Markovian strategies
For ξ ∈ Π and Vsw ∈ [V,V], denote the set of all optimal Markovian strategies for
the decision problem DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw) by X(ξ,Vsw) ⊆ Π. In particular, X(ξ,Vsw) is
the set of all ζ ∈ Π such that
ζ(z, n) =

1 ifVst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) > Vsw;
0 ifVst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) < Vsw.
It is straightforward to show that the set X(ξ,Vsw) is non-empty and convex.
In this section, we provide characterization of a compact set Π̂ ⊆ Π of strategies
such that if ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ∈ [V,V], then X(ξ,Vsw) ⊆ Π̂. This characterization is
later used to define a correspondence over a compact set to which we apply the
Kakutani fixed point theorem to show the existence of an MFE. (Note that the set
Π is not compact under the sup-norm.)
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We begin by defining the set Π̂. Recall that F(z, n) → 0 as n → ∞ for all z ∈ Z.
Let K0 be defined as
K0 = inf
{
m : F(z, n) <
(1 − γ)2
2
V for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ m
}
,
and let K1 be defined as
K1 = inf
n : exp
(
−1
8
√
n − 1
)
+
2√
log(n − 1) + γ
b
√
log(n−1)c(1 − γ) < (1 − γ)
2V
4‖F‖∞

Let Kmax = max{4K20 + 1,K1}. Define the set Π̂ ∈ Π as follows:
Π̂ = {ξ ∈ Π : ξ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax}.
In other words, under any strategy ξ ∈ Π̂, each agent chooses to switch her loca-
tion, if the number of agents at her location is greater than Kmax, irrespective of the
resource level. It is straightforward to show that Π̂ is compact, by noting that it is
isomorphic to [0, 1]Kmax under the Euclidean topology.
The following lemma states that if ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ≥ V, then the optimal action
for an agent at the state (z, n) is to switch if n ≥ Kmax.
Lemma A.1.12. For ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ≥ V, we haveVst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) < Vsw for all z ∈ Z and
for all n ≥ Kmax.
Proof. Consider an agent i in location k facing the decision problem
DEC(ξ, κ(ξ),Vsw) for a given ξ ∈ Π̂ and Vsw ≥ V. Let τ` > 0 denote the time of
the `th-decision epoch of the agent, for ` = 1, 2, · · · . Let (Zt,Nt) denote the state
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of the location at time t, and for brevity, we let (Z`,N`) denote (Zτ` ,Nτ`) for each
` = 1, 2, · · · .
Suppose (Z0,N0) = (z, n) for z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax. Fix a strategy φ ∈ Π for
the agent, and let τφ denote the first time at which the agent chooses to switch
under φ. Let Vφst(z, n) denote agent i’s continuation payoffs under the strategy φ,
subsequent to her making the decision to stay and not leaving the system, given
the state of the location (z, n). We have the following expression for the Vφst(z, n):
Vφst(z, n) = E
 ∞∑
`=1
γ`−1F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ} + γ`I{τ` = τφ}Vsw
 . (A.20)
The first term inside the expectation denotes the total expected payoff until the
agent chooses to switch, the second term denotes the payoff on switching. Here,
the expectation E is conditioned on (Z0,N0) = (z, n) and on the fact that agent i
follows strategy φ and all other agents follow strategy ξ. (We drop this explicit
dependence from the notation for E for brevity.) From this, we obtain,
Vφst(z, n) =
∞∑
`=1
γ`−1E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
+
∞∑
`=1
γ`VswP
(
τ` = τφ
)
≤
∞∑
`=1
γ`−1E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
+ γVsw.
(A.21)
Let n̂ = b √n − 1/2 + 1c. For each ` = 1, 2, · · · , we have
E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
= E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
∣∣∣N` ≥ n̂]P(N` ≥ n̂)
+ E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
∣∣∣N` < n̂]P(N` < n̂)
≤ 1
2
(1 − γ)2V + ‖F‖∞P(N` < n̂).
(A.22)
Here, in the inequality, the first term follows from the fact that since n > Kmax, we
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have n̂ > K0, and hence F(Z`,N`) <
(1−γ)2V
2 if N` ≥ n̂. In the second term, we have
used the fact that F(Z`,N`) ≤ ‖F‖∞.
To bound P(N` < n̂), consider an auxiliary system with n agents at t = 0 where
each agent other than agent i stays in the system for a time that is independently
and identically distributed as an exponential distribution with rate λ. (We assume
agent i never leaves the auxiliary system.) Furthermore, there are no arrivals to
this auxiliary system. Let N˜t denote the number of agents in this auxiliary system.
It is straightforward to show that N˜t is first-order stochastically dominated by Nt,
via a coupling argument and we omit the details here. This implies that P(N` ≤
n̂) ≤ P(N˜` ≤ n̂), where we write N˜` to denote N˜τ` . Thus, we obtain
E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
≤ 1
2
(1 − γ)2V + ‖F‖∞P(N˜` < n̂).
Let ̂`= b√log(n − 1)c, and t̂ = log(n−1)2λ . For each ` ≤ ̂`, we have N˜` ≥ N˜̂`, and hence,
P(N˜` < n̂) ≤ P(N˜̂` < n̂)
= P(N˜̂` < n̂|τ̂` < t̂)P(τ̂` < t̂) + P(N˜̂` < n̂|τ̂` ≥ t̂)P(τ̂` ≥ t̂)
≤ P(N˜̂` < n̂|τ̂` < t̂)P(τ̂` < t̂) + P(τ̂` ≥ t̂)
≤ P(N˜t̂ < n̂|τ̂` < t̂)P(τ̂` < t̂) + P(τ̂` ≥ t̂)
≤ P(N˜t̂ < n̂) + P(τ̂` ≥ t̂),
(A.23)
where the third inequality follows from the fact that on τ̂` < t̂, we have N˜t̂ ≤ N˜̂`,
and the fourth inequality follows from the independence of τ̂` and N˜t.
Now, observe that since each agent j , i stays in the auxiliary system for a time
distributed independently and exponentially with rate λ, the probability that the
118
agent j , i is still in the auxiliary system by time t̂ is equal to exp(−λ̂t) = 1/√n − 1.
Thus, the number of agents N˜t̂ in the auxiliary system at time t̂ is distributed as
1 + Bin(n − 1, 1√
n−1 ), where Bin(·, ·) denotes the binomial distribution. (Recall that
in the auxiliary system, agent i never leaves.) Now, note that E[Bin(n − 1, 1√
n−1 )] =√
n − 1 > n̂ − 1. From this, we obtain
P(N˜t̂ < n̂) = P
(
Bin
(
n − 1, 1√
n − 1
)
< n̂ − 1
)
≤ P
(
Bin
(
n − 1, 1√
n − 1
)
<
1
2
√
n − 1
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
√
n − 1
)
,
(A.24)
where we have used the Chernoff bound [60] for the lower tail of the binomial
distribution in the last inequality.
Next, note that τ` ∼ Gamma(`, λ), since τ` is the sum of ` independently and
exponentially distributed time intervals. Hence, from Markov’s inequality, we
obtain
P(τ̂` > t̂) ≤ E[τ̂`]
t̂
=
̂`
λ̂t
≤ 2√
log(n − 1) . (A.25)
Thus, combining (A.22), (A.23), (A.24) and (A.25), we obtain for all ` ≤ ̂`,
E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
≤ 1
2
(1 − γ)2V + ‖F‖∞
exp(−18 √n − 1) + 2√log(n − 1)
 .
Thus, using (A.21), we have
Vφst(z, n) =
̂`∑
`=1
γ`−1E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
+
∞∑
`=̂`+1
γ`−1E
[
F(Z`,N`)I{τ` ≤ τφ}
]
+ γVsw
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≤ 1
1 − γ
12(1 − γ)2V + ‖F‖∞
exp(−18 √n − 1) + 2√log(n − 1)

+ γ
̂`‖F‖∞ + γVsw,
where in the inequality, we use that fact that F(Z`,N`) ≤ ‖F‖∞ for all ` > ̂`. Thus,
we obtain,
Vφst(z, n) ≤
1
1 − γ
12(1 − γ)2V + ‖F‖∞
exp(−18 √n − 1) + 2√log(n − 1) + γ̂`(1 − γ)

+ γVsw.
Now, note that since n ≥ Kmax ≥ K1, we have
‖F‖∞
exp(−18 √n − 1) + 2√log(n − 1) + γ̂`(1 − γ)
 < (1 − γ)2V4 .
Thus we obtain Vφst(z, n) ≤ 11−γ
(
(1−γ)2V
2 +
(1−γ)2V
4
)
+ γVsw =
3(1−γ)
4 V + γVsw. Since
this inequality holds for all strategies φ ∈ Π and since Vsw ≥ V, we obtain
Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) < Vsw for all z ∈ Z and all n ≥ Kmax. 
Let Υ = Π̂× [V,V]. The preceding lemma implies that for any ζ ∈ X(ξ,Vsw) with
(ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ, it must be the case that ζ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and all n ≥ Kmax. From
the definition of Π̂, this implies that X(ξ,Vsw) ⊆ Π̂ for all (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ. Thus, we can
view the map (ξ,Vsw)→ X(ξ,Vsw) as defining a correspondence X : Υ⇒ Π̂.
A.1.6 Upper-hemicontinuity of R
For (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ, define the map R as R(ξ,Vsw) = X(ξ,Vsw) × {Varr(ξ,Vsw)}. Note
that from Lemma A.1.10, Lemma A.1.11 and Lemma A.1.12, we obtain that
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R(ξ,Vsw) ⊆ Υ for any (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ. This implies that we can view the map R as a cor-
respondence R : Υ⇒ Υ. In this section, we seek to show that this correspondence
is upper-hemicontinuous. This result directly used in proof for Theorem 2.3.1.
To prove this, we first show that the value functions V(ξ,Vsw) and Varr(ξ,Vsw)
are jointly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ. In the following, we use the following nota-
tion: for U ∈ Cb(S), let ‖U‖∗ , maxz∈Z,n<Kmax |U(z, n)|. Note that ‖U‖∗ ≤ ‖U‖∞.
Lemma A.1.13. The map (ξ,Vsw)→V(ξ,Vsw) is (jointly) continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ.
Proof. For (ξi,V isw) ∈ Υ for i = 1, 2, let Wi(z, n) = V(z, n; ξi,V isw). Using the definition
of T and Lemma A.1.12, we obtain Wi(z, n) = F(z, n)+γV isw for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax.
This implies that
|W1(z, n) −W2(z, n)| ≤ γ|V1sw − V2sw|, for z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax.
This implies that ‖W1 −W2‖∞ ≤ max{‖W1 −W2‖∗, γ|V1sw − V2sw|}.
Next, we have
‖W1 −W2‖∗ =‖T(ξ1,V1sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W2)‖∗
≤‖T(ξ1,V1sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W1)‖∗
+ ‖T(ξ2,V2sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W2)‖∗
≤‖T(ξ1,V1sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W1)‖∗
+ ‖T(ξ2,V2sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W2)‖∞
≤‖T(ξ1,V1sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W1)‖∗ + γ‖W1 −W2‖∞.
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where we have used Lemma A.1.9 in the last inequality. Using the fact that ‖W1 −
W2‖∗ ≤ ‖W1 −W2‖∞ ≤ max{‖W1 −W2‖∗, γ|V1sw − V2sw|} ≤ ‖W1 −W2‖∗ + γ|V1sw − V2sw| and
after some straightforward algebra, we obtain
‖W1 −W2‖∞ ≤ 11 − γ
(
‖T(ξ1,V1sw,W1) − T(ξ2,V2sw,W1)‖∗ + γ|V1sw − V2sw|
)
.
From Lemma A.1.14, we obtain that the first term in the parenthesis can be made
arbitrarily small by setting ‖ξ1−ξ2‖∞ and |V1sw−V2sw| correspondingly small enough.
Thus, we conclude thatV(ξ,Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ. 
The following auxiliary lemma is used in the proof of Lemma A.1.13.
Lemma A.1.14. Let (ξm,Vmsw) ∈ Υ with (ξm,Vmsw) → (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ as m → ∞. For any
U ∈ Cb(S), we have ‖T(ξm,Vmsw,U) − T(ξ,Vsw,U)‖∗ → 0 as m→ ∞.
Proof. Let (ξm,Vmsw) be as in the statement of the lemma, and let Wm = T(ξm,Vmsw,U)
and W = T(ξ,Vsw,U). By definition of T, we have
|Wm(z, n) −W(z, n)| =γ|max{Em[U(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vmsw}
−max{Eξ[U(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw}|
≤γmax{|Em[U(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n]
− Eξ[U(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n]|, |Vmsw − Vsw|},
where we let Em = Eξm . Thus, it suffices to show that the first term inside the
maximization converges to zero as m→ ∞ for all z ∈ Z and n < Kmax. Observe that,
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since U ∈ Cb(S) and τ is exponentially distributed with parameter λ, we have
Eξ [U(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n] =
∫ ∞
0
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt,Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
=
∫ T
0
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt,Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
+
∫ ∞
T
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt,Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt
with similar expressions for ξm in place of ξ. For large enough value of T > 0, the
second term in the last equation can be made arbitrarily small (uniformly for ξ
and all ξm). Thus, again it suffices to show that the first term in the last equation is
continuous in (ξ,Vsw) for all z ∈ Z and n < Kmax and for large enough T .
Now, using the definition (2.1) of the transition rate matrix Qξ of the chain
MC(ξ, κ(ξ)) (and similarly Qm = Qξm of the chain MC(ξm, κ(ξm))), we obtain that
Qm((u, k) → (v, `)) −→ Q((u, k) → (v, `)) as m → ∞ for all (u, k), (v, `) ∈ S. Then, from
[73, See pg. 2183, Example 1.1] or [35, pg. 262, problem 8], we obtain that the mea-
sure Pm(·|z, n, τ = t) converges weakly to Pξ(·|z, n, τ = t). From this, we conclude that∫ T
0
λ exp(−λt)Em[U(Zt,Nt)|z, n, τ = t]dt converges to
∫ T
0
λ exp(−λt)Eξ[U(Zt,Nt)|z, n, τ =
t]dt as m→ ∞. This completes the proof. 
The continuity ofVarr(ξ,Vsw) is then obtained as a corollary of Lemma A.1.13.
Lemma A.1.15. The value functionVarr(ξ,Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ.
Proof. Recall the definition (A.17) ofVarr(ξ,Vsw):
Varr(ξ,Vsw) =
∑
(z,n)∈S
pi(z, n)Varr(z, n + 1; ξ,Vsw),
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where pi = pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) is the invariant distribution of MC(ξ, κ(ξ)). From
Lemma A.1.10, we have ‖Vst(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ ≤ V. Also, note that Lemma A.1.2 and
Lemma A.1.8 imply that the invariant distribution pi(ξ, κ(ξ)) is continuous. More-
over, from Lemma A.1.3, we obtain that the set of invariant distributions Γ is tight.
These results together imply that it suffices to show that Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) is uni-
formly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ for all z ∈ Z and all n < M for some large enough
M.
Let (ξm,Vmsw) ∈ Υ with (ξm,Vmsw)→ (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ as m→ ∞. We have
|Vst(z, n; ξm,Vmsw) −Vst(z, n; ξ,Vsw)|
≤|Eξm[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξm,Vmsw)|z, n] − Eξ[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]|
≤|Eξm[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξm,Vmsw)|z, n] − Eξm[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]|
+ |Eξm[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n] − Eξ[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]|
≤|V(ξm,Vmsw) −V(ξ,Vsw)‖∞ + |Eξm[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]
− Eξ[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]|.
From Lemma A.1.13, we obtain that as m → ∞, the first term converges to zero.
Moreover, from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma A.1.13, we obtain
that Eξm[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n]→ Eξ[V(Zτ,Nτ; ξ,Vsw)|z, n] as m→ ∞ for each (z, n) ∈ S.
From this, we conclude thatVst(z, n; ξ,Vsw) is uniformly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ
for all z ∈ Z and all n < M for large enough M. 
We are now ready to show that the correspondence R is upper-
hemicontinuous.
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Lemma A.1.16. The correspondence R : Υ⇒ Υ is upper-hemicontinuous.
Proof. By definition, R(ξ,Vsw) = X(ξ,Vsw) × {Varr(ξ,Vsw)} for (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ. From
Lemma A.1.15, we obtain that Varr(ξ,Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈
Υ. Thus, it suffices to show that the correspondence X : Υ ⇒ Π̂ is upper-
hemicontinuous.
Consider a sequence (ξn,Vnsw, ζn) → (ξ,Vsw, ζ) as n → ∞ such that ζn ∈ X(ξn,Vnsw)
for each n ≥ 0. By continuity of Vst(·), we obtain that if Vst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) > Vsw for
some (z, n) ∈ S, then for all large enough m, we must have Vst(z, n, ξm,Vmsw) > Vmsw,
and hence ζm(z, n) = 1. Similarly, if Vst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) < Vsw, then ζm(z, n) = 0 for all
large enough m. Since ζm → ζ, this implies that ζ(z, n) = 1 if Vst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) > Vsw,
and ζ(z, n) = 0 ifVst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) < Vsw. Thus, we obtain that ζ(z,m) ∈ X(ξ,Vsw). 
We are now ready to show that the correspondence R is upper-
hemicontinuous.
Lemma A.1.17. The correspondence R : Υ⇒ Υ is upper-hemicontinuous.
Proof. By definition, R(ξ,Vsw) = X(ξ,Vsw) × {Varr(ξ,Vsw)} for (ξ,Vsw) ∈ Υ. From
Lemma A.1.15, we obtain that Varr(ξ,Vsw) is jointly continuous in (ξ,Vsw) ∈
Υ. Thus, it suffices to show that the correspondence X : Υ ⇒ Π̂ is upper-
hemicontinuous.
Consider a sequence (ξn,Vnsw, ζn) → (ξ,Vsw, ζ) as n → ∞ such that ζn ∈ X(ξn,Vnsw)
for each n ≥ 0. By continuity of Vst(·), we obtain that if Vst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) > Vsw for
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some (z, n) ∈ S, then for all large enough m, we must have Vst(z, n, ξm,Vmsw) > Vmsw,
and hence ζm(z, n) = 1. Similarly, if Vst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) < Vsw, then ζm(z, n) = 0 for all
large enough m. Since ζm → ζ, this implies that ζ(z, n) = 1 if Vst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) > Vsw,
and ζ(z, n) = 0 ifVst(z, n, ξ,Vsw) < Vsw. Thus, we obtain that ζ(z,m) ∈ X(ξ,Vsw). 
A.1.7 Existence of an optimal threshold strategy
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 2.4.1. We prove this result in two
steps: first, we prove Lemma 2.4.1, which states that the value function Vst : S→ R
is non-increasing in the number of agents n at the location for any fixed resource
level z inZ. Second, we show in Lemma A.1.12 that limn→∞ Vst(z, n) ≤ γVsw for all
z ∈ Z. Therefore there always exists a threshold strategy in the set of best responses
OPT(ξ, κ,Vsw).
proof of Theorem 2.4.1. We define a partial order 4p on the state space S of MC(ξ, κ)
as follows: for (z1, n1), (z2, n2) ∈ S, (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2) if and only if z1 = z2 and n1 ≤ n2.
For any function f : S → R, we say f is decreasing with respect to 4p if for all
(z1, n1), (z2, n2) ∈ S such that (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2), we have f (z1, n1) ≥ f (z2, n2).
Thus, our goal is to show that the value function Vst of DEC(ξ, κ,Vsw) is decreas-
ing with respect to 4p. We note that the property “decreasing with respect to 4p”
is a closed convex cone property for functions on S, as defined in [66]. Thus, using
their Proposition 5, we can conclude that Vst has this property if the following two
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conditions hold:
1. The resource sharing function F is decreasing with respect to 4p.
2. Let (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ). For any (z, n) ∈ S, let ν(z,n) be the probability distribu-
tion of (Zτ,Nτ) ∼ ν(z,n) conditioning on (Z0,N0) = (z, n), where τ is distributed
independently as an exponential with rate λ, denoting the first decision
epoch of a fixed agent. Then for any f : S→ R that is decreasing with respect
to 4p, it must hold that E[ f (Z,N)|(Z,N) ∼ ν(z1,n1)] ≥ E[ f (Z,N)|(Z,N) ∼ ν(z2,n2)]
for all (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2).
Since F(z, n) is decreasing in n for each z ∈ Z, we immediately obtain the first
condition. We now show that the second condition also holds using a coupling
argument.
Suppose (z1, n1) 4p (z2, n2). By using an argument same as that in the proof
of Lemma A.1.19, we obtain that there exists a coupling of the two processes
(Z(i)t ,N
(i)
t ) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with (Z(i)0 ,N(i)0 ) = (zi, ni) for i = 1, 2, such that for all t ≥ 0,
(Z(1)t ,N
(1)
t ) 4p (Z
(2)
t ,N
(2)
t ). Thus, for any f that is decreasing with respect to 4p
we have f (Z(1)t ,N
(1)
t ) ≥ f (Z(2)t ,N(2)t ) for all t ≥ 0, and therefore E[ f (Z(1)τ ,N(1)τ )] ≥
E[ f (Z(2)τ ,N(2)τ )], where τ is a distributed independently as an exponential with rate
λ. Since (Z(i)τ ,N
(i)
τ ) ∼ ν(zi,ni) for i = 1, 2, we obtain the result. 
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A.1.8 Coupling results
In this section, we obtain structural properties of the Markov chain MC(ξ, κ) by
coupling the chain with an M/M/∞ queue.
Let M/M/∞(λ, κ) denote an (independent) M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate κ
and service rate λ. We begin with the following simple result which states that
a queue with higher arrival rate and/or lower service rate is more likely to have
more agents in the queue. The proof is straightforward and omitted.
Lemma A.1.18. Let N(i)t , for i = 1, 2, denote the number of agents at time t in an (inde-
pendent) M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate κi and service rate λi. Suppose N(1)0 = N(2)0 , and
one of the following two conditions holds: (1) λ1 = λ2 and κ1 ≤ κ2; or (2) λ1 ≥ λ2 and
κ1 = κ2. Then, for all t ≥ 0, N(1)t is stochastically dominated by N(2)t , i.e., for all n ∈ N0, we
have P(N(1)t ≥ n) ≤ P(N(2)t ≥ n).
In the proof of Theorem 2.3.1, we frequently compare the MC(ξ, κ) process
for two (or more) different values of (ξ, κ) to show the monotonicity of vari-
ous quantities. Our next result justifies these stochastic comparisons. Before
we state the lemma, we make the following definition of stochastic dominance.
Let
(
Z(i)t ,N
(i)
t
) ∼ MC(ξi, κi) with (Z(i)0 ,N(i)0 ) = (zi, ni) for i = 1, 2. We say the process(
Z(1)t ,N
(1)
t
)
is stochastically dominated by the process
(
Z(2)t ,N
(2)
t
)
if
P(Z(1)t = z,N
(1)
t ≥ n) ≤ P(Z(2)t = z,N(2)t ≥ n), for all (z, n) ∈ S.
In that case, we denote as
(
Z(1)t ,N
(1)
t
)
4sd
(
Z(2)t ,N
(2)
t
)
. Note that this also implies
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that N(1)t is stochastically dominated by N
(2)
t under the usual sense of stochastic
dominance.
Lemma A.1.19. Let ξ ∈ Π and κ > 0. Let (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ).
1. Let κ0 ≥ κ, and let ξ0 ∈ Π be such that ξ0(z, n) ≥ ξ(z, n) for all (z, n) ∈ S. Then
we have (Zt,Nt) 4sd
(
Z(0)t ,N
(0)
t
)
for all t ≥ 0, where (Z(0)t ,N(0)t ) ∼ MC(ξ0, κ0) with
Z(0)0 = Z0 and N
(0)
0 ≥ N0.
2. Let Xit ∼ M/M/∞(λi, κ) for i = 1, 2 be two independent processes with X10 = X20 = N0,
where λ1 = λ and λ2 = (1− γ)λ. Then, we have for all t ≥ 0, (Zt, X1t ) 4sd (Zt,Nt) 4sd
(Zt, X2t ).
Proof. First note that the second statement in the lemma is implied by the first.
In particular, let ξ1(z, n) = 0 and ξ2(z, n) = 1 for all (z, n) ∈ S. Then, using the
first statement in the lemma, we obtain
(
Z(1)t ,N
(1)
t
)
4sd (Zt,Nt) 4sd
(
Z(2)t ,N
(2)
t
)
, where(
Z(i)t ,N
(i)
t
) ∼ MC(ξi, κ) with (Z(i)0 ,N(i)0 ) = (Z0,N0). The second statement then follows
directly by the fact that under ξi, the process
(
Z(i)t ,N
(i)
t
)
has the same distribution as
(Zt, Xit) for i = 1, 2.
To prove the first statement in the lemma, we use a coupling argument. We
construct two chains as follows. Let t0 = 0 and (Z0,N0) = (z0, n0) and
(
Z(0)0 ,N
(0)
0
)
=
(u0, v0), with u0 = z0 and v0 ≥ n0. For k = 1, 2 . . . , define the following recursively:
1. Let τk ∼ Exp(∆k) where ∆k , ∑y,uk−1 µuk−1,y + κ0 + λvk−1. Let tk = tk−1 + τk.
2. Let
(
Z(0)t ,N
(0)
t
)
= (uk−1, vk−1) and (Zt,Nt) = (zk−1, nk−1) for t ∈ [tk−1, tk).
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3. For t = tk, let
(
Z(0)t ,N
(0)
t
)
= (uk, vk), where
(uk, vk) =

(y, vk−1)
with probability µuk−1,y/∆k, for each y ∈ Z with y , uk−1;
(uk−1, vk−1 + 1)
with probability κ0/∆k;
(uk−1, vk−1 − 1)
with probability λvk−1(1 − γξ0(uk−1, vk−1))/∆k;
(uk−1, vk−1)
with probability λvk−1γξ0(uk−1, vk−1)/∆k.
4. Define ζk ,
nk−1(1−γξ(zk−1,nk−1))
vk−1(1−γξ0(uk−1,vk−1)) and ηk ,
(
1−γξ0(uk−1,vk−1)
γξ0(uk−1,vk−1)
)
max(ζk − 1, 0). It is straight-
forward to verify that ηk ∈ [0, 1].
130
5. Let (Zt,Nt) = (zk, nk) for t = tk, where
(zk, nk) =

(uk, nk−1) if uk , uk−1;
(zk−1, nk−1 + 1)
with probability κ
κ0
;
(zk−1, nk−1)
with probability 1 − κ
κ0
,
if (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 + 1);

(zk−1, nk−1 − 1)
with probability
min(ζk, 1);
(zk−1, nk−1)
with probability
max(1 − ζk, 0),
if (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 − 1);

(zk−1, nk−1 − 1)
with probability ηk;
(zk−1, nk−1)
with probability 1 − ηk,
if (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1).
It is straightforward to verify that under this construction, we have
(
Z(0)t ,N
(0)
t
) ∼
MC(ξ0, κ0) and (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξ, κ) with Z(0)0 = Z0 and N0 ≤ N(0)0 . Furthermore, by
construction, we have zk = uk for all k, and hence Z
(0)
t = Zt for all t ≥ 0.
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To show that Nt ≤ N(0)t for all t ≥ 0, we perform induction on k in the above
construction. Note that n0 ≤ v0. Suppose for some k, we have nk−1 ≤ vk−1. Then,
from the definition, we obtain that nk ≤ vk for all the cases, except possibly when
(uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 − 1) and (zk, nk) = (zk−1, nk−1). Under this case, if nk−1 < vk−1, then
again we have nk ≤ vk. On the other hand, if nk−1 = vk−1, then together with the
fact that zk−1 = uk−1, we obtain ξ(zk−1, nk−1) ≤ ξ0(uk−1, vk−1), implying that ζk ≥ 1.
However, note that if ζk ≥ 1, then the event where (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1 − 1) and
(zk, nk) = (zk−1, nk−1) occurs with zero probability. Thus, we obtain that under all
cases, nk ≤ vk. This completes the induction step and hence the proof. 
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1.1
The proof consists of the following two main steps.
STEP 1 Given λ > 0, β > 0 transition rates {µθzy > 0 : z, y ∈ Z}θ∈Θ and type distribution
{pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, we show for each Markovian strategy profile ξ , {ξθ : θ ∈ Θ},
there exists {κθ(ξ) : θ ∈ Θ}, {Vθarr(ξ) : θ ∈ Θ}, {βθ(ξ) : θ ∈ Θ} and Vsw(ξ) that
satisfies (3.1) ∼ (3.2) and (3.4) ∼ (3.8).
STEP 2 Given λ > 0, β > 0 transition rates {µθzy > 0 : z, y ∈ Z}θ∈Θ and type distribu-
tion {pθ : θ ∈ Θ}, for any Markovian strategy profile ξ, let {κθ(ξ) : θ ∈ Θ},
{Vθarr(ξ) : θ ∈ Θ}, {βθ(ξ) : θ ∈ Θ} and Vsw(ξ) be given as in STEP 1. Consider
the correspondence ξ 7→ X(ξ), where X(ξ) , ×θ∈ΘXθ(ξθ) and Xθ(ξθ) is the set of
best responses for the decision problem DEC(ξθ, κθ(ξ),Vsw(ξ)). We show the
correspondence has a fixed point ξ∗ and (ξ∗, {κθ(ξ∗) : θ ∈ Θ}, {Vθarr(ξ∗) : θ ∈
Θ}, {βθ(ξ)∗ : θ ∈ Θ},Vsw(ξ∗)) gives the mean field equilibrium.
Below we provide a complete proof of STEP 1 and STEP 2. We omit details
of the proof of lemmas and claims that can be shown straightforwardly using
similar arguments as in the proof for existence of mean field equilibria of the ho-
mogeneous locations model.
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We first prove STEP 1, and throughout the proof we assume we are given a
Markovian strategy profile ξ = {ξθ : θ ∈ Θ}, and we would sometimes omit ξ and
ξθ in notations when no confusions will arise.
For each type θ ∈ Θ, for any κθ ≥ 0 and Vsw > 0, from Lemma A.1.1 let piκθθ be the
steady state distribution of the Markov chain MC(ξθ, κθ). Let Vθ,κθ,Vsw and Vθ,κθ,Vswst be
the value functions satisfying the following Bellman equation:
Vθ,κθ,Vsw(z, n) = Fθ(z, n) + γmax{Vθ,κθ,Vswst (z, n),Vsw}
Vθ,κθ,Vswst (z, n) = E[V
θ,κθ,Vsw(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; ξθ, κθ].
(B.1)
Let
Vθarr(κθ,Vsw) ,
∑
z∈Z,n∈N0
Vθ,κθ,Vswst (z, n + 1)pi
κθ
θ (z, n)
and
φθ(κθ,Vsw) , Vθarr(κθ,Vsw) − Vsw.
Lemma B.1.1. The function φθ(κθ,Vsw) is (i) jointly continuous in κθ and Vsw, (ii) for
each κθ, φθ(κθ,Vsw) is strictly decreasing in Vsw; and (iii) for each Vsw, φθ(κθ,Vsw) is strictly
decreasing in κθ.
Proof. Continuity is straightforward using similar arguments as in the proof of
Lemma A.1.7 and Lemma A.1.13 in Appendix A, and we omit the details here.
To show φθ(κθ,Vsw) is decreasing in Vsw, given any κθ ≥ 0, let V (0),V ′(0) : Z×N0 →
R+ be defined as
V (0)(z, n) = V ′(0)(z, n) = 0, for allz, n. (B.2)
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For any δ > 0, define the two sequences V (i),V ′(i) : Z × N0 → R+, i = 1, 2, . . .
inductively as:
V (i)(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V (i−1)(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw},
V ′(i)(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V ′(i−1)(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw + δ},
for all z ∈ Z, n ∈ N0.
Convergence of value iteration implies {V (i)}∞i=0 and {V ′(i)}∞i=1 converge uniformly
to V,V ′ : Z × N0 → R+ respectively where V and V ′ satisfy
V(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw},
V ′(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V ′(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw + δ},
for all z ∈ Z, n ∈ N0.
It is straightforward to observe for all i ≥ 0, for all z ∈ Z and n ∈ N0, V ′(i)(z, n) ≥
V (i)(z, n). Next, we show inductively supz∈Z,n∈N0 V
′(i)(z, n) − V (i)(z, n) ≤ γδ for all i ≥ 0.
The claim holds trivially for i = 0. Given supz∈Z,n∈N0 V
′(i)(z, n) − V (i)(z, n) ≤ γδ for
some i ≥ 0, we have for any z ∈ Z and n ∈ N0,
V ′(i+1)(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V ′(i)(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw}
≤Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V (i)(Zτ,Nτ) + γδ|z, n],Vsw}
≤Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V (i)(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n],Vsw} + γδ
=V (i+1)(z, n) + γδ,
which completes the induction step. Along with the uniform convergence of
{V (i)}∞i=0 and {V ′(i)}∞i=1, we have 0 ≤ V ′(z, n) − V(z, n) ≤ γδ, ∀z ∈ Z, n ∈ N0.
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Since Vθ,κθ,Vsw+δst (z, n) = E[V
′(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n] and Vθ,κθ,Vswst (z, n) = E[V(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n], we
have
sup
z∈Z,n∈N0
Vθ,κθ,Vsw+δst (z, n) − Vθ,κθ,Vswst (z, n) ≤ γδ,
and therefore
Vθarr(κθ,Vsw + δ) −Vθarr(κθ,Vsw) ≤ γδ.
Finally, we have
φθ(κθ,Vsw + δ) − φθ(κθ,Vsw) =Vθarr(κθ,Vsw + δ) −Vθarr(κθ,Vsw) − δ
≤γδ − δ < 0,
which completes the proof of monotonicity in Vsw.
Next, we show φθ(κθ,Vsw) is decreasing κθ given any Vsw. The argument is sim-
ilar to that of showing monotonicity in Vsw, by induction on the value iteration
procedure. Consider κθ and κ′θ where κθ < κ
′
θ. Define V
(0),V ′(0) : Z × N0 → R+ as in
(B.2) and V (i),V ′(i) : Z × N0 → R+, i = 1, 2, . . . inductively as:
V (i)(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V (i−1)(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κθ)],Vsw},
V ′(i)(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V ′(i−1)(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κ′θ)],Vsw}.
Since F(z, ·) is decreasing and non-constant, it is straightforward to show for all
i, for each z, V (i)(z, ·) and V ′(i)(z, ·) is decreasing and non-constant. We show in-
ductively for all i, for each z, n, V ′(i)(z, n) ≤ V (i)(z, n). The claim holds for i = 0
trivially. For the induction step, assume the claim holds for some i ≥ 0. For each
z, n, let (Z1t ,N1t ) ∼ MC(ξθ, κθ) and (Z2t ,N2t ) ∼ MC(ξθ, κ′θ) and (Z j0,N j0) = (z, n) for j = 1, 2,
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and we couple Z1,Z2. From Lemma A.1.18, for any t ≥ 0, since κ′θ > κθ, we have
Z1t = Z
2
t and N1t 4sd N2t , and hence V ′(i)(Z2τ ,N2τ ) 4sd V (i)(Z1τ , n1τ). Therefore we have
V (i+1)(z, n) ≤ V ′(i+1)(z, n).
It follows that V ′(z, n) ≤ V(z, n) for each z, n where V,V ′ : Z×N0 → R+ are defined
as
V(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κθ)],Vsw},
V ′(z, n) =Fθ(z, n) + γmax{E[V ′(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κ′θ)],Vsw}.
It then follows that
Vθ,κ
′
θ
st (z, n) =E[V
′(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κ′θ)]
≤E[V(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κ′θ)]
≤E[V(Zτ,Nτ)|z, n; (Zt,Nt) ∼ MC(ξθ, κθ)]
=Vθ,κθst (z, n).
Therefore we haveVθarr(κ′θ,Vsw) ≤ Vθarr(κθ,Vsw).
To show strict monotonicity of Vθarr(, ·,Vsw), we can prove by contradiction us-
ing a similar approach as in the proof of Lemma A.1.5, and we omit the detail
here. Since Vθarr(, ·,Vsw) is strictly decreasing, φθ(·,Vsw) is also strictly decreasing,
completing the proof.

Next, we would define a function ψ(Vsw) and show that ψ is strictly decreasing,
137
and there exists V and V such that ψ(V) ≤ β and ψ(V) ≥ β hence there must exist a
unique Vsw such that ψ(Vsw) = β.
Define V
′
as
V
′
, max
θ∈Θ
‖Fθ‖
1 − γ.
With a similar argument in Appendix A.1.4, we can show for each θ ∈ Θ, and
for any κ ≥ 0 and Vsw > 0, ‖Vθ,κ,Vswst ‖∞ ≤ V
′
. ThereforeVθarr(κ,Vsw) ≤ V
′
, and we have
φθ(κ,V
′
) = Vθarr(κ,V
′
) − V′ ≤ 0. (B.3)
Specifically, consider κθ = βλ/pθ. From (B.3) we have φθ(βλ/pθ,V
′
) ≤ 0. On
the other hand, it is trivially to observe φθ(κ, 0) > 0 for any κ > 0 and hence
φθ(βλ/pθ, 0) > 0. From Lemma B.1.1, for any θ ∈ Θ, φθ(βλ/pθ, ·) is a strictly de-
creasing function, hence there exists a unique Vθ ∈ (0,V
′
] such that
φθ
(
βλ
pθ
,Vθ
)
= 0.
Next, consider κ = βλ(1−γ). For each θ ∈ Θ, since φθ(·,Vθ) is decreasing, we have
φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) ≥ φθ(βλ/pθ,Vθ) = 0. Also, from (B.3) we have φθ(βλ(1 − γ),V
′
) ≤ 0.
Since φθ(βλ(1−γ), ·) is strictly decreasing, there exists unique Vθ ∈ [Vθ,V
′
] such that
φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) = 0.
Let V , maxθ∈Θ Vθ and V , maxθ∈Θ Vθ. Note that there exists θ
′ ∈ Θ such that
Vθ′ = V, and hence V = Vθ′ ≤ Vθ′ ≤ V.
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For any Vsw ∈ [V,V], and for each θ ∈ Θ, we define κθ(Vsw) as follows. First,
notice that since φθ(βλ/pθ, ·) is a decreasing function, we have
φθ
(
βλ
pθ
,Vsw
)
≤ φθ
(
βλ
pθ
,V
)
≤ φθ
(
βλ
pθ
,Vθ
)
= 0.
On the other hand, if Vsw ≥ Vθ, we have
φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vsw) ≥ φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) = 0.
By Lemma B.1.1, φθ(·,Vsw) is strictly decreasing, so there exists a unique κ ∈ [βλ(1−
γ), βλ/pθ] such that φθ(κ,Vsw) = 0, and we let κθ(Vsw) = κ. Otherwise Vθ < Vsw ≤ V,
and for all κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ], it must be that φθ(κ,Vsw) ≤ φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vsw) <
φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) = 0. In this case we let κθ(Vsw) = βλ(1 − γ).
Having defined κθ(Vsw), we let
βθ(Vsw) ,
∑
z∈Z,n∈N0
npiκθ(Vsw)(z, n).
We then let
ψ(Vsw) ,
∑
θ∈Θ
βθ(Vsw)pθ.
Consider θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ Vθ, we have
ψ(V) =
∑
θ∈Θ
βθ(V)pθ ≥ βθ′(V)pθ′ . (B.4)
Since θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ Vθ, we have Vsw(θ′) = V and φθ′(βλ/pθ′ ,V) =
φθ′(βλ/pθ′ ,Vsw(θ′)) = 0. Therefore κθ′(V) = βλ/pθ′ .
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Since βθ′(V) is the expected number of agents of MC(ξθ, κθ′(V)) in steady state,
from Lemma A.1.19, we can lower bound βθ′(V) with the expected number of
agents in an M/M/∞ queue M/M/∞(κθ′(V), λ), which gives
βθ′(V) ≥ κθ
′(V)
λ
=
β
pθ′
. (B.5)
Combining (B.4) and (B.5), we have ψ(V) ≥ β.
On the other hand, for each θ ∈ Θ, either V = Vθ or V > Vθ. If V = Vθ, we
have φ(βλ(1 − γ),V) = φ(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) = 0 and κθ(V) = βλ(1 − γ); otherwise V > Vθ,
and for all κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ], φθ(κ,V) < φθ(κ,Vθ) ≤ φθ(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) = 0 hence
κθ(V) = βλ(1 − γ). Therefore for each θ ∈ Θ, κ(V) = βλ(1 − γ).
For each θ ∈ Θ, since βθ(V) is the expected number of agents of MC(ξθ, κθ(V), by
Lemma A.1.19 we can upper bound βθ(V) with the expected number of agents of
an M/M/∞ queue M/M/∞(κθ(V), λ(1 − γ)), which gives
ψ(V) ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
κθ(V)
λ(1 − γ) pθ =
∑
θ∈Θ
βpθ = β.
In the next lemma, we show ψ(Vsw) is a continuous and strictly decreasing
function on Vsw ∈ [V,V].
Lemma B.1.2. ψ is continuous and strictly decreasing on Vsw ∈ [V,V].
Proof. We first show ψ is strictly decreasing. Consider Vsw,V ′sw that V ≤ V ′sw < Vsw ≤
V, and we would like to show for any θ ∈ Θ, κθ(Vsw) ≤ κθ(V ′sw), and there exists
θ′ ∈ Θ such that κθ(Vsw) < κθ(V ′sw).
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For each θ, if for any κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ], φθ(κ,V ′sw) < 0, then κθ(V ′sw) = βλ(1 −
γ), and for any κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ], since φ(κ, ·) is strictly decreasing, we have
φθ(κ,Vsw) < φθ(κ,V ′sw) < 0, which gives κθ(Vsw) = βλ(1 − γ) = κθ(V ′sw). On the other
hand, assume there exists κθ(V ′sw) ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ] such that φθ(κθ(V ′sw),V ′sw) = 0.
In this case, if for all κ ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ], φθ(κ,Vsw) < 0, then κθ(Vsw) = βλ(1 − γ)
and clearly κθ(Vsw) ≤ κθ(V ′sw); otherwise there exists κθ(Vsw) ∈ [βλ(1 − γ), βλ/pθ] such
that φθ(κθ(Vsw),Vsw) = 0, and we have
φθ(κθ(Vsw),Vsw) = 0 = φθ(κθ(V ′sw),V
′
sw) > φθ(κθ(V
′
sw),Vsw). (B.6)
Since φθ(·,Vsw) is decreasing, we have κθ(Vsw) < κθ(V ′sw). Therefore, for each θ ∈ Θ,
we have κθ(Vsw) ≤ κθ(V ′sw).
For θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ Vθ, since V ′sw < V, we have φθ′(βλ(1 − γ),V ′sw) > φθ′(βλ(1 −
γ),V) = φθ′(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ) = 0, hence it must hold that φθ(κθ(V ′sw),V ′sw) = 0. If Vsw < V,
we can similarly show φθ′(κθ′(Vsw),Vsw) = 0; otherwise Vsw = V = Vθ′ , we also have
κθ′(Vsw) = βλ(1 − γ) and φθ′(κθ′(Vsw),Vsw) = 0. Thus,
φθ′(κθ′(Vsw),Vsw) = 0 = φθ′(κθ′(V ′sw),V
′
sw) > φθ′(κθ′(V
′
sw),Vsw), (B.7)
and therefore κθ′(Vsw) < κθ′(V ′sw).
By Lemma A.1.5, βθ(V ′sw) ≤ βθ(Vsw) for all θ ∈ Θ and βθ′(V ′sw) < βθ′(Vsw) for
θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ Vθ. Therefore, we have ψ(V ′sw) < ψ(Vsw) so ψ is strictly decreasing.
Continuity is straightforward. For each θ, for Vsw ∈ [V,Vθ], since κθ(Vsw)
uniquely maximizes the function f (·) , −|φθ(·,Vsw)|, by Berge’s maximum theo-
rem, κθ(Vsw) is continuous with respect to Vsw, and since κθ(Vsw) = βλ(1 − γ) for all
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Vsw ∈ [Vθ,V], κθ(Vsw) is continous on Vsw ∈ [V,V]. By Lemma A.1.7, βθ(Vsw) is also
continuous in Vsw ∈ [V,V], and since Θ is finite ψ(Vsw) is also continuous.

Since ψ(Vsw) is continuous and strictly decreasing on [V,V], and ψ(V) ≤ β and
ψ(V) ≥ β, there exists unique V∗sw ∈ [V,V] such that ψ(V∗sw) = β. Let Vsw(ξ) = V∗sw. For
each θ ∈ Θ, let κθ(ξ) = κ(V∗sw) as defined above, let βθ(ξ) =
∑
z∈Z,n∈N0 npi
κθ(Vsw)(z, n), and
let Vθarr(ξ) = Vθarr(κθ(V∗sw),V∗sw).
Clearly {κθ(ξ)}θ∈Θ, {βθ(ξ)}θ∈Θ, {Vθarr(ξ)}θ∈Θ and Vsw(ξ) so defined satisfies (3.1), (3.2)
and (3.4) ∼ (3.7). Also, notice that for each θ ∈ Θ, if κθ(V∗sw) = βλ(1 − γ), (3.8) holds
directly. Otherwise, κθ(V∗sw) > βλ(1 − γ), and it must hold that φθ(κθ(V∗sw),V∗sw) = 0.
In this case, since φθ(κθ(V∗sw),V∗sw) = Vθarr(κθ(V∗sw),V∗sw)−V∗sw = Vθarr(ξ)−Vsw(ξ), we have
Vθarr(ξ) = Vsw(ξ) and (3.8) holds. To show (3.9) holds, for each θ ∈ Θ, first notice by
definition of κθ(V∗sw), 0 ≥ φθ(κθ(V∗sw),V∗sw) = Vθarr(κθ(V∗sw),V∗sw) − V∗sw = Vθarr(ξ) − Vsw(ξ)
hence Vθarr(ξ) ≤ Vsw(ξ). Finally we show there must exist θ′ such that Vθ′sw(ξ) = Vsw(ξ).
Consider θ′ ∈ argmaxθ∈Θ Vθ, if κθ′(V∗sw) > βλ(1 − γ) then by definition of κθ′(V∗sw) we
have φθ′(κθ′(V∗sw),V∗sw) = 0 and hence Vθ
′
sw(ξ) = Vsw(ξ). Otherwise κθ′(V∗sw) = βλ(1 − γ),
and it must be the case that V∗sw = V = Vθ′ , since if V∗sw < Vθ′ , we would have
φθ′(βλ(1 − γ),V∗sw) > φθ′(βλ(1 − γ),Vθ′) = 0,
which implies κθ′(V∗sw) > βλ(1− γ), leading to a contradiction. Now since V∗sw = V =
Vθ′ , we have κθ′(V∗sw) = βλ(1 − γ) and φθ′(κθ′(V∗sw),V∗sw) = 0 and Vθ′sw(ξ) = Vsw(ξ). Thus
we always have Vθ′sw(ξ) = Vsw(ξ) and (3.9) holds.
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We finished STEP 1. Next, we proceed to STEP 2. First, notice for any Marko-
vian strategy ξ and Vsw > 0, for each θ, we have κθ(Vsw) as defined above satisfies
κθ(Vsw) ≤ βλ/pθ.
We let
V
∗
,
1
1 − γ‖Fθ‖∞,
V∗θ , exp
(
− β
(1 − γ)pθ
) ∑
(z,n)∈S
βn(1 − γ)n
(1 + β/pθ + Ψθ)n+1(n + 1)!
piθres(z)F(z, n + 1) > 0,∀θ ∈ Θ,
V∗ , min
θ∈Θ
{
V∗θ
}
> 0,
where Ψθ = 1λ maxz∈Z
∑
y,z µ
θ
zy ∈ (0,∞), and piθres is the steady state distribution of the
resource process in a type-θ location.
For each θ ∈ Θ, using a similar argument of the proof of Lemma A.1.10, we can
show for any Markovian strategy profile ξ, any Vsw > 0 and any κθ ≤ βλ/pθ, we
have Vθarr(ξ) ≤ V
∗
. Hence we have Vsw(ξ) ≤ V∗ for any ξ.
On the other hand, for each θ ∈ Θ, using a similar argument of the proof of
Lemma A.1.11, we can show for any Markovian strategy profile ξ, any Vsw > 0
and any κθ ≤ βλ/pθ, we have Vθarr(ξ) ≥ V∗θ. Hence we have Vsw(ξ) ≥ V∗ for any ξ.
Similar to Appendix A.1.5, we define, for each θ ∈ Θ,
K0(θ) , inf
{
m : Fθ(z, n) <
(1 − γ)2
2
V∗ for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ m
}
,
K1(θ) , inf
n : exp
(
−1
8
√
n − 1
)
+
2√
log(n − 1) + γ
b
√
log(n−1)c(1 − γ) < (1 − γ)
2V∗
4‖Fθ‖∞
 ,
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and Kmax(θ) , max{4K0(θ)2 + 1,K1(θ)}. We define the set Π̂θ as:
Π̂θ = {ξθ ∈ Π : ξθ(z, n) = 0 for all z ∈ Z and n ≥ Kmax(θ)},
where Π still denotes the set of all Markovian Strategies.
Using similar arguments to the proof of Lemma A.1.12, we can showXθ(ξ) ⊆ Π̂θ
for each θ ∈ Θ, for any markovian strategy profile ξ. Let Π̂ , ×θ∈ΘΠ̂θ, and we have
for any Markovian strategy profile ξ, X(ξ) ∈ Π̂.
Next, note that ξ 7→ Vsw(ξ) is continuous since Vsw(ξ) maximizes −|ψ(·) − β| so
Berge’s maximum theorem implies continuity. Along with arguments similar to
that of Appendix A.1.6, we can show ξ 7→ Xθ(ξ) is upper hemicontinuous for each
θ ∈ Θ. Therefore ξ 7→ X(ξ) is also upper hemicontinuous. By Fan-Glicksberg fixed
point theorem, the correspondence ξ 7→ X(ξ) has a fixed point, which completes
the proof of the theorem.
Remark. This proof relies on the assumption that Fθ is a decreasing resource
sharing function for each θ ∈ Θ, which ensures strict monotoncity of ψ, hence
there exists a unique V∗sw such that ψ(V∗sw) = β. When this assumption does not
hold, there might exist more than one V∗sw such that ψ(V∗sw) = β. In this case, the
correspondence ξ 7→ ×θXθ(ξ) is not well defined. There may exist other ways to
construct a correspondence whose fixed points correspond to mean field equilib-
ria when not all Fθ is decreasing, and by proving existence of a fixed point for that
correspondence one can show existence of mean field equilibria for more general
resouce sharing functions. Currently, this remains an open problem.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3.1
Proof. Let φ be an arbitrary persuasive straightforward signaling scheme, where
for any S ⊆ [N], φ(S |θ) is the probability of recommending agents in S to move,
condition on resource state is θ. We construct another straightforward signaling
scheme φ′ where φ′(S |1) = φ(S |1) for all S ⊆ [N]; φ′(∅|0) = 1 and φ′(S |0) = 0 for all
S ⊆ [N] and S , {∅}. We would show φ′ is also persuasive and achieves at least
the same social welfare as φ. The expected social welfare under φ is
∑
θ=0,1,S⊆[N]
µ(θ)φ(S |θ)W(θ, S )
=
∑
θ=0,1,S⊆[N]
φ(θ, S )W(θ, S )
=
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(1, S )W(1, S ) +
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(0, S )W(0, S )
=
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(1, S )W(1, S ) −
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(0, S )
∑
i∈S
r(i)
≤
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(1, S )W(1, S )
=
∑
S⊆[N]
φ′(1, S )W(1, S ) + φ′(0,∅)W(0,∅)
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=
∑
θ=0,1,S⊆[N]
φ′(θ, S )W(θ, S ),
which is the social welfare under φ′.
Next, we show (Σ, φ′) satisfies the persuasive constraints (4.3) and (4.4). For
each agent i, since φ′(S |0) = 0 for S , ∅ and φ′(S |1) = φ(S |1) for any subset S , we
have
∑
θ,S :i∈S
φ′(θ, S )(θF(|S |) − r(i))
=
∑
S :i∈S
φ′(1, S )(F(|S |) − r(i))
=
∑
S :i∈S
φ(1, S )(F(|S |) − r(i))
≥ − r(i)
∑
S :i∈S
φ(0, S ) +
∑
S :i∈S
φ(1, S )(F(|S |) − r(i))
=
∑
θ,S :i∈S
φ(θ, S )(θF(|S |) − r(i))
≥0,
where the last inequality is because φ is persuasive. Therefore we have shown
(4.3) holds for agent i.
On the other hand, for each agent i, we have
∑
θ,S :i<S
φ′(θ, S )(θF(|S | + 1) − r(i))
= − r(i)
∑
S :i<S
φ′(0, S ) +
∑
S :i<S
φ′(1, S )(F(|S | + 1) − r(i))
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= − r(i)µ(0) +
∑
S :i<S
φ(1, S )(F(|S | + 1) − r(i))
≤ − r(i)
∑
S :i<S
φ(0, S ) +
∑
S :i<S
φ(1, S )(F(|S | + 1) − r(i))
=
∑
θ,S :i<S
φ(θ, S )(θF(|S | + 1) − r(i))
≤0,
where the first inequality is because
∑
S :i<S φ(0, S ) ≤ µ(0), and the last inequality
holds because φ is persuasive. Thus we have shown (4.4) holds for agent i.

C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3.2
Proof. Let S be the random subset of agents recommended to move under φ. For
each agent i, let Xi = 1{i ∈ S} be the random variable denoting that agent i is rec-
ommended to move. Let P and E denote the probability measure and expectation
induced by φ.
Since pik = P(|S| = k, i ∈ S|θ = 1) = P(|S| = k|θ = 1)P(i ∈ S||S| = k, θ = 1), and
k = E
 N∑
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣|S| = k, θ = 1
 = N∑
i=1
E[Xi||S| = k, θ = 1] =
N∑
i=1
P(i ∈ S||S| = k, θ = 1),
we have
N∑
i=1
pik = P(|S| = k|θ = 1)
N∑
i=1
P(i ∈ S||S| = k, θ = 1) = kP(|S| = k|θ = 1),
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and therefore P(|S| = k|θ = 1) = ∑Ni=1 pik/k.
The objective (4.2) of (LP.1) can be written as
µ(0)
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(S |θ)W(0, S ) + µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(S |θ)W(1, S )
=µ(0)φ(∅|0)W(0,∅) + µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N]
|S |F(|S |) −∑
i∈S
r(i)

=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
∑
S :|S |=k
φ(S |1)
kF(k) −∑
i∈S
r(i)

=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
kF(k)
∑
S :|S |=k
φ(S |1) − µ(1)
N∑
k=1
∑
S :|S |=k
φ(S |1)
∑
i∈S
r(i)
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
kF(k)P(|S| = k|θ = 1) − µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
r(i)
∑
S :|S |=k,i∈S
φ(S |1)
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
kF(k)
N∑
i=1
pik
k
− µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
r(i)pik
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik(F(k) − r(i)).
Next, we write the persuasive constraints in terms of the pik’s. For each agent
i, the left hand side of (4.3) can be written as∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S :i∈S
φ(S |θ)(θF(|S |) − r(i))
=µ(1)
∑
S :i∈S
φ(S |1)(F(|S |) − r(i))
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
∑
S :|S |=k,i∈S
φ(S |1)(F(k) − r(i))
=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
(F(k) − r(i))
∑
S :|S |=k,i∈S
φ(S |1)
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=µ(1)
N∑
k=1
pik(F(k) − r(i)).
Therefore for agent i, constraint (4.3) is equivalent as
N∑
k=1
pik(F(k) − r(i)) ≥ 0.
On the other hand, for each agent i, the left hand side of (4.4) can be written as∑
θ=0,1
µ(θ)
∑
S :i<S
φ(S |θ)(θF(|S | + 1) − r(i))
= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
∑
S :i<S
φ(S |1)(F(|S | + 1) − r(i))
= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
∑
S :|S |=k,i<S
φ(S |1)(F(k + 1) − r(i))
= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
 ∑
S :|S |=k
φ(S |1)(F(k + 1) − r(i)) −
∑
S :|S |=k,i∈S
φ(S |1)(F(k + 1) − r(i))

= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
(F(k + 1) − r(i))
∑
S :|S |=k
φ(S |1) − µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F(k + 1) − r(i))
∑
S :|S |=k,i∈S
φ(S |1)
= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=0
(F(k + 1) − r(i))P(|S| = k|θ = 1) − µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F(k + 1) − r(i))pik
= − µ(0)r(i) − µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F(k + 1) − r(i))pik + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F(k + 1) − r(i))P(|S| = k|θ = 1)
+ µ(1)(F(1) − r(i))P(|S| = 0|θ = 1)
= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F(k + 1) − r(i))(P(|S| = k|θ = 1) − pik)
+ µ(1)(F(1) − r(i))
1 − N∑
k=1
P(|S| = k|θ = 1)

= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)
N−1∑
k=1
(F(k + 1) − r(i))
 N∑
i=1
pik
k
− pik

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+ µ(1)(F(1) − r(i))
1 − N∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
pik
k

= − µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)

1 − N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
p jk
 (F(1) − r(i)) + N−1∑
k=1
1k
N∑
j=1
p jk − pik
 (F(k + 1) − r(i))
Therefore for agent i, constraint (4.4) is equivalent as
−µ(0)r(i) + µ(1)

1 − N∑
k=1
1
k
N∑
j=1
p jk
 (F(1) − r(i)) + N−1∑
k=1
1k
N∑
j=1
p jk − pik
 (F(k + 1) − r(i))
 ≤ 0

C.1.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3.3
Proof. For any k > 0, [68] presents a sequential elimination subroutine that
eliminates one agent from agents 1, . . . ,N at each step, and output the remain-
ing k agents, ensuring the probability each agent i is included in the sample is
kpik/
∑N
i=1 pik, so long as (4.9) holds for pik’s.
Specifically, at each step n = N − 1,N − 2, . . . , k, this subroutine computes pi(i|n)
for each i ∈ [N] in the following way. It first computes for each i the quantity
npik∑N
i=1 pik
.
For each agent i such that this quantity is larger than 1, it assigns this quantity to
pi(i|n). It then recomputes this quantity for remaining agents, with the multiplier
in the numerator being the number of remaining agents instead of n. This process
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is repeated until for all i ∈ [N], pi(i|n) is in [0, 1]. After this process, some pi(i|n) is
equal to 1 and others are strictly proportional to pik.
This subroutine then computes for each i ∈ [N]
rni =

1 − pi(i|n), if n = N − 1;
1 − pi(i|n)
pi(i|n+1) , if n < N − 1.
For each n, let S n be the set of remaining agents at the beginning of step n, it can
be verified {rni}i∈S n is a valid probability distribution, and this subroutine samples
one agent according to this distribution and eliminate this agent from the pool. If
(4.9) holds, this subroutine ensures after the final step k, the probability each agent
i is included in the sample is kpik/
∑N
i=1 pik = qik.
The rest of the proof of this lemma is given in the main paper.

C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First we show F(i∗) ≥ r(i∗). This claim holds trivially when i∗ = 0. Assume
i∗ ≥ 1 and assume for contradiction F(i∗) < r(i∗). We have
W˜(i∗) − W˜(i∗ − 1)
=i∗F(i∗) −
i∗∑
j=1
r( j) −
(i∗ − 1)∗F(i∗ − 1) − i∗−1∑
j=1
r( j)

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=(i∗ − 1)(F(i∗) − F(i∗ − 1)) + F(i∗) − r(i∗)
≤F(i∗) − r(i∗)
<0.
Therefore i∗ is not maximizer of W˜, leading to a contradiction.
Let x be the probability distribution over the subsets of [N] such that
x({1, . . . , i∗}) = 1 and x(S ) = 0 for any other S ⊆ [N]. To show recommending
the agents to follow the social optimal strategy profile is persuasive, it suffices to
show x satisfies the constraints of the linear program (LP.1).
For agent i ≤ i∗, x(S ) = 0 for all S such that i < S so the second constraint in
(LP.1) is satisfied. Also,
∑
S :i∈S
x(S )(F(|S |) − r(i)) = x({1, . . . , i∗})(F(i∗) − r(i)) = F(i∗) − r(i) ≥ F(i∗) − r(i∗) ≥ 0,
hence the first constraint is also satisfied.
On the other hand, for agent i > i∗, x(S ) = 0 for all S such that i ∈ S so the first
constraint in (LP.1) is satisfied. Also,
∑
S :i<S
x(S )(F(|S | + 1) − r(i))
=F(i∗ + 1) − r(i)
≤F(i∗ + 1) − r(i∗ + 1)
≤r(i
∗ + 1)
µ(1)
− r(i∗ + 1)
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=
µ(0)
µ(1)
r(i∗ + 1)
≤µ(0)
µ(1)
r(i),
so the second constraint is satisfied. Therefore x is persuasive.
The social welfare corresponding to x is µ(1)W˜(i∗). Note that for any S ⊆ [N],
|S |F(|S |) −
∑
i∈S
r(i) ≤ |S |F(|S |) −
|S |∑
i=1
r(i) = W˜(|S |) ≤ W˜(i∗).
Therefore for any signaling scheme φ, the social welfare with respect to φ is
µ(0)
∑
S⊆{[N]}
φ(S |0)
−∑
i∈S
r(i)
 + µ(1) ∑
S⊆[N]
φ(S |1)
|S |F(|S |) −∑
i∈S
r(i)

≤µ(1)
∑
S⊆[N]
φ(S |1)W˜(i∗)
≤µ(1)W˜(i∗),
hence x gives the optimal signaling mechanism.

C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Since agent i is randomizing between moving and staying in equilibrium,
assuming all other agents follow the given strategy profile, she should be indif-
ferent in moving and staying, hence the expected payoff for agent i choosing to
move should be equal to r(i). Let N−i j be the number of agents who choose to
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move besides agent i and j, we have
q(p jE[F(N−i j + 2)] + (1 − p j)E[F(N−i j + 1)]) = r(i)
⇒p j = E[F(N−i j + 1)] − r(i)/qE[F(N−i j + 1) − F(N−i j + 2)] .
Similarly, agent j is indifferent in moving and staying given other agents’ strate-
gies, which gives
pi =
E[F(N−i j + 1)] − r( j)/q
E[F(N−i j + 1) − F(N−i j + 2)] . (C.1)
Since F is decreasing, E[F(N−i j + 1) − F(N−i j + 2)] > 0 and r(i) ≤ r( j) implies pi ≤
p j. 
C.1.6 Proof of Lemma 4.4.1
Proof. For any t ∈ [i(q), i(q)], let p = t+1−dte. We consider the utility for each agent
i choosing to move assuming all other agents follow their strategy in the threshold
equilibrium.
For i < dte, agent i’ s expected utility for moving is
q(pF(dte) + (1 − p)F(dte − 1)) ≥ qF(dte) ≥ F(i(q)) ≥ r(i(q)) ≥ r(i),
hence she has no incentive to alter her strategy in the threshold equilibrium.
For agent dte, her expected utility for moving is qF(dte). If t > i(q), we have
i(q) < dte ≤ i(q), and by definition of i(q) and i(q), we have qF(dte) = r(dte) so agent
dte would not alter her strategy. On the other hand, if t = i(q), by definition of
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i(q) we know agent dte would also choose to move, same as her strategy in the
threshold equilibrium.
Finally, for agent i > dte, her expected utility for moving is q(pF(dte + 1) + (1 −
p)F(dte)). In the case t > i(q), this utility is upper bounded by qF(dte) ≤ qF(i(q)+ 1);
and in the case t = i(q), we have p = 1 and the utility for moving is also qF(i(q)+1).
We have qF(i(q) + 1) ≤ r(i(q) + 1) ≤ r(i) so agent i would not alter her equilibrium
strategy, which completes the proof for (i).
The “only if” part is straightforward and we omit the details. 
C.1.7 Proof of Theorem 4.4.1
Proof. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma C.1.1. W(q, n) is concave in n and W(q, i(q)) ≥ W(q, i(q) + 1).
Proof. Concavity is straightforward since nF(n) is concave and r(i)’s are increasing
in i so −∑ni=1 r(i) is also concave. To show W(q, i(q)) ≥ W(q, i(q) + 1), we have
W(q, i(q) + 1) −W(q, i(q))
=q(i(q) + 1)F(i(q) + 1) −
i(q)+1∑
i=1
r(i) −
qi(q)F(i(q)) − i(q)∑
i=1
r(i)

=qi(q)(F(i(q) + 1) − F(i(q))) + qF(i(q) + 1) − r(i(q) + 1)
≤0,
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where the inequality is from qF(i(q) + 1) ≤ r(i(q) + 1) and F is decreasing. 
Let p = (p1, . . . , pN) be an arbitrary equilibrium strategy profile under belief q.
Define I1, I0 and Imix as: I1 , {1 ≤ i ≤ N : pi = 1}, I0 , {1 ≤ i ≤ N : pi = 0}
and Imix , {1 ≤ i ≤ N : 0 < pi < 1}, denoting the agents who moves, stays and
randomizes between moving and staying. Recall W(q, p) denote the principal’s
expected utility with respect to belief q and this strategy profile. We aim to show
W(q, p) ≤ W(q, i(q)).
We have
W(q, p) =
∑
S⊆Imix
∏
j∈S
p j
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1 − p j)
q(|S | + |I1|)F(|S | + |I1|) − ∑
j∈I1∪S
r( j)

≤
∑
S⊆Imix
∏
j∈S
p j
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1 − p j)
q(|S | + |I1|)F(|S | + |I1|) − |I1 |+|S |∑
j=1
r( j)
 (C.2)
=
|Imix |∑
n=0
q(|I1| + n)F(|I1| + n) − |I1 |+n∑
j=1
r( j)
 ∑
S⊆Imix:|S |=n
∏
j∈S
p j
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1 − p j)
=
|Imix |∑
n=0
W(q, |I1| + n)
∑
S⊆Imix:|S |=n
∏
j∈S
p j
∏
j∈Imix\S
(1 − p j).
The inequality is from that r(i)’s are increasing in i. Let X be the number of
agents in Imix that chooses to move. The right-hand side of the last equality of
(C.2) equals E[W(q, |I1| + X)]. Since W is concave, by Jensen’s inequality we have
E[W(q, |I1| + X)] ≤ W(q, |I1| + E[X]). (C.3)
Therefore, U(p1, . . . , pN) ≤ W(q, |I1| + E[X]). Next, we show |I1| + E[X] ≥ i(q) in
Lemma C.1.2.
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Lemma C.1.2. |I1| + E[X] ≥ i(q).
Proof. Define G(n) , qF(n), n ∈ [N]. Since G is convex, by Jensen’s inequality, we
have
G(|I1| + E[X] + 1) ≤ E[G(|I1| + X + 1)]. (C.4)
For any agent i ∈ I0, her expected utility if she chooses to move is E[G(|I1| +
X + 1)]. Since she prefers staying, we have E[G(|I1| + X + 1)] ≤ r(i). On the other
hand, for any agent i ∈ Imix, let X(i) denote the number of agents in Imix besides
agent i who chooses to move. Agent i’s expected utility if she chooses to move
is E[G(|I1| + X(i) + 1)]. Since agent i is indifferent in moving and staying, we have
E[G(|I1|+X(i)+1)] = r(i). Clearly X(i) 4sd X where “sd” denotes first-order stochastic
dominance, and sinceG is a decreasing function, we haveG(|I1|+X+1) 4sd G(|I1|+
X(i) + 1). Therefore E[G(|I1| + X + 1)] ≤ E[G(|I1| + X(i) + 1)] = r(i). Summarizing the
above, we have
E[G(|I1| + X + 1)] ≤ min
i∈I0∪Imix
r(i). (C.5)
Let j , minI0 ∪ Imix and we show it must hold that j ≤ i(q). Assume, for contra-
diction, j > i(q). First observe that since j is the agent in I0∪Imix with the smallest
index, it must hold j ≤ |I1| + 1, which implies |I1| ≥ j − 1 ≥ i(q). Meanwhile, if
j ∈ I0, we have r( j) = E[G(|I1| + X( j) + 1)] ≤ G(|I1| + 1); and if j ∈ Imix, we have
r( j) ≤ E[G(|I1| + X + 1)] ≤ G(|I1| + 1). Therefore,
r(i(q) + 1) ≤ r( j) ≤ G(|I1| + 1) ≤ G(i(q) + 1).
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However by definition of i(q) it must be that G(i(q) + 1) < r(i(q) + 1), which leads
to a contradiction.
From j ≤ i(q), along with (C.4) and (C.5), we have
G(|I1| + E[X] + 1) ≤ E[G(|I1| + X + 1] ≤ r( j) ≤ r(i(q)).
By definition of i(q) we have G(i(q)) ≥ r(i(q)). In the case G(i(q)) > r(i(q)), we have
G(i(q)) > G(|I1| + E[X] + 1) hence |I1| + E[X] + 1 > i(q) since G is decreasing. Note
when G(i(q)) > r(i(q)), i(q) = i(q), so we have |I1| + E[X] ≥ i(q). On the other hand,
if G(i(q)) = r(i(q)), we have i(q) < i(q) so |I1| + E[X] + 1 ≥ i(q) > i(q) and we also get
|I1| + E[X] ≥ i(q). 
By Lemma C.1.1, W(i) is decreasing on i ≥ i(q). Since |I1| + E[X] ≥ i(q) we have
W(q, |I1| + E[X]) ≤ W(q, i(q)). Along with (C.2), (C.3) and Lemma C.1.2 we have
W(q, p) ≤ E[W(q, |I1| + X)] ≤ W(q,I1| + E[X]) ≤ W(q, i(q)),
completing the proof.

C.2 Upper Bound of µ(1)
In this section, we compute the upper bound r(i∗ + 1)/F(i∗ + 1) for µ(1) given in
Proposition 3, which ensures recommending the agents following the social op-
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timal strategy profile is persuasive, for several typical resource sharing functions
and cost structures.
Specifically, we consider cost function F(i) = 1/iα for α = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, with
different α controlling the curvature of F and representing different resource shar-
ing scenarios. We consider 3 different cost structures: constant costs , linear costs,
and quadratic costs. We fix the total number of agents N = 20 since i∗ does not
depend on N. The result is given in Table C.1.
C.3 Additional Computational Results
In this section, we present computational results on how much social welfare can
be generated by the optimal private and public signaling mechanism under dif-
ferent priors. We consider three different resource sharing function F(i) = 1/iα for
α = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9; and three different cost structures: constant costs where r(i) = 0.25,
linear costs where r(i) = 0.05i and quadratic costs where r(i) = 0.01i2, and r is the
cost coefficient. The results are given in Figure C.1.
159
α
r
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.811 0.808
0.4 1 1 1 0.621 0.628 0.653 0.666 0.696 0.698 0.776
0.6 1 0.422 0.44 0.459 0.483 0.58 0.531 0.606 0.682 0.758
0.8 0.237 0.241 0.261 0.348 0.435 0.522 0.609 0.696 0.783 0.871
(a) Resource sharing function F(i) = 1/iα, with constant costs r(i) = 0.5r.
α
r
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 1 1 0.836 0.869 0.888 0.838 0.849 0.826 0.93 0.859
0.4 0.617 0.648 0.65 0.735 0.762 0.737 0.666 0.761 0.857 0.696
0.6 0.464 0.45 0.527 0.525 0.459 0.551 0.643 0.464 0.521 0.58
0.8 0.252 0.243 0.364 0.289 0.361 0.433 0.506 0.279 0.313 0.348
(b) Resource sharing function F(i) = 1/iα, with linear costs r(i) = 0.1ri.
α
r
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2 0.891 0.947 0.951 1 0.97 0.868 1 0.824 0.927 1
0.4 0.631 0.78 0.64 0.854 0.737 0.885 0.666 0.761 0.857 0.952
0.6 0.446 0.63 0.633 0.525 0.657 0.441 0.515 0.588 0.662 0.735
0.8 0.302 0.362 0.291 0.388 0.485 0.26 0.303 0.347 0.39 0.433
(c) Resource sharing function F(i) = 1/iα, with quadratic costs r(i) = 0.02ri2.
Table C.1: The upper bound r(i∗ + 1)/F(i∗ + 1) of µ(1) for the private signaling
mechanism that recommends every agent to stay when θ = 0 and recommends
the first i∗ agents to move when θ = 1 to be optimal, given by Proposition 3, for
different resource sharing functions and cost structures.
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(a) Constant costs: r(i) = 0.25.
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(b) Linear costs: r(i) = 0.05i.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
µ(1)
0
1
2
3
4
W
el
fa
re
 / 
N
o-
in
fo
 W
el
fa
re
F(i) = 1/i 0. 2
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
µ(1)
0
1
2
3
4
W
el
fa
re
 / 
N
o-
in
fo
 W
el
fa
re
F(i) = 1/i 0. 5
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
µ(1)
0
1
2
3
4
W
el
fa
re
 / 
N
o-
in
fo
 W
el
fa
re
F(i) = 1/i 0. 9
optimal private
optimal public
full information
social optimal
(c) Quadratic costs: r(i) = 0.01i2.
Figure C.1: Social welfare of the optimal signaling mechanisms and the bench-
marks, under different prior beliefs, for different resource sharing and cost func-
tions. In all experiments, N = 20.
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